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Preface
This volume contains the proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Formal Aspects of
Component Software (FACS09). FACS’09 was held in Eindhoven, the Netherlands on November
2-3, 2009 as a satellite event of the Formal Methods Week.
The objective of FACS’09 is to bring together researchers in the areas of component software and
formal methods to promote a deep understanding of this paradigm and its applications. Component-
based software has emerged as a promising paradigm to deal with the ever increasing need for mas-
tering systems’ complexity, for enabling evolution and reuse, and for bringing sound production and
engineering standards into software engineering. However, many issues in component-based soft-
ware development remain open and pose challenging research questions. Formal methods consist
of mathematically-based techniques for the specification, development and verification of software
and hardware systems. They have shown their great utility for setting up the formal foundations
of component software and working out challenging issues such as mathematical models for compo-
nents, their composition and adaptation, or rigorous approaches to verification, deployment, testing
and certification.
FACS’09 is the 6th event in a series of workshops, founded by the International Institute for
Software Technology of the United Nations University (UNU-IIST). The first FACS workshop was
co-located with FM’03 (Pisa, Italy, September 2003). The following FACS workshops were organ-
ised as standalone events, respectively at UNU-IIST in Macau (October 2005), at Charles University
in Prague (September 2006), at INRIA in Sophia-Antipolis (September 2007), and at University of
Ma´laga in Spain (September 2008).
FACS’09 was scheduled as part of the first Formal Methods Week (FMweek), to be hosted by
Technische Universiteit Eindhoven in Eindhoven, the Netherlands, in November 2009. The sci-
entific program includes 13 regular papers and 2 invited talks, delivered by Gert Do¨hmen from
AIRBUS Deutschland GmbH, Hamburg, Germany and by Jan Rutten from CWI, Amsterdam, the
Netherlands. Each paper was reviewed by at least three Program Committee members. The entire
reviewing process was supported by the EasyChair Conference System.
We would like to express our gratitude to all the researchers who submitted their work to the
workshop and to all colleagues who served on the Program Committee and helped us in preparing
a high-quality workshop program. We are also most grateful to the invited speakers for the willing-
ness to present their research and to share their own perspectives on formal methods for component
software at the workshop.
Without the support of TU Eindhoven, CWI and UNU-IIST this workshop could not have
happened. We are most grateful to all organizing institutions and staff for supporting FACS and
providing an organizational framework for the workshop. In particular, we are deeply indebted to
Erik de Vink and Tijn Borghuis at TU Eindhoven, Jos van der Werf and Jan Schipper at CWI, and
Kitty Chan Iok Sam at UNU-IIST Macau, for their help in managing the practical aspects of this
event.
Sun Meng and Bernhard Scha¨tz
FACS’09 PC Chairs
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Component-based design for avionics systems
Gert Do¨hmen
AIRBUS Operations GmbH
HAMBURG, Germany
Email: gert.doehmen@airbus.com
Abstract
Current trend in aeronautics goes from system-specific avionics to a network of standardized processing-
and I/O-modules, so-called Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA) platform, which can host different systems.
It necessitates advanced processes and methods to provide a cost-efficient development of software-intensive
systems. The talk will discuss current and future IMA and how a component-based approach can pave the
way from functional and extra-functional requirements of a system to its implementation to be hosted by
IMA.
This paper is electronically published in
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science
URL: www.elsevier.nl/locate/entcs
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Coalgebraic Methods for Component
Connectors
Jan Rutten
CWI
Amsterdam, the Netherlands
Email: Jan.Rutten@cwi.nl
Abstract
We present a small toolset of coalgebraic structures and methods (mainly streams, Mealy automata, and
coinduction) and illustrate their use in the modelling of component connectors.
This paper is electronically published in
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science
URL: www.elsevier.nl/locate/entcs
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Action Prefixes: Reified Synchronization Paths in
Minimal Component Interaction Automata
Markus Lumpe1
Faculty of Information & Communication Technologies, Swinburne University of Technology
P.O. Box 218, Hawthorn, VIC 3122, AUSTRALIA
Abstract
Component Interaction Automata provide a fitting model to capture and analyze the temporal facets of hierarchical-structured
component-oriented software systems. However, the rules governing composition, as is typical for all automata-based ap-
proaches, suffer from combinatorial state explosion, an effect that can have significant ramifications on the successful appli-
cation of the Component Interaction Automata formalism to real-world scenarios. We must, therefore, find some appropriate
means to counteract state explosion – one of which is partition refinement through weak bisimulation. But, while this tech-
nique can yield the desired state space reduction, it does not consider synchronization cliques, i.e., groups of states that
are interconnected solely by internal synchronization transitions. Synchronization cliques give rise to action prefixes that
capture pre-conditions for a component’s ability to interact with the environment. Current practice does not pay attention
to these cliques, but ignoring them can result in a loss of valuable information. For this reason we show, in this paper, how
synchronization cliques emerge and how we can capture their behavior in order to make state space reduction aware of the
presence of synchronization cliques.
Keywords: Component Interaction Automata, Partition Refinement, Emerging Properties
1 Introduction
Component-based software engineering has become the prevalent trend in present-day soft-
ware and system engineering [6]. In this approach the focus is on well-defined interfaces
[3,7,11,26] that provide appropriate means for decomposing an engineered system into log-
ical and interacting entities, the components, and constructing their respective aggregations,
the composites, to yield the desired system functionality at matching levels of abstraction
and granularity. Moreover, according to this technique, new components are created by
combining pre-existing ones with new software, the glue [24], using only the information
published in the interface specifications of the components being composed.
Component interfaces can convey a variety of information [1] that collectively form a
contractual specification. Ideally, all assumptions about a component’s environment should
be stated explicitly and formally as part of the interface specification [25]. However, even
though interfaces must be organized in such a way that contractual specifications guarantee
safe deployment in new contexts, the information contained in these interfaces must not
1 Email: mlumpe@swin.edu.au
This paper is electronically published in
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science
URL: www.elsevier.nl/locate/entcs
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provide any instruments to circumvent component encapsulation. On the other hand, the
purpose of contractual specifications is to prevent errors, at both design time and run-time.
Therefore, component contracts should impose a well-balanced set of constraints to enforce
contractual obligations, but must be defined in a manner so that the reasons why a particular
contract verification has failed are self-evident [4].
In this paper, we are concerned with the specification of behavioral and synchroniza-
tion contracts [1] between interacting components. In particular, we study the effectiveness
of Component Interaction Automata [2,5], an automata-based modeling language for the
specification of hierarchical-structured component-based systems. Components synchro-
nize through answering mutual service requests. However, some service requests should
only occur in certain situations [23] depending on the component’s readiness to satisfy a
given request (pre-condition) and its cumulative interaction profile (post-condition). The
description of these temporal aspects corresponds best to finite automata in which accept-
able service requests are modeled as state transitions between activating sets (i.e., states of
the modeling automaton) [23].
Unfortunately, automata-based formalisms suffer from combinatorial state explosion, a
major obstacle to the successful application of these approaches for the specification of the
interactive behavior in component-based systems. More precisely, to capture the complete
behavior of an automata-based system, we need to construct the product automaton of the
system’s individual components [10]. This operation exhibits exponential space and time
complexity and the resource consumption quickly reaches a level at which an effective
specification of a composite system is not feasible anymore [13]. We need, therefore,
workable abstraction methods that allow for a reduction of the composite state space at
acceptable costs.
For this reason, we have developed a bisimulation-based partition refinement algorithm
for Component Interaction Automata [13]. Partition refinement [9,20] is a state space re-
duction technique that, driven by a corresponding equivalence relation, merges separate
equivalent states into one unifying representative. On termination, partition refinement
yields a new automaton that reproduces the behavior of the original one up to the defined
equivalence, but isminimal (i.e., a fixed-point) with respect to the number of required states.
Partition refinement can effectively reduce the size and complexity of composite com-
ponent interaction automata [13]. There are, however, instances in which partition refine-
ment produces unexpected outcomes. In particular, we observe a frequent appearance of
new, non-deterministic transitions in minimal composite component interaction automata,
even when there were none before. These non-determistic transitions can cause harm, as
their elimination may require exponentially more states [10], which is clearly not a desir-
able scenario.
Upon closer inspection we find that these new non-deterministic transitions are directly
linked to states with internal component synchronizations that become unified as result
of partition refinement. Following network theory [17], these states form synchronization
cliques, groups of states, that embed in their structure regular sublanguages over an alpha-
bet of internal component synchronizations. The sentences of these regular sublanguages
serve as prefixes (or pre-conditions) in the interface of a given composite component in-
teraction automaton. Before refinement, these prefixes are woven into the fabric of the
composite automaton. Partition refinement, however, is blind for this additional informa-
tion, as, independent of its presence, observable equivalence is always preserved between
6
M. Lumpe
the original and the reduced automaton.
Synchronization cliques are intrinsic to automata-based approaches that enumerate in-
ternal synchronization actions [6,2,5,14,27] rather than modeling them by τ – a perfect ac-
tion [16]. As a consequence, an external observer can monitor not only the occurrences of
internal synchronizations (through the passing of time), but also the order in which actions
actually trigger the internal synchronizations. We can capture the alternating sequences
of states and internal synchronization actions in synchronization paths [5,13]. However,
weak bisimulation is an equivalence relation that abstracts from internal actions, resulting
in a loss of information, including the ability to monitor the sequence of internal synchro-
nizations. We show, in this paper, that we can recover this information by representing the
existing synchronization paths in a system as action prefixes in the corresponding reduced
component interaction automaton.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we review the Component
Interaction Automata formalism and demonstrate its expressive power on a tailored ver-
sion of a simple e-commerce application. We proceed by developing the core ingredients
of observable equivalence and partition refinement for component interaction automata in
Section 3 and construct, in Section 4, the machinery to distill action prefixes from syn-
chronization cliques. We discuss possible implications of the existence of synchronization
cliques in Section 5 and conclude with a brief summary of our main observations and an
outlook to future work in Section 6.
2 The Component Interaction Automata Modeling Language
I/O Automata [14], Interface Automata [6], and Team Automata [27] have all emerged as
light-weight contenders for capturing concisely the temporal aspects of component-based
software systems. These formalisms use an automata-based language to represent both
the assumptions about a system’s environment and the order in which interactions with the
environment can occur. However, none of these models cater directly for multiple instan-
tiations of the same component within a single system or allow for a more fine-grained
specification of hierarchical relationships between organizational entities in a system.
These restrictions have been relaxed in Component Interaction Automata [2,5]. In this
approach we find two new concepts: a hierarchy of component names and structured la-
bels. The former provides us with a means to record the architecture of a composite system,
whereas the latter paves the way to specify the action, the originating component, and the
target component in the transitions of component interaction automata, a feature that al-
lows us to disambiguate multiple occurrences of the same component (or action) within a
single system. Specifically, the Component Interaction Automata formalism supports three
forms of structured labels: (−, a, n), receive a from the environment as input at compo-
nent n, (n, a,−), send a from component n as output to the environment, and (n1, a, n2),
components n1 and n2 synchronize internally through action a.
TheComponent Interaction Automata formalism uses component identifiers to uniquely
identify specific component instances in a given system. However, a given component
identifier can occur at most once in a composite component interaction automaton. This re-
quirement addresses a frequent difficulty in the specification of component-based systems
– the difference between components and component instances [12]. The I/O Automata
and Interface Automata formalisms, for example, do not distinguish between components
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and their instances. Every specification involves only instances. It is for this reason that
all actions of composed components have to be pairwise disjoined [6,14] (i.e., a single
component can occur at most once in a composite system). In contrast, the Component In-
teraction Automata formalism distinguishes between components and their instances. Each
component is instantiated with a unique identifier that we use also to disambiguate the cor-
responding component transitions. Consider, for example, a component C that defines an
input via action a and two instances of C, named A and B. Then the structured labels for
the input transitions ofA andB are (−, a, A) and (−, a, B), respectively. The unique com-
ponent identifiers A and B are what allows for the safe coexistence of multiple instances
of the same component (or action) in a given system.
We presuppose an infinite set A of component identifiers. A hierarchy of component
names is defined as follows [5]:
Definition 2.1 A hierarchy of component names H is defined recursively by
• H = (a1, ..., an), where a1, ..., an ∈ A are pairwise disjoint component identifiers and
S(H) = ∪ni=1{ai} denoting the set of component identifiers of H;
• H = (H1, ...,Hm), whereH1, ...,Hm are hierarchies of component identifiers satisfying
∀ 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m, i 6= j : S(Hi) ∩ S(Hj) = ∅ and S(H) = ∪mi=1S(Hi) denoting the set
of component identifiers of H .
Definition 2.2 A component interaction automaton C is a quintuple (Q,Act , δ, I,H)where:
• Q is a finite set of states,
• Act is a finite set of actions,
• δ ⊆ Q×Σ×Q is a finite set of labeled transitions, where Σ ⊆ {(S(H)∪ {−}×Act ×
S(H) ∪ {−})}\ {({−} ×Act × {−})} is the set of structured labels induced by C,
• I ⊆ Q is a non empty set of initial states, and
• H is a tuple denoting C’s hierarchical composition structure.
Each component interaction automaton is further characterized by two sets of P ⊆ Act ,
the provided actions, and R ⊆ Act , the required actions, which capture the automaton’s
enabled interface with an environment. We write CPR to denote an automaton C that is
input-enabled in P and output-enabled in R.
In the original definition [2,5], the set of provided actions P and the set of required
actions R originate from a secondary specification outside the Component Interaction Au-
tomata formalism. Incorporating these architectural constraints into the specification of
component interaction automata does not affect the underlying composition rules, but rather
make the relationship with the associated automata more explicit and ease the computation
of composition [13]. We abbreviate, however, the annotation in a natural way if an automa-
ton is enabled in all actions and omit the corresponding specification.
As motivating example, consider a simple electronic commerce system with three par-
ticipants [10]: a Customer, a Store, and a Bank. The behavior of the composite system
is as follows. The customer may initiate a transaction by passing a voucher to the store.
The store will then redeem this voucher with the bank (i.e., the bank will eventually de-
posit money into the store’s account) and, through a third party, ship the ordered goods. In
addition, the customer may cancel the order before the store had a chance to redeem the
8
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(Customer)
(Store)(Bank)
((Customer), (Store), (Bank))
pay
cancel
transfer
ship
redeem
cancel
Fig. 1. A simple e-commerce system.
voucher, in which case the voucher will be returned to the customer immediately. We allow
the customer to cancel an order with either the store or the bank. The high-level interaction
protocol for this system is shown in Figure 1.
We can model Customer, Store, and Bank as component interaction automata as fol-
lows. We write (Customer), (Store), and (Bank) to denote the architecture of the com-
ponent interaction automata Customer, Store, and Bank. More precisely, the three automata
are primitive (or plain) components with an opaque structure (i.e., no explicit hierarchical
relationships):
Customer = ({c0, c1}, {pay, cancel},
{(c0, (Customer, pay,−), c1), (c1, (Customer, cancel ,−), c0)},
{c0}, (Customer))
Store = ({s0, s1, s2, s3, s4, s5}, {pay, redeem, transfer , ship},
{(s0, (−, pay, Store), s1), (s1, (Store, redeem,−), s2), (s1, (−, cancel , Store), s0),
(s2, (−, transfer , Store), s3), (s2, (Store, ship,−), s4), (s3, (Store, ship,−), s5),
(s4, (−, transfer , Store), s5)}, {s0}, (Store))
Bank = ({b0, b1, b2, b3}, {cancel , redeem, transfer},
{(b0, (−, cancel , Bank), b1), (b0, (−, redeem, Bank), b2),
(b1, (Bank, cancel ,−), b0), (b2, (Bank, transfer ,−), b3)},
{b0}, (Bank))
The Customer automaton has two states and two output transitions (i.e., customer re-
quests). The Store automaton, on the other hand, defines six states and seven transitions and
guarantees that orders will only be shipped, if the payment voucher has been redeemed suc-
cessfully. The Store receives a voucher (i.e., action pay), money (i.e., action transfer ), or
a cancelation as input and issues as output the shipment of goods and the request to redeem
the voucher. Finally, the Bank automaton, defining four states and four transitions, medi-
ates Customer and Store. If the Store has not yet cashed the voucher, then the Customer
can still cancel the order and receive a refund. The Bank will forward a cancelation notice
to the Store. If the Store has already submitted the voucher, then the Bank will eventually
transfer funds to the Store. At this point, the Customer cannot cancel the order anymore.
The composition of component interaction automata is defined as the cross-product
over their state spaces. Furthermore, the sets P and R determine, which input and output
transitions occur in the composite system (i.e., interface with the environment). By con-
vention, if any state is rendered inaccessible in the composite automaton, then we remove
9
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(Customer,pay,Store)
(Customer,cancel,Store)
(Store,redeem,Bank) (Bank,transfer,Store)
(Bank,cancel,Store)
(Bank,transfer,Store)
(Customer,cancel,Bank) (Store,ship,−) (Store,ship,−)
((Customer), (Store), (Bank))
s4c1b2
s0c0b0 s2c1b2
s5c1b3
s3c1b3
s1c0b1
s1c1b0
ship
Fig. 2. The composite e-commerce component interaction automaton.
it immediately from the state space in order to obtain the most concise result. The behavior
of the composite automaton is completely captured by its reachable states.
Definition 2.3 Let SPR = {(Qi,Act i, δi, Ii,Hi)}i∈I be a system of pairwise disjoint com-
ponent interaction automata, where I is a finite indexing set and P,R are the provided
and required actions. Then CPR = (
∏
i∈I Qi,∪i∈IAct i, δSPR ,
∏
i∈I Ii, (Hi)i∈I) is a com-
posite component interaction automaton where qj denotes a function
∏
i∈I Qi → Qj , the
projection from product state q to jth component state q and
δSP
R
= δOldSync ∪ δNewSync ∪ δInput ∪ δOutput
with
δOldSync = {(q, (n1, a, n2), q′) | ∃i ∈ I : (qi, (n1, a, n2), q′i) ∈ δi ∧
∀j ∈ I, j 6= i : qj = q′j},
δNewSync = {(q, (n1, a, n2), q′) | ∃i1, i2 ∈ I, i1 6= i2 : (qi1 , (n1, a,−), q′i1 ) ∈ δi1 ∧
(qi2 , (−, a, n2), q′i2 ) ∈ δi2 ∧ ∀j ∈ I, i1 6= j 6= i2 : qj = q′j},
δInput = {(q, (−, a, n), q′) | a ∈ R ∧ ∃i ∈ I : (qi, (−, a, n), q′i) ∈ δi ∧
∀j ∈ I, j 6= i : qj = q′j},
δOutput = {(q, (n, a,−), q′) | a ∈ P ∧ ∃i ∈ I : (qi, (n, a,−), q′i) ∈ δi ∧
∀j ∈ I, j 6= i : qj = q′j}.
The composition rule builds the product automaton for a given system SPR . It does so
by simultaneously recombining the behavior of all individual component interaction au-
tomata {(Qi,Act i, δi, Ii,Hi)}i∈I . The transitions of the composite automaton result from
four sets: the transposed preexisting internal synchronizations δOldSync of the individual
component interaction automata, the newly formed internal synchronizations δNewSync due
to interactions between the individual component interaction automata, and the sets δInput
and δOutput , the transposed remaining interactions of the product automaton with the envi-
ronment.
Applied to our e-commerce system, we can denote the composition of the three com-
ponents Customer, Store, and Bank using the following expression:
S{ship}∅ = {Customer, Store,Bank},
which yields a composite automaton with 7 reachable states (out of 48 product states).
Moreover, due to the architectural constraintsP = {ship} andR = ∅ the composite system
can only interact with its environment by emitting a ship action. A graphical representation
of the composite system is shown in Figure 2.
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3 Observable Equivalence and Partition Refinement
The problem of combinatorial state explosion does not only occur when constructing new
composite components or systems, but also when we wish to study their inherent prop-
erties [13]. A measure to alleviate state explosion is partition refinement [13,9,20,18,8],
which allows, by means of some equivalence relation, for the identification of states that
exhibit the same interactive behavior with respect to an external observer. Partition refine-
ment merges equivalent states into one and removes the remaining superfluous states and
their transitions from the system. We use bisimulation [19], in particular a notion of weak
bisimulation [13,16], as the desired observable equivalence relation for the reduction of
component interaction automata. From an external observer’s point of view, weak bisim-
ulation yields a co-inductive testing strategy in which two component interface automata
cannot be distinguished, if they only differ in their internal synchronizations.
However, the Component Interaction Automata formalism requires an additional crite-
rion to be met: two component interaction automata A and B are considered equivalent,
if and only if they are bisimular and adhere to the same underlying composition structure
[13]. In other words, any technique to reduce the complexity of a given component inter-
action automaton has also to retain its underlying hierarchical composition structure. This
means, two states q, p with transitions (q, (−, a, A), r) and (p, (−, a, B), r) must not be
equated, as the target components in the transition labels differ.
An important element in the definition of an observable equivalence relation over com-
ponent interaction automata is the notion of synchronization path.
Definition 3.1 If (n1, a1, n′1) · · · (nk, ak, n′k) ∈ Σ are internal synchronizations of a com-
ponent interaction automaton C, then we write q ∗=⇒ p to denote the reflexive transitive
closure of
q
(n1,a1,n′1)−−−−−−→ r1
(n2,a2,n′2)−−−−−−→ · · ·
(nk−1,ak−1,n′k−1)−−−−−−−−−−−→ rk−1
(nk,ak,n
′
k)−−−−−−→ p,
called synchronization path between q and p.
Synchronization paths give rise to weak transitions.
Definition 3.2 If l ∈ Σ is a structured label, then q l=⇒ p is a weak transition from q to p
over label l, if there exists r, r′ such that
q
∗=⇒ r l−→ r′ ∗=⇒ p.
Using the concept of weak transitions, we can define now a weak bisimulation over
component interaction automata.
Definition 3.3 GivenA = (QA,ActA, δA, IA,H) andB = (QB,ActB, δB,H), two com-
ponent interaction automata with an identical composition hierarchy H , a binary relation
R ⊆ Q×Q with Q = QA ∪QB is a weak bisimulation, if it is symmetric and (q, p) ∈ R
implies, for all l ∈ Σ, Σ = ΣA ∪ ΣB being the set of structured labels induced by A and
B,
• whenever q l−→ q′, then ∃p′ such that p l=⇒ p′ and (q′, p′) ∈ R.
Two component interaction automataA andB are weakly bisimilar, writtenA ≈ B, if they
are related by some weak bisimulation.
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Using the preceding definition, we can find a new automaton, R{ship}∅ , capable of re-
producing the interactive behavior of our e-commerce systems up to weak bisimulation.
R{ship}∅ (cf. Figure 3) satisfies two requirements: (i) it interacts with the environment
through the structured label (Store, ship,−), and (ii) it adheres to the hierarchical compo-
sition structure ((Customer), (Store), (Bank)).
(Store,ship,−)
((Customer), (Store), (Bank))
r0 r1 ship
Fig. 3. The weakly-bisimular e-commerce component interaction automatonR{ship}∅ .
To show thatR{ship}∅ and S
{ship}
∅ = {Customer, Store,Bank} are indeed observable
equivalent with respect to an external observer, we have to find a weak bisimulationR such
thatR{ship}∅ ≈ S
{ship}
∅ . Such a relation exists and is defined asR = r ∪ r−1 with
r= {(s0c0b0, r0), (s1c1b0, r0), (s1c0b1, r0), (s2c1b2, r0), (s3c1b3, r0),
(s4c1b2, r1), (s5c1b3, r1)}.
There are only two states in S{ship}∅ , s2c1b2 and s3c1b3, that require the automatonR
{ship}
∅
to move. Consider, for example, state s2c1b2 of S{ship}∅ . Since (s2c1b2, r0) ∈ R and
S{ship}∅ can perform (s2c1b2, (Store, ship,−), s4c1b2), we select (r0, (Store, ship,−), r1)
as a matching transition of R{ship}∅ that yields the pair (s4c1b2, r1) ∈ R, as required. For
all states in S{ship}∅ other than s2c1b2 and s3c1b3, R
{ship}
∅ pauses, since all internal syn-
chronization have been factored out inR{ship}∅ .
The global tactic for the computation of bisimularity is partition refinement, which
factorizes a given state space into equivalence classes [9,20,18,8]. The result of partition
refinement is a surjective function that maps the elements of the original state space to its
corresponding representatives of the computed equivalence classes. Partition refinement
always yields a minimal automaton.
In the heart of partition refinement is a splitter function that determines the granularity
of the computed equivalence classes. A splitter for component interaction automata is a
boolean predicate γ : Q × Σ × S 7→ {true, false}, where S ⊆ 2Q is a set of candidate
equivalence classes for C = (Q,Act , δ, I,H), the component interaction automaton in
question.
Definition 3.4 Let q ∈ Q be a state, P ′ ∈ S be candidate equivalence class, and l ∈ Σ be
a structured label for a component interaction automaton C = (Q,Act , δ, I,H). Then
γ(q, l, P ′) :=
 true if there is p ′ ∈ P ′ such that q
l=⇒ p ′,
false otherwise
We obtain with this definition a means of expressing the computation of a weakly-
bisimular component interaction automaton as the possibility of a set of its states, P , to
evolve into another set of states, P ′, with the same observable behavior, where P ′ is the
equivalence class of P .
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Definition 3.5 Let γ be a splitter function generating weakly-bisimular equivalence classes
for a component interaction automaton C = (Q,Act , δ, I,H). Then
refine(X, l, P ′) :=∪P∈X(∪v∈{true,false}{q | ∀q ∈ P. γ(q, l, P ′) = v})− {∅}
The actual refinement process is defined by a procedure, refine : X ×Σ×S ×X , that
takes a set of partitions X ∈ X , a structured label l ∈ Σ, and a candicate equivalence class
P ′ ∈ S to yield, possibly new, candidate equivalence classes. Partition refinement, starting
withX = {Q} as initial partition set, repeatedly applies refine toX and its derivatives for
all l ∈ Σ until a fixed-point is reached [9].
When applied to our composite e-commerce system S{ship}∅ , partition refinement com-
putes the following equivalence classes:
{r0 = {s0c0b0, s1c1b0, s1c0b1, s2c1b2, s3c1b3}, r1 = {s4c1b2, s5c1b3}},
which correspond exactly to the weak bisimulation R, shown earlier. More precisely, we
can use these equivalence classes to construct the automatonR{ship}∅ .
4 Action Prefixes
Partition refinement, up to weak bisimulation, can eliminate most if not all, as in case
of R{ship}∅ , internal synchronizations from a given component interaction automaton. It
provides, therefore, a suitable abstraction method that lets system designers focus on the
essence of the behavioral protocol defined by a given component interaction automaton.
As shown in Section 3, when using the perspective of an external observer, only the out-
put (Store, ship,−) remains in the interface of R{ship}∅ , a significant improvement with
respect to the original complexity of S{ship}∅ .
(−,d,A2)
(A1,c,−)
(A1,a,A2)
(−,d,A2)
(A2,b,A1)
(A1,c,−)
((A1), (A2))
q1q0
q0q1
q0q0
q1q1
cd
(a) A{c}{d}
((A1), (A2))
(−,d,A2) (A1,c,−)
(A1,c,−) (−,d,A2)
r1 r2r0 cd
(b) A-R{c}{d}
Fig. 4. The weakly-bisimular component interaction automata A{c}{d} and A-R
{c}
{d}.
Unfortunately, there are also situations in which partition refinement can eliminate in-
formation, which, in itself, can be viewed vital for the understanding of the interactive
behavior of a component interaction automaton. Consider, for example, the two automata
A
{c}
{d} and A-R
{c}
{d}, shown in Figure 4. Both are weakly-bisimular, A
{c}
{d}, however, contains
a subgraph that produces a condition similar to the small-world effect [17]. In particu-
lar, the states q0q0 and q1q1 in automaton A{c}{d} form a synchronization clique generat-
ing two distinct regular sublanguages, Lq0q0 = {(ab)n|n ≥ 0} ∪ {b(ab)m|m ≥ 0} and
Lq1q1 = {a(ba)n|n ≥ 0}∪ {(ba)m|m ≥ 0}, of synchronization paths, which can originate
from any clique state and terminate in the designated state q0q0 and q1q1, respectively.
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The prefix strings emerging from these sublanguages define pre-conditions that determine,
when the transitions (r0, (−, d, A2), r1) and (r0, (A1, c,−), r2) can actually occur in the
reduced automaton A-R{c}{d}.
Definition 4.1 Let C = (Q,Act , δ, I,H) be a component interaction automaton and X ∈
X be a set of equivalence classes up to weak bisimulation for C. Then a synchronization
clique is a non-empty directed graph (V,E), where V ⊆ Q is a set of clique states and
E ⊆ δ is a set of internal synchronizations (q, (n, a, n′), p) with q, p ∈ V and q 6= p, if
there exists P ∈ X such that q, p ∈ P .
A synchronization clique appears, when partition refinement creates new reflexive in-
ternal synchronizations due to mapping the endpoints of these transitions onto the same
equivalence class. By default, we can ignore preexisting reflexive internal synchroniza-
tions, as they can occur, interleaving, in any order. However, the newly formed reflexive
internal synchronizations are of a different kind, as their non-reflexive originals encode a
specific partial order over internal synchronizations. This property is lost in the refinement
process. We can, however, recover it through the notion of action prefixes. For example, in
A-R{c}{d} the transition (r0, (−, d, A2), r1)may occur only after a, possibly empty, sequence
of internal synchronizations over actions b and a, captured by the prefix [b](ab)∗ that rei-
fies the required synchronization path to arrive in state q0q0 from synchronization clique
{q0q0, q1q1}. In other words, the internal synchronizations have disappeared in A-R{c}{d},
but we can use the prefix [b](ab)∗ to reenforce the existing pre-condition for the occurrence
of transition (r0, (−, d, A2), r1) in A-R{c}{d}. That is, (r0, (−, d, A2), r1) can occur without
any proceeding internal synchronizations, only after a single b, or only after a sequence of
paired a’s and b’s.
The presence of synchronization cliques can cause even more worries, as illustrated in
Figure 5. The automaton B{c}∅ is defined as the composition of the following two automata
B1 and B2 2 :
B1 = ({q0, q1}, {a, b, c},
{(q0, (B1, a,−), q1), (q0, (B1, c,−), q1), (q1, (−, b, B1), q0)},
{q0}, (B1))
B2 = ({q0, q1}, {a, b, c},
{(q0, (−, a, B2), q1), (q0, (B2, c,−), q1), (q1, (B2, c,−), q0), (q1, (B2, b,−), q0)},
{q0}, (B2))
The composition of B1 and B2, the automaton B{c}∅ , yields also a synchronization
clique generating the corresponding sublanguages Lq0q0 = {(ab)n|n ≥ 0}∪{b(ab)m|m ≥
0} and Lq1q1 = {a(ba)n|n ≥ 0} ∪ {(ba)m|m ≥ 0}. Unlike A{c}{d}, however, the reduc-
tion of B{c}∅ results in a non-deterministic specification (cf. Figure 5(b)). It is transition
(q0, (B1, c,−), q1) of B1 that enables this phenomenon, not the flip-flop between B2’s
states over c. Fortunately, action prefixes provide us with the means to disambiguate the
conflicting transitions. In particular, (r0, (B2, c,−), r1) can only occur after a synchro-
2 These automata have been especially designed to reproduce an effect, which we have observed in many system specifica-
tions that we have analyzed over time [13].
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(B2,c,−)
((B1), (B2))
(B2,c,−)(B2,c,−)
(B2,b,B1)
(B1,a,B2)
(B1,c,−)
(B1,c,−)
(B2,c,−)
q0q0
q0q1 q1q1
q1q0
c
(a) B{c}∅
(B2,c,−)
((B1), (B2))
(B2,c,−) (B1,c,−)/(B2,c,−)
(B2,c,−)/(B1,c−)
r0r1 r2
c
(b) B-R{c}∅
Fig. 5. The weakly-bisimular component interaction automata B{c}∅ and B-R
{c}
∅ .
nization sequence [b](ab)∗, whereas (r0, (B2, c,−), r2) is enabled by [a](ba)∗. The pre-
fixes [b](ab)∗ and [a](ba)∗ capture the possible corresponding reified synchronization paths
within automaton B{c}∅ induced by synchronization clique {q0q0, q1q1}, as illustrated in
Figure 6.
(B1,a,B2)
(B2,b,B1)
(B2,c,−)
q0q0
q0q1 q1q1
(a) Prefix [b](ab)∗.
(B2,b,B1)
(B1,a,B2)
(B2,c,−)
q0q0
q1q1
q1q0
(b) Prefix [a](ba)∗.
Fig. 6. The prefix-giving interaction sequences in B{c}∅ .
Definition 4.2 Let C = (Q,Act , δ, I,H) be a component interaction automaton, Σ be the
induced alphabet of C, and (V,E) be a synchronization clique in C. Then a finite action
prefix generator is a quadruple CP = (V,Act , E, qP ), where
• V is the set of clique states,
• Act = {a|(q, (n, a, n′), p) ∈ E} is the prefix alphabet,
• E = {(q, a, p)|(q, (n, a, n′)p) ∈ E} is the prefix transition function,
• qP ∈ V is a prefix state, if there is l ∈ Σ such that qP l−→ p′ ∈ δ, p′ 6∈ V , and
all states in V are start states. We write AP [q] to denote the action prefix generator for
prefix state q. If WP is the set of all prefix strings that AP [q] accepts in q, we say thatWP
is the action prefix language of AP [q] and write L(AP [q]) = WP .
An action prefix generator simultaneously explores all possible paths in a synchroniza-
tion clique in order to distill the required action prefixes for a given prefix state. From
a technical point of view, a prefix generator iterates over all clique states in (V,E) and
constructs for each a finite state machine whose language is the union of all accepted
action prefixes for a given prefix state. For example, in automaton B{c}∅ , both states in
the synchronization clique {q0q0, q1q1} are prefix states and the generated languages are
L(AP [q0q0]) = {b0:1(ab)n|n ≥ 0} and L(AP [q1q1]) = {a0:1(ba)m|m ≥ 0}, which we
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denote by the action prefixes [b](ab)∗ and [a](ba)∗. On the other hand, state q1q1 in au-
tomaton A{c}{d} (cf. Figure 4(a)) is not a prefix state and we, therefore, obtain only a prefix
for state q0q0 (i.e., [b](ab)∗).
Definition 4.3 Let C = (Q,Act , δ, I,H) be component interaction automaton, q l−→ q′ ∈
δ, and AP [q] = α be an action prefix, then q
/α/l−→ q′ is a α-prefixed transition, with
/α/l =

(−, /α/a, n) if l = (−, a, n),
(n, /α/a,−) if l = (n, a,−), and
(n1, /α/a, n2) if l = (n1, a, n2).
Returning to the reduced automaton B-R{c}∅ (cf. Figure 5(b)), we can obtain a deter-
ministic version B-R’{c}∅ by applying the generated prefixes to the conflicting transitions:
B-R’{c}∅ = ({r0, r1, r2}, {a, b, c},
{(r0, (B2, /[b](ab)∗/c,−), r1), (r0, (B2, /[a](ba)∗/c,−), r2), (r0, (B1, /[b](ab)∗/c,−), r2),
(r1, (B2, c−), r0), (r1, (B1, c,−), r0), (r2, (B2, c,−), r0)},
{r0}, ((B1), (B2))
B-R’{c}∅ is, naturally, not weakly-bisimular to B-R
{c}
∅ , as prefixed transitions produce
a different behavior. However, we can restore bisimularity by erasing the added prefixes.
We can think of prefixes as types [4], or more precisely sequence types [23], that explicitly
record interaction constraints of the reduced component interaction automaton.
The composition of action prefixes is defined in the usual way. The composition of a re-
fined automaton, containing prefixed transitions, with another automaton and the successive
refinement may yield new action prefixes that have to be incorporated into the final result.
We use the regular concatenation operation to built composite action prefixes. For exam-
ple, if an existing action prefix [f ](ef )∗ needs to be prefixed by [b](ab)∗, then the newly
composed action prefix becomes [f ](ef )∗[b](ab)∗. That is, before an interaction prefixed
with [f ](ef )∗[b](ab)∗ can occur, the corresponding component interaction automata must
have performed a, possibly empty, sequence of internal synchronizations over actions f and
e, followed by a, possibly empty, sequence of internal synchronizations over actions b and
a.
Finally, we need to incorporate the prefix mechanism into the composition rule (cf.
Definition 2.3) for new synchronizations, δNewSync . We use the tags ‘?’ to indicate a prefix
associated with an input action and ‘!’ to denote a prefix originating from an output action.
Definition 4.4 Let q1
(n1,/α1/a,−)−−−−−−−−→ q′1 and q2
(−,/α2/a,n2)−−−−−−−−→ q′2 be two prefixed transitions
that synchronize according to Definition 2.3. Then q
(n1,/?α1!α2/a,n2)−−−−−−−−−−−→ q′ is the resulting
prefixed synchronization transition, where ?α1!α2 is an atomic directional prefix.
Two component interaction automata can synchronize through matching complemen-
tary structured labels. These labels may, in turn, occur prefixed as result of a previous
refinement of the underlying automata. These prefixes, however, cannot simply be con-
catenated as regular prefixes. Each prefix encodes either an input constraint or an output
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constraint, which we both must retain. On the surface, this appears cumbersome, but we
facilitate the use of directional prefixes by considering them atomic, as if they were plain
actions. We only require, as for all prefixes, that they are well-formed, that is, they are
regularly composed of elements from the set, Act , of actions.
5 Discussion
We cannot underestimate the computational needs for the construction of a composite com-
ponent interaction automaton. For example, even for a relatively small system consisting of
components with no more than 4 states, the resulting product automaton requires easily in
excess of 16,000 states with approx. 880,000 transitions and can take more than 6 hours to
compute on a PC equipped with a 2.2 GHz dual-core processor and 2GB of main memory
[13].
To study different means for an effective specification and construction of component
interaction automata, we have developed an experimental composition framework for Com-
ponent Interaction Automata in PLT-Scheme [21] that provides modular support for the
specification, composition, and refinement of component interaction automata [13]. All
analysis and transformation functions in the system are timed and can be controlled by a
variety of parameters to fine-tune the induced operational semantics of an operation. The
system also generates information about frequencies and distributions of states and transi-
tions within composite automata, data that allows for an independent statistical analysis of
the effects of composition and refinement.
One of the rather unexpected findings, while conducting experiments in our composi-
tion framework, is the existence of synchronization cliques in component interaction au-
tomata. To explain their presence, we have adopted some of the terminology that has been
developed in network theory in order to characterize properties of complex networks [17].
Of particular interest are small-world networks that have been discovered in an astonishing
number of natural phenomena, but also in software systems. Potanin et al. [22] have stud-
ied Java programs and detected power laws in object graphs indicating that object-oriented
systems form scale-free networks [17]. A consequence of the existence of power laws in
object-oriented systems is that there is no typical size to objects [22]. We find a similar
property, both, in component interaction automata and emerging synchronization cliques.
But there remains a curiosity as to why synchronization cliques exist. We do not find
a similar phenomenon in process-based models [24,9,16,12,15]. There is, however, a dif-
ference in the way internal sysnchronizations are represented. Process-based formalisms
use a special symbol, τ , to denote the handshake between two matching, interacting pro-
cesses. The synchronization of processes takes place internally. From an external ob-
server’s point of view, we notice the occurrence of a process synchronization through a
delay between adjacent interactions with the environment. Milner [16] calls τ a perfect
action, which arises from a pair of complementary input- and output-actions. What makes
τ special is the observable equivalence between a sequence P1
τ−→ P2 τ−→ · · · τ−→ Pn
of process synchronizations and a single synchronization P1
τ−→ Pn. A similar concept
does not exist in Component Interaction Automata and its predecessors I/O Automata and
Interface Automata. We cannot equate a sequence of internal synchronizations in a com-
ponent interaction automaton with a single action. First, such an abstraction would ignore
the inherent partial order defined by a synchronization sequence and second, there exists
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no designated action in the Component Interaction Automata formalism that can subsume
interaction sequences under one umbrella. Moreover, the precise sequence of internal syn-
chronizations conveys a valuable information. For example, the Store will only issue the
action (Store, ship,−) after a successful interaction with the Bank to redeem the payment
voucher (cf. Figure 2). This knowledge is vital for the understanding of the behavior of the
whole e-commerce system S{ship}∅ .
We have chosen regular expressions like [b](ab)∗ rather than fresh action labels to de-
note action prefixes in order to make pre-conditions to interactions as explicit as possible.
This works well for simple prefixes. Experiments have shown, however, that the prefixes
can grow in complexity rather quickly, rendering this structural technique unwieldy. We
can envision a nominal approach to the specification of action prefixes in which we assign
each action prefix a unique identifier and add a corresponding lookup table to the specifi-
cation of the component interaction automata in question.
Finally, the outcome of partition refinement can be improved even further, if we erase
the information about the underlying composition hierarchy by making the analyzed com-
ponent primitive before refinement [13]. The composition of multiple instances of the
same component can produce identical sub-structures in the resulting composite automa-
ton. However, the unique component identifiers used to disambiguate shared actions pre-
vent partition refinement from simplifying common sub-structures into a single, unifying
one. We can overcome this difficulty by creating a fresh image of a given component in-
teraction automaton in which all component names are the same. We will lose, though, the
information, which particular sub-component participates in an actual occurring interaction
with the environment.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper we have discussed some of the effects that partition refinement can produce
when we apply this state space reduction technique to Component Interaction Automata
specifications. We use weak bisimulation as underlying equivalence relation to drive the
refinement process. From an external observer’s point of view, weak bisimulation yields a
means to hide internal intra-component synchronizations.
While a corresponding implementation of partition refinement for Component Interac-
tion Automata specifications is feasible and effective, its application has revealed a specific
property of component interaction automata that mandates an additional analysis to recover
pre-conditions encoded in so-called synchronization cliques. A synchronization clique is
a subgraph of internal intra-component synchronizations that define guards for component
interactions with the environment. Partition refinement removes synchronization cliques
from the specification of given component interaction automaton. But, in this paper, we
have presented a workable solution to restore pre-conditions in reduced automata, when
necessary.
We are only beginning to understand the emerging properties of software systems in
general and component-based software systems in particular. There is sufficient evidence
for the existence of small-world networks in software. To further our knowledge in this
area, in future work we aim at studying network effects in component interaction automata
specifications. In particular, we seek to explore possibilities to (i) predict the presence of
synchronization cliques, (ii) estimate the reduction ratio, and (iii) use frequency distribu-
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tions to monitor evolutionary changes in component interaction automata specifications.
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Abstract
We propose a formal foundation for behaviour protocols of interacting components with (encapsulated)
data states. Formally, behaviour protocols are given by labelled transition systems which specify the order
of operation invocations as well as the allowed changes of data states of components in terms of pre- and
postconditions. We study the compatibility of protocols and we consider their composition which yields a
behaviour protocol for a component assembly. Behaviour protocols are equipped with a model-theoretic
semantics which describes the class of all correct component or assembly implementations. Implementation
models are again formalised in terms of labelled transition systems and the correctness notion is based on an
alternating simulation relation between protocol and implementation which takes into account control and
data states. As a major result we show that our approach is compositional, i.e. that correct implementation
models of compatible protocols compose to a correct implementation of the resulting assembly protocol.
Keywords: Behaviour protocol, pre- and postcondition, stateful component, compositionality
1 Introduction
Component-based software development has received much attention not only in
practice but also in theory during the last decade. Thereby an important role is
played by formal specifications of component behaviours which are usually based
on a control-flow oriented perspective describing the sequences of actions a com-
ponent can perform when interacting with its environment; cf., e.g., [12]. Some
approaches also consider data that can be transmitted by value passing messages
but less attention has been directed towards the integration of data states that
a component can possess and which are typically specified by invariants and pre-
and postconditions in sequential systems. Frameworks like CSP-OZ [6] or rCOS [8]
support this facility but they do not distinguish (at least semantically) between
input and output actions and their expressive power is limited to cases where the
effect of an operation is specified independently of the control-flow behaviour of
1 This research has been partially supported by the GLOWA-Danube project 01LW0602A2 sponsored by
the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research.
This paper is electronically published in
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science
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a component. Other approaches are based on symbolic transition systems with a
strong focus on the generation of abstractions for model checking [1,5] but they do
not study formal correctness notions to relate specifications and implementations
which is needed in a top-down development process. The goal of this work is to
provide a formal foundation for interacting stateful components with a clear separa-
tion between specification and implementation such that the latter can still choose
“among the possibilities left by the specification”; see [1]. Of crucial importance is,
of course, the study of component composition and preservation of local correctness
in global contexts. In this paper we propose an integrated framework which takes
into account control flow and the evolution of component data states as well as
the discrimination of input and output for distinguishing operation reception and
operation calls. In particular, we are interested in a contract-based specification
style where the caller of an operation can formulate its assumptions and guarantees
with respect to the data state of the called component. On this basis we study
compatibility of specifications, which are called behaviour protocols hereafter.
As a roadmap for this paper we follow the ideas of de Alfaro and Henzinger [3]
who have studied interface automata, their refinement, their compatibility and their
composition and we aim at an extension of these ideas by taking into account state-
ful components, where components are equipped with local data states to allow
for an evaluation of pre- and postconditions attached to the labels of a behaviour
protocol. In the context of data states we cannot use the same formalism for speci-
fication and refinement (implementation) of component behaviour which both have
been formalised in terms of interface automata in [3,4]. Though labelled transition
systems still provide an appropriate basis, the crucial difference here is that for the
purpose of behaviour specification labels must include logical predicates describing
pre- and postconditions while for modelling component implementations labels must
represent concrete actions like operation invocations which can occur in concrete
states of an implementation. As a consequence, we must adjust the alternating sim-
ulation relation used by de Alfaro and Henzinger in an appropriate way. Thereby
an important role is played by so-called observers which determine the visible states
of components.
After providing the necessary technical preliminaries we introduce the main
structural elements of our component model in Sect. 2. We study compatibility of
behaviour protocols of different components (and assemblies) which are supposed
to be composed via connectors between open ports of components (and assemblies)
in Sect. 3. Our notion of compatibility extends the corresponding notion in [4] by
requiring that if an operation can be called by one component such that the required
precondition is satisfied then the connected component must be able to treat the
operation invocation in the specified way. We define the (synchronous) composition
of behaviour protocols which turns out to have the expected properties (see below)
if the protocols are compatible.
In the next step, in Sect. 4, we focus on component (and assembly) implemen-
tations which are formalised as labelled transition systems whose states are divided
into a control part and a data part and whose transitions carry labels which rep-
resent sending or receiving of concrete operation invocations for particular actual
parameters. We define a correctness notion for implementations in the spirit of
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the alternating simulation relation used for refinements in [4] which requires that
any specified input must be accepted by an implementation and that, conversely,
any possible output of an implementation must be admitted by the behaviour pro-
tocol. In the context of data states the alternating simulation relation between a
behaviour protocol and an implementation model is, however, more involved since
it has to take into account pre- and postconditions in protocols which must be re-
lated to the (visible) data states of component implementations when transitions
are performed. Our main theorem shows that the proposed concepts for protocol
compatibility and implementation correctness work smoothly together. This means,
two implementation models which are locally correct w.r.t. compatible behaviour
protocols compose to a correct implementation model of the composed behaviour
protocol.
Preliminaries. Our approach is based on labelled transition systems to formalise
the control-flow aspects of component behaviours. A labelled transition system
(LTS) M = (Q, q0, L,∆) consists of a set Q of states, an initial state q0 ∈ Q, a set
L of labels, and a transition relation ∆ ⊆ Q×L×Q. If (q, l, q′) ∈ ∆, l is enabled at
q. M is called L′-enabled, for a set L′ ⊆ L of labels, if for any reachable state q ∈ Q
and label l ∈ L′ there is at least one transition in ∆ such that l is enabled at q.
To deal with the specification and implementation of the externally visible data
states of components we use observer signatures. An observer signature ΣObs con-
sists of a set of (visible) state variables. A ΣObs-data state σ : ΣObs → V assigns to
each state variable in ΣObs a value in some predefined data universe V. The class
of all ΣObs-data states is denoted by D(ΣObs). For any observer signature ΣObs, we
assume given a set S(ΣObs) of state predicates ϕ and a set T (ΣObs) of transition
predicates pi with associated sets var(ϕ) and var(pi) of variables. State predicates
refer to single states and transition predicates refer to pre- and poststates. We
assume that state predicates ϕ ∈ S(ΣObs) are equipped with a satisfaction relation
σ; ρ  ϕ for states σ ∈ D(ΣObs) and valuations ρ : var(ϕ)→ V. Similarly, for tran-
sition predicates pi ∈ T (ΣObs) we assume a satisfaction relation σ, σ′; ρ  pi, for two
states σ, σ′ ∈ D(ΣObs) and valuation ρ : var(pi) → V. For ϕ ∈ S(ΣObs), we write
 ϕ to express that ϕ is universally valid, i.e. σ; ρ  ϕ for all states σ ∈ D(ΣObs)
and for all valuations ρ : var(ϕ) → V. Universal validity of transition predicates is
defined in the analogous way. We assume that state predicates (transition predi-
cates resp.) are closed under the usual logical connectives (like ∧,⇒, etc.) with the
usual interpretation. In some occasions we will use state predicates in combination
with transition predicates. Then a state predicate ϕ ∈ S(ΣObs) is considered as a
special transition predicate where σ, σ′; ρ  ϕ is defined by σ; ρ  ϕ. We do not
fix a particular syntax for observer signatures, observers, and predicates here. In
the examples unprimed symbols refer to the prestate and primed symbols to the
poststate of a transition.
2 Component Model
In this section we summarize the structural concepts of our component model which
extends the one in [7] by introducing observer signatures for ports and components.
We do, however, not consider hierarchical components here and we make the sim-
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plifying assumption that names of ports and components are globally unique.
Components interact with each other by using operations which belong to the
provided and required interfaces of their ports. An operation op is of the form
opname(Xin) where Xin is a (possibly empty) sequence of input variables. 2 We
write varin(op) to refer to the input variables of an operation op. An interface is a
pair (ΣObs,Op) consisting of an observer signature ΣObs and a set Op of operations.
A port signature (Iprov, Ireq) consists of a provided interface Iprov and a required
interface Ireq. Throughout this paper when we talk about a port P , we always
assume given a port declaration P : Σ where Σ is a port signature and P is a globally
unique port name. We write prv(P ) for the provided interface of Σ, obsprv (P ) for
the observer signature and opnsprv (P ) for the operations of prv(P ). The operations
in opnsprv (P ) are offered at port P and the observer signature obsprv (P ) defines
the possible obervations that can be made at this port (about the data state of
its owning component). Symmetrically, we write req(P ) for the required interface
of Σ, obsreq(P ) refers to the observer signature and opnsreq(P ) to the operations
of the required interface of req(P ). In this case, the operations in opnsreq(P ) are
required from components which are connected to P and the observer signature
obsprv (P ) defines which observations are required about the data states of connected
components.
Components encapsulate data states and interact with their environment via
ports. The data states of a component can only be observed via observers which
are determined by the component’s observer signature. The access points of a
component are given by ports. Formally, a component signature (ΣObs, (P : ΣP )P∈I)
consists of an observer signature ΣObs and a finite family of port declarations P :
ΣP . In the following when we talk about a component C, we always assume given
a component declaration C : Σ where Σ is a component signature and C is a
globally unique component name. We write obs(C) to refer to the observer signature
and ports(C) to refer to the ports declared in Σ. We require that for all ports
P ∈ ports(C), obsprv (P ) = obs(C), i.e. on each port all observers of its owning
component are visible. 3 For a port P , cmp(P ) denotes its owning component.
For building assemblies we connect ports of components. If P1 and P2 are ports
such that req(P1) = prv(P2) and req(P2) = prv(P1), then K : {P1, P2} is a (binary)
connector declaration where K is a globally unique connector name. In the following
when we talk about a connector K, we always assume given a connector declaration
of the form K : {P1, P2} and we write ports(K) to refer to its set of ports {P1, P2}.
An assembly A = 〈(C : ΣC)C∈I ; (K : {PK1 , PK2 })K∈I′〉 consists of a finite family
of component declarations C : ΣC and a finite family of connector declarations
K : {PK1 , PK2 }. We write cmps(A) to refer to the components of the assembly,
conns(A) to refer to its connectors and we define ports(A) =
⋃{ports(C) | C ∈
cmps(A)}. The open ports of A, i.e., the ports which are not connected, are given
by open(A) = ports(A) \ ⋃{ports(K) | K ∈ conns(A)}. For the above definitions
to make sense, we require that (i) only ports of components inside A are connected,
2 For the sake of simplicity we do not consider output variables here which, however, could be easily
integrated in our framework.
3 In general, the observers of a port could be a subset of the component’s observers or should be related
by an abstraction function. This could be methodologically desirable to emphasize the difference between
port and component protocols which, however, goes beyond the scope of this paper.
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i.e., for all K ∈ conns(A) we have that ports(K) ⊆ ports(A); and (ii) there is at
most one connector for each port, i.e., if P ∈ ports(A) and K,K ′ ∈ conns(A) with
P ∈ ports(K)∩ ports(K ′), then K = K ′. Finally, composition of two assemblies A1
and A2 via a connector K : {P1, P2} with Pi ∈ open(Ai) for i = 1, 2 is denoted by
A = A1 +K A2 and defined by cmps(A) = cmps(A1) ∪ cmps(A2) and conns(A) =
conns(A1) ∪ conns(A2) ∪ {K : {P1, P2}}.
S Turnstile O
K
T Operator
Figure 1. Components of the turnstile system.
Example 2.1 Our running example models a turnstile located at the entrance of
a subway. The static structure of the system is given by the assembly depicted in
Fig. 1. It consists of two components, Turnstile and Operator, which are connected
via their ports O and T . The port S of the turnstile is left open. The observer
signatures and the provided and required operations on each port will be explained
later when the behaviour protocols of the two components are discussed.
3 Behaviour Protocols and their Compatibility
Behaviour protocols are a means to specify the observable behaviour of components
and assemblies. For components they specify the legal sequences of operation in-
vocations on the ports of a component, their invocation conditions and their effect
with respect to the (visible) data state of a component. For assemblies behaviour
protocols specify on the one hand, the legal interactions between connected compo-
nents (taking into account the components’ states) and, on the other hand, the legal
sequences of invocations on those ports which are left open in the assembly. We start
by introducing the syntax of behaviour protocols which are given by appropriate
labelled transition systems.
Protocol labels are divided into labels LP(P ) for ports P and labels LP(K) for
connectors K; see Fig. 2. Labels for ports model either receiving (?) or sending
(!) of a message. Messages which are supposed to be received must correspond to
operations of the provided interface of a port while messages which can be sent
must correspond to operations of the required interface of a port. Protocol labels
can be equipped with pre- and postconditions represented by state and transition
predicates of the respective observer signatures. A label [ϕ]?P.m[pi] for a port
P expresses that port P is ready to receive an operation invocation of m under
the assumption that the precondition ϕ holds, and after the execution of m the
postcondition pi is ensured. In this case ϕ must be a state predicate and pi a
transition predicate over the observer signature of the provided interface of port P .
A label [ϕ]!P.m[pi] describes the sending of an invocation of m on port P with the
guarantee of the precondition ϕ upon operation call and with the expectation that
pi holds when the operation is finished. Here ϕ must be a state predicate and pi a
transition predicate over the observer signature of the required interface of port P .
For a connector K which connects two ports Pi and Pj , a label [ϕ]Pi .K Pj .m[pi]
stands for the synchronised sending, reception and execution of an operation m via
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1. Labels LP (P ) for a port P , m ∈ opnsprv (P ), n ∈ opnsreq (P ):
• [ϕ]?P.m[pi] where ϕ ∈ S(obsprv (P )), var(ϕ) ⊆ varin(m), pi ∈ T (obsprv (P )), var(pi) ⊆ varin(m)
• [ϕ]!P.n[pi] where ϕ ∈ S(obsreq (P )), var(ϕ) ⊆ varin(n), pi ∈ T (obsreq (P )), var(pi) ⊆ varin(n)
2. Labels LP (K) for a connector K : {P1, P2}, m ∈ opnsprv (Pj), i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j:
• [ϕ]Pi .K Pj .m[pi] where ϕ ∈ S(obsprv (Pj)), var(ϕ) ⊆ varin(m), pi ∈ T (obsprv (Pj)), and
var(pi) ⊆ varin(m)
3. Labels LP (A) for an assembly A: LP (A) = SP∈open(A) LP (P ) ∪SK∈conns(A) LP (K)
Figure 2. Labels for protocols.
the connected ports Pi and Pj . In this case the pre- and postconditions must be
predicates over the observer signature obsreq(Pi) (which is the same as obsprv (Pj)
since required and provided interfaces of connected ports coincide). For an assembly
A the protocol labels in LP(A) are those labels which correspond to connectors or
to open ports of A.
Definition 3.1 [Behaviour Protocol]
Let A be an assembly. A behaviour protocol for A, also called A-protocol, is an LTS
F = (S, s0,LP(A),∆) where S is a finite set of protocol states, s0 ∈ S is the initial
protocol state, LP(A) is the set of protocol labels, and ∆ is a finite protocol transition
relation. The class of all A-protocols is denoted by Prot(A).
Here and in the following all definitions and results are provided for assemblies
but they carry over to components since a component C can be identified with
a degenerated assembly 〈{C}; ∅〉 which contains only the component C and no
connectors. From the methodological point of view behaviour protocols for a proper
assembly A correspond to architecture protocols in [11] while behaviour protocols
for components C correspond to frame protocols in [11] and to interface automata
in [3].
Example 3.2 Let us now come back to the turnstile example with the assembly
shown in Fig. 1. For the observer signature of the Turnstile component we use
two visible state variables: fare for the actual costs of a trip, and passed for the
number of persons that have already passed the turnstile. The turnstile has two
ports S and O. At port S no operation is required and two operations are provided:
coin(x : int) for dropping a coin with amount x into the turnstile’s slot, and pass()
for passing through the turnstile. At port O the turnstile requires an operation
alarm() to inform the operator that a client has tried to pass the turnstile without
paying and an operation ready() is provided to switch off the alarm mode.
Fig. 3 presents the frame protocol FT of component Turnstile. If in the initial
state LOCKED a coin is deposited whose value is at least the required fare the
turnstile becomes unlocked. In the state UNLOCKED a person can pass through
the turnstile with the effect that the number of passed persons is increased by one
and the state LOCKED is reached again. If a person tries to pass the turnstile
without dropping a coin into its slot this causes the turnstile to send out an alarm
on its port O. On the same port the alarm can be shut off by invoking ready.
The frame protocol FO of component Operator is shown in Fig. 4. It says that an
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operator can invoke ready whenever an alarm has been received. If a protocol label
shows no explicit pre- or postcondition we implicitly assume the trivial predicate
true. For instance, in the turnstile protocol of Fig. 3 the transition with label
?S.pass() between the states LOCKED and ON ALERT has the implicit pre- and
postcondition true (and hence is underspecified) while for the same operation called
in state UNLOCKED the postcondition is passed′ = passed + 1. This shows that
the effect of an invocation of a particular operation may indeed depend on the
source state where the operation is called which can be conveniently specified by
the behaviour protocols as introduced here.
UNLOCKED LOCKED
ALARM
ON ALERT
!O.alarm()
?S.pass()[passed ′ = passed + 1]
[x ≥ fare]?S.coin(x) ?O.ready()
?S.pass()
Figure 3. Protocol FT of component Turnstile.
IDLE
?T.alarm()
!T.ready()
ALARM
Figure 4. Protocol FO of component Operator.
Two behaviour protocols can be combined to an assembly protocol that de-
scribes the behaviour of a system with interacting components. For this purpose we
introduce a composition operator K which composes two protocols in accordance
with a connector K between ports P1 and P2. The composition synchronises tran-
sitions whose labels match on corresponding inputs and outputs on P1 and P2 and
vice versa. For instance, a transition with label [ϕ1]!P1.op[pi1] of the first protocol
is synchronised with a transition with label [ϕ2]?P2.op[pi2] of the second protocol
which yields a transition with label [ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2]P1 .K P2.op[pi1 ∧ pi2]. The resulting
transition expresses a correct communication which can only occur if both precon-
ditions and both postconditions are satisfied. Thus by protocol composition via
a connector K with ports(K) = {P1, P2}, two transitions with matching labels in
LP(P1) and LP(P2) are synchronised to a single transition with label in LP(K).
Transitions with labels in LP(P1) ∪ LP(P2) which can not be matched are deleted
and all other transitions are interleaved.
Definition 3.3 [Protocol Composition]
For i ∈ {1, 2}, let Ai be assemblies, Pi ∈ open(Ai), Fi = (Si, s0,i,LP(Ai),∆i) ∈
Prot(Ai), and let K : {P1, P2} be a connector. The protocol composition of F1 and
F2 via K is defined by
F1 K F2 = (S1 × S2, (s0,1, s0,2),LP(A1 +K A2),∆)
where ∆ is the least relation satisfying: if (s1, s2) ∈ S1 × S2 then
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(1) for i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j, for all op ∈ opnsreq(Pi), li = [ϕi]!Pi.op[pii] ∈ LP(Pi),
and lj = [ϕj ]?Pj .op[pij ] ∈ LP(Pj), if (si, li, s′i) ∈ ∆i and (sj , lj , s′j) ∈ ∆j then
((s1, s2), [ϕi ∧ ϕj ]Pi .K Pj .op[pii ∧ pij ], (s′1, s′2)) ∈ ∆;
(2) for all l1 ∈ LP(A1) \ LP(P1) and s2 ∈ S2,
if (s1, l1, s′1) ∈ ∆1 then ((s1, s2), l1, (s′1, s2)) ∈ ∆;
(3) for all l2 ∈ LP(A2) \ LP(P2) and s1 ∈ S1,
if (s2, l2, s′2) ∈ ∆2 then ((s1, s2), l2, (s1, s′2)) ∈ ∆.
The composition operator for protocols is associative (up to equivalence of pre-
conditions and of postconditions). It is related to the synchronous product of sym-
bolic transition systems defined in [5] where synchronisation vectors are used in-
stead of corresponding input/output labels. While in [5] predicates occurring in
labels always refer to the data states of the owning component, in our approach
we distinguish between send labels, whose predicates refer to the data states of the
connected component, and receive labels whose predicates refer to the data states
of the owning component.
Apparently, the conjunctions of the preconditions and of the postconditions used
in the protocol composition do, in general, not allow for independent implementabil-
ity which can only be ensured if the protocols to be composed are compatible. Two
protocols are compatible w.r.t. a connector K if their transitions with send labels on
a port of K can be mutually simulated by corresponding transitions with a match-
ing input label on the opposite port. In particular, the pre- and postconditions of
matching labels must subsume each other in the usual covariant manner where it is
allowed to weaken preconditions and to strengthen postconditions; cf., e.g. [9,13].
Formally, we define protocol compatibility by using the following compatibility re-
lation (which is a particular kind of a mutual simulation relation).
Definition 3.4 [Compatibility Relation]
For i ∈ {1, 2}, let Ai be assemblies, Pi ∈ open(Ai), Fi = (Si, s0,i,LP(Ai),∆i) ∈
Prot(Ai), and K : {P1, P2} be a connector. A K-compatibility relation for F1 and
F2 is a relation R ⊆ S1 × S2 such that for all (s1, s2) ∈ R the following holds:
(1) for i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j, for all li = [ϕi]!Pi.op[pii] ∈ LP(Pi), if (si, li, s′i) ∈ ∆i,
then there exists a transition (sj , lj , s′j) ∈ ∆j with lj = [ϕj ]?Pj .op[pij ] ∈ LP(Pj)
such that (s′i, s
′
j) ∈ R,  (ϕi ⇒ ϕj), and  (ϕi ∧ pij ⇒ pii);
(2) for all l1 ∈ LP(A1) \ LP(P1), if (s1, l1, s′1) ∈ ∆1 then (s′1, s2) ∈ R;
(3) for all l2 ∈ LP(A2) \ LP(P2), if (s2, l2, s′2) ∈ ∆2 then (s1, s′2) ∈ R.
Condition (1) formalises the requirements that for every operation call specified
by a protocol there must exists a corresponding reception specified by the other
protocol, with the conditions on pre- and postconditions as explained above. By
conditions (2) and (3) compatibility must be independent of other transitions not
involved in communications on K.
Definition 3.5 [Protocol Compatibility]
Let F1, F2, K be as in Def. 3.4. F1 and F2 are K-compatible if there exists a
K-compatibility relation R for F1 and F2 such that (s0,1, s0,2) ∈ R.
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1. Labels L(P ) for a port P , m ∈ opnsprv (P ), n ∈ opnsreq (P ):
• ?P.(m, ρ) where ρ : varin(m)→ V
• (T, !P.(n, ρ)) where T ⊆ D(obsreq (P )), ρ : varin(n)→ V
2. Labels L(K) for a connector K : {P1, P2}, m ∈ opnsprv (Pj), i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j:
• Pi .K Pj .(m, ρ) where ρ : varin(m)→ V
3. Labels L(A) for assembly A: L(A) = SP∈open(A) L(P ) ∪SK∈conns(A) L(K)
Figure 5. Labels for implementation models.
4 Protocol Implementation and Compositionality
In this section we define a formal semantics for behaviour protocols in terms of
their correct implementations and we study compositionality of implementations
and protocols. For the formalisation of implementations we follow a model-theoretic
approach where an implementation is represented by an input-enabled labelled tran-
sition system, also called implementation model.
The states of an implementation model must carry information for both, the
control flow and the evolution of data states. To discriminate the two aspects we
distinguish between control states and data states. As already explained in the
preliminaries a (visible) data state is determined by the values of the observers of
a given observer signature. Hence, for a component C, a (visible) data state is an
element σ ∈ D(obs(C)). The underlying state space of C in an implementation
model is then formed by the cartesian product CtrlC ×QC of a set of control states
CtrlC and a set of data states QC ⊆ D(obs(C)). The state space of an assembly is
formed by the cartesian product of the state spaces of all contained components.
We will now define the different labels occurring in implementation models. Im-
plementation labels are divided, like protocol labels, into labels L(P ) for ports P
and labels L(K) for connectors K; see Fig. 5. The labels in L(P ) describe the ac-
tions of receiving or sending an operation invocation on port P . A label of the form
?P.(m, ρ) expresses the reception of an invocation of a provided operation m on port
P with actual parameters determined by a valuation ρ : varin(m)→ V. A transition
labelled with ?P.(m, ρ) connects the state where the operation is called with the
state after execution of the operation. Hence the implementation models considered
here assume atomic operation executions. We do not model non terminating pro-
grams here which could, however, be easily integrated by using partial transitions
which lead to an undefined state ⊥. A label of the form (T, !P.(m, ρ)) expresses
that the implementation sends out an operation call of m with actual parameters
ρ provided that the receiver is in some state determined by T . More precisely, T is
a set of data states over the observer signature of the connected component which
models the fact that the implementation only invokes m if the visible data state
of the receiver component belongs to T . In a concrete implementation this would
mean that the sender component performs in an atomic action a test on the data
state of the receiver component (by means of the observers) and, depending on the
result, invokes the required operation. Implementation models for assemblies must
also include labels for communication via connectors. For a connector K between
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ports P1 and P2, the set L(K) consists of labels of the form P1 .K P2.(m, ρ) which
express the synchronised operation invocation (m, ρ) sent on P1 and received on
P2. The target state of a transition labelled by P1 .K P2.(m, ρ) is reached when
the operation has finished its execution. For an assembly A the implementation
labels in L(A) are those labels which correspond to connectors or to open ports of
A. Moreover, the set of input labels L?(A) of A is given by all labels in L(A) of
the form ?P.(m, ρ) where P ∈ open(A). Implementation models are required to be
L?(A)-enabled, i.e. all provided operations on the open ports of an assembly can
be called in each reachable state.
Definition 4.1 [Implementation Model]
For an assembly A, an A-implementation model (A-implementation for short) is an
L?(A)-enabled LTS M = (Q, q0,L(A),∆) with state space
Q =
∏
C∈cmps(A)
CtrlC ×QC
where for each component C ∈ cmps(A), CtrlC is a set of control states and QC ⊆
D(obs(C)) is a set of (visible) data states of C. The class of all A-implementations
is denoted by Impl(A). For a state q ∈ Q and a component C ∈ cmps(A) we
write qC for the projection of q to the state of the component C which is a pair
qC = (c, σ) ∈ CtrlC ×QC . We write δ(qC) to refer to the data state part σ of qC .
We require that implementation models are well-formed : A component’s state
may only be changed by a transition whose label involves a port of the component.
More specifically, the data state of a component C can only be changed by a tran-
sition whose label has the form ?P.(m, ρ) or P1 .K P.(m, ρ) where P is a port of C.
The formalisation of well-formedness of implementation models is straightforward
and omitted here.
Let us now discuss implementation correctness for an implementation model M
w.r.t. a given protocol F . The behaviour protocol F can be considered as a contract
between the implementor and the users of provided and required operations. From
the implementor’s point of view this means that it can be assumed that, first, a
provided operation is only called in a state where the call is admissible according
to the protocol and, secondly, that the given precondition for the invoked operation
is satisfied. Under these assumptions the implementation must ensure that after
the execution of the operation the given postcondition is satisfied and that one can
proceed as specified by the protocol. If the user does not meet the implementor’s
assumptions then the implementation can have an arbitrary behaviour. From the
user’s point of view the contract principle imposes the obligation that a required
operation is only invoked in accordance with the protocol; in particular the given
precondition must be satisfied. Then the user can assume that the given postcondi-
tion holds after execution of the operation and that she/he can proceed as specified
by the protocol. It may still be useful to remark that an implementation model
plays, in general, the role of an implementor and the role of a user. The imple-
mentor’s role is shown by transitions with labels of the form ?P.(m, ρ) while the
user’s role is shown by transitions with labels of the form (T, !P.(m, ρ)). The above
considerations can be formalised by adapting the concept of an alternating simula-
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tion relation for interface automata in [3] to our needs where we have to deal with
predicates on the specification level and with data states on the implementation
level. In this context the alternating simulation relation contains pairs (s, q), where
s is a protocol state and q denotes an assembly state; i.e. q determines, for each
component C in the assembly, the component’s control and data state qC = (c, σ).
The simulation relation is alternating, because reception of messages as specified in
the protocol must be simulated in the implementation model, and conversely, every
sending of a message in the model must be simulated by the protocol.
Definition 4.2 [Alternating Simulation Relation]
Let A be an assembly, F = (S, s0,LP(A),∆F , I) ∈ Prot(A) be an A-protocol, and
M = (Q, q0,L(A),∆M ) ∈ Impl(A). An alternating simulation relation between F
and M is a relation R ⊆ S ×Q such that for all (s, q) ∈ R,
(1) for all P ∈ open(A), C = cmp(P ),
(a) for all labels l = [ϕ]?P.op[pi] ∈ LP(P ) and for all ρ : varin(op)→ V,
if (s, l, s′) ∈ ∆F and δ(qC); ρ  ϕ then for all transitions (q, ?P.(op, ρ), q′) ∈
∆M it holds (s′, q′) ∈ R and δ(qC), δ(q′C); ρ  pi;
(b) for all labels l = (T, !P.(op, ρ)) ∈ L(P ), if (q, l, q′) ∈ ∆M then there exists a
transition (s, [ϕ]!P.op[pi], s′) ∈ ∆F such that for all σ ∈ T it holds σ; ρ  ϕ
and (s′, q′) ∈ R;
(2) for all K : {P1, P2} ∈ conns(A), C1 = cmp(P1), C2 = cmp(P2) it holds:
for i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j, for all labels l = Pi.KPj .(op, ρ) ∈ L(K), if (q, l, q′) ∈ ∆M
then there exists a transition (s, [ϕ]Pi .K Pj .op[pi], s′) ∈ ∆F such that (s′, q′) ∈
R, δ(qCj ); ρ  ϕ and δ(qCj ), δ(q′Cj ); ρ  pi.
Conditions (1)(a) and (1)(b) formalise the contract principle behind protocols
as described above. Condition (2) expresses that communications between com-
ponents on the implementation level must be simulated by corresponding protocol
transitions. Thus we do not treat communications as invisible actions which are
abstracted in a refinement relation because for assembly implementations it is still
important that communications conform to the protocol. At a later stage one can
still abstract from communications and build a composite component arround an
assembly which, however, goes beyond the scope of this paper.
We can now define correctness of assembly models w.r.t. assembly protocols in
terms of alternating simulation relations.
Definition 4.3 [Implementation Correctness]
Let A be an assembly, F = (S, s0,LP(A),∆F ) ∈ Prot(A) be an A-protocol, and
M = (Q, q0,L(A),∆M ) ∈ Impl(A). M is a correct A-implementation of F , if there
exists an alternating simulation relation R between F and M such that (s0, q0) ∈ R.
The class of all correct A-implementations of F is denoted by JF K.
Implementation models can be composed to build larger systems from smaller
ones. For this purpose we introduce the operator ⊗K which composes two imple-
mentation models in accordance with a connector K between ports P1 and P2. The
composition of two models M1, M2 synchronises transitions concerning the con-
nected ports if their labels, e.g. (T, !P1.(op, ρ)) and ?P2.(op, ρ), express the same
operation invocation (op, ρ) and if M1 meets M2 in a state whose visible data part
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(of the connected component) lies in the set T which has guarded the send message.
The remaining messages on the connected ports P1 and P2 are removed. Transitions
with labels not in L(P1) ∪ L(P2) are interleaved in the model composition.
Definition 4.4 [Model Composition]
For i ∈ {1, 2}, let Ai be assemblies, Mi = (Qi, q0,i,L(Ai),∆i) ∈ Impl(Ai), Pi ∈
open(Ai), and let K : {P1, P2} be a connector. The model composition of M1
and M2 via K is defined by M1 ⊗K M2 = (Q, q0,L(A),∆) where A = A1 +K A2,
Q = Q1 × Q2, q0 = (q0,1, q0,2), and the transition relation ∆ is the least relation
satisfying
(1) for i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j, for all op ∈ opnsreq(Pi), ρ : varin(op)→ V,
if (qi, (T, !Pi.(op, ρ)), q′i) ∈ ∆i and (qj , ?Pj .(op, ρ), q′j) ∈ ∆j
and δ(qj,cmp(Pj)) ∈ T , then ((q1, q2), Pi .K Pj .(op, ρ), (q′1, q′2)) ∈ ∆;
(2) for all l1 ∈ L(A1) \ L(P1) and q2 ∈ Q2,
if (q1, l1, q′1) ∈ ∆1 then ((q1, q2), l1, (q′1, q2)) ∈ ∆;
(3) for all l2 ∈ L(A2) \ L(P2) and q1 ∈ Q1,
if (q2, l2, q′2) ∈ ∆2 then ((q1, q2), l2, (q1, q′2)) ∈ ∆.
The composition operator ⊗K is associative and is straightforward to show that
it preserves well-formedness of implementation models.
We are now able to present our final compositionality result which says that
two correct implementation models with compatible protocols can be composed to
a correct implementation model of the composed protocol. Often this is also called
independent implementability [3]: Under the assumption of compatible protocols,
any correct implementation of the first protocol composed with any correct imple-
mentation of the second protocol yields a correct implementation of the composed
specification, i.e., protocols can be independently implemented.
Theorem 4.5 For i ∈ {1, 2}, let Fi be Ai-protocols, Pi ∈ ports(Ai),Mi ∈ Impl(Ai),
and let K : {P1, P2} be a connector. If M1 ∈ JF1K, M2 ∈ JF2K, and F1, F2 are K-
compatible, then M1 ⊗K M2 ∈ JF1 K F2K.
Proof For i ∈ {1, 2}, let Si be the state space of Fi and Qi be the state space of
Mi. By assumption there exist alternating simulation relations R1 ⊆ S1 × Q1 and
R2 ⊆ S2 × Q2, and a K-compatibility relation Rcompat ⊆ S1 × S2 for F1 and F2.
For proving the correctness of M1 ⊗K M2 we must find an alternating simulation
relation R between F1K F2 and M1⊗KM2 such that ((s0,1, s0,2), (q0,1, q0,2)) ∈ R.
We define R by
((s1, s2), (q1, q2)) ∈ R :⇐⇒ (s1, q1) ∈ R1 and (s2, q2) ∈ R2 and (s1, s2) ∈ Rcompat.
It is straightforward to show that R is indeed an alternating simulation relation as
required. 2
The following example illustrates that protocol compatibility is indeed manda-
tory for the validity of Thm. 4.5.
Example 4.6 Fig. 6 shows two connected components C and D which are specified
by the protocols FC and FD resp. We assume that the state predicate ϕ is not
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equivalent to true. Then FC and FD are obviously not compatible because the
label !P.a in FC has the (implicit) precondition true. Moreover, extracts of two
correct implementations MC ∈ JFCK and MD ∈ JFDK are given which show the
relevant transitions for this example. In the graphical presentation of MD we use the
following “relaxed” notations: The indicated initial state denotes a set of reachable
states which contains the concrete initial state which we assume does not satisfy ϕ;
the transition labelled with {ϕ}?Q.a stands for a set of transitions {(q, ?Q.(a, ρ), q′) |
δ(q); ρ  ϕ} and, similarly, the transition labelled with {¬ϕ}?Q.a stands for a set of
transitions. The implementation model MD is correct since for any call of a on port
Q which meets MD in a data state satisfying ϕ it shows the specified behaviour,
otherwise it may show arbitrary behaviour; in our case, MD sends out b on the
open port R. In the model composition MC ⊗K MD, the message b will indeed be
sent out but this is not an admissible action according to the protocol composition
FC K FD. Thus the theorem does not hold without the assumption of compatible
protocols.
!P.a
!P.(a, ρ)
P
K
Q RC D
FC
MC
{¬ϕ}?Q.(a, ρ)
{ϕ}?Q.(a, ρ)
[ϕ]?Q.a
!R.(b, ρ′)
FD
MD
Figure 6. Incompatible protocols.
Theorem 4.5 is strongly related to the compositionality result of de Alfaro and
Henzinger which was formulated for refinements of interface automata; cf. [4]. As
already mentioned before a crucial difference in our approach is that, caused by the
treatment of data states, we use two different formalisms for specification and for
implementation: finite behaviour protocols and implementation models (with possi-
bly infinitely many states). On the specification level we have required compatibility
of protocols while on the implementation level this requirement is trivially satisfied
since implementation models are input-enabled. This is also the reason why it was
not necessary to restrict the parallel composition operator to compatible states as
done in [4].
5 Concluding Remarks
We have proposed a formalism for specification and implementation of component
and assembly behaviour which integrates the aspects of control flow and evolving
data states. A simpler form of the current approach has been presented in [2]
where components and assemblies were not considered and where a program can
only play one role, either being a user or being the provider of a set of operations.
So two different correctness notions were considered in [2], user correctness and
implementation correctness, and no alternating simulation was used. Moreover,
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we have focused on a sequential approach in [2] where the correctness notion for
implementations allows to utilise postconditions to infer properties of the connected
component’s data states. If, for instance, in two subsequent operation calls the
postcondition of the first operation implies the precondition of the second one, the
invocation of the latter would be safe in a sequential system even without querying
the data state again. Obviously, this would, in general, not work for systems of
concurrently running components as considered here, because there might be some
interfering operation executions (invoked on different ports) in between possibly
changing the component’s data state in an unexpected way. There are essentially
three ways out of this problem:
• Blocking of operation execution until the precondition is satisfied (which is sug-
gested in [10] for asynchronous communication but which requires possibly costly
deadlock and liveness analysis).
• Querying the data state of the target component to check the precondition before
an operation is called; in this case the query and the operation execution must
be combined to an atomic action (which is the model supported here at the cost
of flexibility and performance).
• Architectural constraints or protocol constraints on access to shared observers
(which is still an issue for further investigation).
There are several directions in which the current approach can be further de-
veloped. First, it is straightforward to integrate state invariants for components.
It should also not be difficult to take into account hierarchically structured compo-
nents as considered in [7]. A real challenge will be to study to what extent the ideas
presented here can be transferred to asynchronously communicating components
which use FIFO buffers for transmitting messages.
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comments have shown that we needed a simplification of the presentation. There-
fore we have decided to simplify behaviour protocols and implementation models
such that, differently to the pure form of behaviour protocols in [11], the events of
emitting an operation invocation and getting the corresponding response are not
distinguished anymore; symmetrically, also the events of receiving an operation in-
vocation and sending the response are not distinguished here. As a consequence,
the current formalisation assumes that operation executions are atomic. The more
general case would allow for an arbitrary interleaving of operation executions; but
then to get the compositionality theorem one needs to impose appropriate restric-
tions to ensure that the change of data states is consistent to the single views of
each user of a component.
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Abstract
Contract-based design is an expressive paradigm for a modular and compositional specification of programs.
It is in turn becoming a fundamental concept in mainstream industrial computer-aided design tools for
embedded system design. In this paper, we elaborate new foundations for contract-based embedded system
design by proposing a general-purpose algebra of assume/guarantee contracts based on two simple concepts:
first, the assumption or guarantee of a component is defined as a filter and, second, filters enjoy the structure
of a Boolean algebra. This yields a structure of contracts that is a Heyting algebra.
1 Introduction
Common methodological guidelines for attacking the design of large embedded ar-
chitectures advise the validation of specifications as early as possible and an iterative
validation of each refinement or modification made to the initial specification, until
the implementation of the system is finalized. Additionally, cooperative component-
based development requires to use and to assemble components, which have been
developed by different suppliers, in a safe and consistent way [10,15]. These com-
ponents have to be provided with their conditions of use and guarantees that they
have been validated when these conditions are satisfied. This represents a notion
of contract. Contracts are now often required as a useful mechanism for valida-
tion in robust software design. Design by Contract, as advocated in [26], is being
made available for usual languages like C++ or Java. Assertion-based contracts ex-
press program invariants, pre- and post-conditions, as Boolean type expressions that
have to be true for the contract being validated. We adopt a different paradigm
of contract to define a component-based validation technique in the context of a
synchronous modeling framework. In our model, a component is represented by
an abstract view of its behaviors. It has a finite set of input/output variables to
1 Partially funded by the EADS Foundation.
This paper is electronically published in
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science
URL: www.elsevier.nl/locate/entcs
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cooperate with its environment. Behaviors are viewed as multi-set traces on the
variables of the component. The abstract model of a component is thus a process,
defined as a set of such behaviors.
A contract is a pair (assumptions, guarantees). Assumptions describe properties
expected by a component to be satisfied by the context (the environment) in which
this component is used; on the opposite guarantees describe properties that are
satisfied by the component itself when the context satisfies the assumptions. Such
a contract may be documentary; however, when a suitable formal model exists,
contracts can be subject to some formal verification tool. We want to provide
designers with such a formal model allowing “simple” but powerful and efficient
computation on contracts. Thus, we define a novel algebraic framework to enable
formal reasoning on contracts. It is based on two simple concepts.
First, the assumptions and guarantees of a component are defined as process-
filters: assumptions filter the processes (sets of behaviors) a component may accept
and guarantees filter the processes a component provides. A process-filter is the
set of processes, whatever their input and output variables are, that are compatible
with some property (or constraint), expressed on the variables of the component.
Second and foremost, we define a Boolean algebra to manipulate process-filters.
This yields an algebraically rich structure which allows us to reason on contracts
(to abstract, refine, combine and normalize them). This algebraic model is based
on a minimalist model of execution traces, allowing one to adapt it easily to a
particular design framework.
A characteristic of this model is that it allows one to precisely handle the vari-
ables of components and their possible behaviors. This is a key point. Indeed,
assumptions and guarantees are expressed, as usual, by properties constraining or
relating the behaviors of some variables. What has to be considered very carefully
is thus the “compatibility” of such constraints with the possible behaviors of other
variables. This is the reason why we introduce partial order relations on processes
and on process-filters. Moreover, having a Boolean algebra on process-filters allows
one to formally, unambiguously and finitely express complementation within the
algebra. This is, in turn, a real advantage compared to related formalisms and
models.
Plan
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces a suitably general alge-
bra of processes which borrows its notations and concepts from domain theory [1].
A contract (A,G) is viewed as a pair of logical devices filtering processes: the as-
sumption A filters processes to select (accept or conversely reject) those that are
asserted (accepted or conversely rejected) by the guarantee G. Process-filters are
defined in Section 3 and contracts in Section 4. Section 5 discusses application of
our model to the synchronous Signal language. Related works are further discussed
in Section 6. Section 7 concludes the presentation. Detailed proofs of all properties
presented in this article are available in a technical report [12].
2 An algebra of processes
We start with the definition of a suitable algebra for behaviors and processes. Usu-
ally, a behavior describes the trace of a discrete process (a Mazurkiewicz trace [24] or
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a tuple of signals in Lee’s tagged signal model [18]). We deliberately choose a more
abstract definition in order to encompass not only sequences of Boolean, integer,
real variables but also behaviors of more complex systems such as hybrid systems
or, on the contrary, simpler “behaviors” associating scalar values with variables, to
represent execution cost, memory size, etc. In this paper we focus the presentation
on usual process behaviors.
Definition 2.1 [Behavior] Let V be an infinite, countable set of variables, and D
a set of values; for Y, a finite set of variables included in V (written Y ⊂ V), Y
nonempty, a Y-behavior is a function b : Y → D.
The set of Y-behaviors is denoted by BY =∆ Y → D. Definition 2.1 is extended
to the empty variable domain: B∅ =∆ ∅ (there is no behavior associated with the
empty set of variables). For Y, a finite set of variables included in V, Y nonempty,
c a Y-behavior, X a (possibly empty) subset of Y, c|X is the restriction of c on X,
c|X =∆ {(x,c(x))|x ∈ X}, c|∅ =∆ ∅; then c|Y = c.
In Figure 1, the x, y-behaviors b1 and b2 are functions from the variables x, y to
functions that denote signals. Behavior b1 is a discrete sampling mapping a domain
of time represented by natural numbers to values. Behavior b2 associates x, y to
continuous functions of time.
Figure 1. Examples of behaviors.
We define a process as a set of behaviors on a given set of variables.
Definition 2.2 [Process] For X, a finite set of variables (X ⊂ V), an X-process p
is a nonempty set of X-behaviors.
Thus, since B∅ = ∅, there is a unique ∅-process, designated by Ω =∆ {∅}; Ω has
the empty behavior as unique behavior. The empty process is denoted by f =∆ ∅.
Since Ω does not have any variable, it has no effect when composed (intersected)
with other processes. It can be seen as the universal process, for constraint conjunc-
tion, in contrast with f, the empty set of behaviors, the use of which in constraint
conjunction always results in the empty set. f can be seen as the null process.
For X, a finite set of variables (X ⊂ V), we denote by PX =∆ P(BX) \ {f} the
set of X-processes (P∅ = {Ω}). P =∆ ∪(X ⊂ V) PX denotes the set of all processes.
The domain of behaviors in an X-process p is denoted by var(p) =∆ X.
A process is a nonempty set of behaviors. Then we extend P to P? =∆ P ∪ {f}
and ∀X ⊂ V, PX to P?X =∆ PX ∪ {f}. Moreover, we extend the definition of var(p)
to var(f) =∆ V.
The following operators will be used to define filters and contracts: the comple-
mentary of a process p in PX is a process in P?X; the restriction of a process p in
PX to Y ⊆ X ⊂ V is the abstraction (projection) of p to Y; finally, the extension
of p in PX to Y ⊂ V, Y finite, is the process on Y that has the same constraints as
p.
39
Y. Glouche, P. Le Guernic, J-P. Talpin, T. Gautier
Definition 2.3 [Complementary, restriction and extension] For X, a finite set of
variables (X ⊂ V), the complementary p˜ of a process p ∈ PX is defined by p˜ =∆
(BX \ p). Also, B˜X = f. When X, Y are finite sets of variables such that X ⊆
Y ⊂ V, we define by q|X =∆ {c|X|c ∈ q} the restriction q|X ∈ PX of q ∈ PY and by
p|Y =∆ {c ∈ BY|c|X ∈ p} the extension p|Y ∈ PY of p ∈ PX. Hence, we have q|∅ =
Ω, q|var(q) = q, Ω|Y = BY and p|var(p) = p.
Figure 2. Complementary, restriction and extension of a process.
The complementary p˜ of a process p defined on the variables x and y, Figure 2,
consists of all behaviors defined on x, y not belonging to p. The restriction p|{x, y}
of a process p defined on x, y, z, consists of its projection on the restricted domain;
right, the extension p|{x, y, z} of a process p defined on x, y is the largest process
defined on x, y, z whose restriction on x, y is equal to p.
The set P?X, equipped with union, intersection and complementary, extended
with f˜ = BX, is a Boolean algebra with supremum P?X and infimum f. The
definition of restriction is extended to f, the null process, with f|X =∆ {c|X|c ∈ ∅}
= f. Since V is the set of all variables, the definition of extension is simply extended
to f, with f|V =∆ f. The process extension operator induces a partial order  ,
such that p  q if q is an extension of p to variables of q; the relation  , used to
define filters, is studied below.
Definition 2.4 [Process extension relation] The process extension relation  is
defined by: (∀ p ∈ P) ( ∀ q ∈ P) (p  q) =∆ ((var(p) ⊆ var(q)) ∧ (p|var(q) = q))
Thus, if (p  q), q is defined on more variables than p; on the variables of p, q
has the same constraints as p; its other variables are free. This relation extends to
P? with (f  f).
Property 2.5 (P?,) is a poset.
Checking transitivity, antisymmetry and reflexivity is immediate.
In this poset, the upper set of a process p, called ex-
tension upper set, is the set of all its extensions; it
is denoted by p↑ =∆ {q ∈ P|p  q}. The extension
upper set is illustrated in Figure 3.
To study properties of extension upper sets, we char-
acterize the set of variables that are constrained by a
given process: we write that a process q ∈ P controls
some variable y, if y belongs to var(q) and q is not
equal to the extension on var(q) of its projection on
(var(q)\{y}). Figure 3. Extension upper set.
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This is illustrated in Fig-
ure 4, there is some be-
havior b in q that has
the same restriction on
(var(q)\{y}) as some be-
havior c in Bvar(q) such that
c does not belong to q;
thus q is strictly included in
(q|(var(q)\{y}))|var(q) . Figure 4. Controlled (left) and non-controlled (right) variable y in aprocess q.
Formally, a process q ∈ P controls a variable y, written (q y), iff (y ∈ var(q))
and q 6= ((q|(var(q)\{y}))|var(q)). A process q ∈ P controls a variable set X, written
(qX), iff (∀ x ∈ X) (q x).
Moreover,  is extended to P? with f V. Note that if a process p controls X,
this does not imply that, for all x ∈ X, y ∈ X, x 6= y, (p|(X\{x})) controls y: it may
be the case that x is constrained in p by y; then if x is “removed” (by the projection
on other controlled variables), y may be free in this projection. We define a reduced
process (the key concept to define filters) as being a process that controls all of its
variables.
Definition 2.6 [Reduced process] A process p ∈ P? is reduced iff p var(p).
For instance, Ω is reduced. On the contrary, BX is never reduced when X is not
empty. Reduced processes are minimal in (P,). We denote by Oq, called reduction
of q, the (minimal) process such that
O
q  q (p is reduced iff Op = p). For all X, we
have
O
BX = Ω.
Figure 5 illustrates the reduction
O
q of a process
q and a process p, in the extension upper set
O
q↑. Assuming that var(q) = ({x1...n} ∪ {y1...m})
and that q controls the variables {x1...n}, we have
var(
O
q) = {x1...n}; the process p is such that p ∈ Oq↑
with var(p) ⊆ ({x1...n} ∪ {y1...m} ∪ {z1...l}); it con-
trols the variables {x1...n}, and {y1...m} ∪ {z1...l} is
a set of free variables, such that
O
q =
O
p.
Figure 5. Reduction of a process.
Property 2.7 The complementary p˜ of a nonempty process p strictly included in
Bvar(p) is reduced iff p is reduced; then p˜ and p control the same set of variables
var(p).
From the above, the extension upper set
O
p↑ of the reduction of p is a (principal)
filtered set [1]: it is nonempty and each pair of elements has a lower bound. Then
O
p↑ is composed of all the sets of behaviors, defined on variable sets that include
the variables controlled by p, as maximal processes (for union of sets of behaviors)
that have exactly the same constraints as p (variables that are not controlled by p
are also not controlled in the processes of
O
p↑). We also observe that var(
O
q) is the
greatest subset of variables such that q var(
O
q). For a process q ∈ P?, we extend
the definition of var() to the extension upper set of its reduction by var(
O
q↑) =∆
var(
O
q). Notice that f↑ = {f}.
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We define the inclusion lower set of a set of processes to capture all the subsets
of behaviors of these processes. Let R ⊆ P?, R↓⊆ is the inclusion lower set of R for
⊆ defined by R↓⊆ =∆ {p ∈ P?|( ∃ q ∈ R) (p ⊆ q)}. Hence, none of the processes
but f belongs to the inclusion lower set of the extension upper set of f; on the
contrary, all processes belong to the inclusion lower set of the extension upper set
of Ω: [
O
f↑]↓⊆ = {f} and [
O
Ω↑]↓⊆ = P?.
3 An algebra of filters
In this section, we define a process-filter by the set of processes that satisfy a given
property. We propose an order relation (v) on the set of process-filters Φ. We
establish that (Φ,v) is a Boolean algebra. A process-filter R is a subset of P? that
filters processes. It contains all the processes that are “equivalent” with respect to
some constraint or property, so that all processes in R are accepted or all of them
but f are rejected. A process-filter is built from a unique process generator by
extending it to larger sets of variables and then by including subprocesses of these
“maximal allowed behavior sets”.
Definition 3.1 [Process-filter] A set of processes R is a process-filter iff ( ∃ r ∈ P?)
((r =
O
r) ∧ (R = [r↑]↓⊆)). The process r is a generator of R (R is generated by r).
The process-filter generated by the reduction of a process p is denoted by p̂
=∆ [
O
p↑]↓⊆. The generator of a process-filter R is unique, we refer to it as
O
R. Ω
generates the set of all processes (including f) and f belongs to all filters. Formally,
( ∀ p,r,s ∈ P?), we have:
(p ∈ r̂) =⇒ (var(Or) ⊆ var(p)) r̂ = ŝ⇐⇒ Or = Os Ω ∈ r̂ ⇐⇒ r̂ = P?
Figure 6 illustrates how a process-filter is generated from a process p (depicted by
the bold line) in two successive operations. The first operation consists of building
the extension upper set of the process:
it takes all the processes that are compatible with
p and that are defined on a larger set of variables.
The second operation proceeds using the inclusion
lower set of this set of processes: it takes all the
processes that are defined by subsets of behaviors
from processes in the extension upper set (in other
words, those processes that remain compatible when
adding constraints, since adding constraints removes
behaviors).
Figure 6. Example of process-filter.
We denote by Φ the set of process-filters. We call strict process-filters the process-
filters that are neither P? nor {f}. The filtered variable set of a process-filter R is
var(R) defined by var(R) =∆ var(
O
R).
We define an order relation on process-filters, which we call relaxation, and write
R v S to mean that R is less wide than S.
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Definition 3.2 [Process-filter relaxation] For R and S, two process-filters, let Z
= var(R) ∪ var(S). The relation S relaxes R, written R v S, is defined by:
{f} v S (R v {f})⇐⇒ {f} = R (R v S⇐⇒
O
R
|Z ⊆
O
S
|Z
)
The relaxation relation defines the structure of process-filters, which is shown
to be a lattice.
Lemma 3.3 (Φ,v) is a lattice of supremum P? and infimum {f}. Let R and S be
two process-filters, V = var(R) ∪ var(S), RV =
O
R
|V
and SV =
O
S
|V
. Conjunction
R u S, disjunction R unionsq S and complementary R˜ are defined by:
{f} u R =∆ {f} R u S =∆ [
O
(RV ∩ SV)↑]↓⊆ R˜ =∆ [
O˜
R↑]↓⊆
{f} unionsq R =∆ R R unionsq S =∆ [
O
(RV ∪ SV)↑]↓⊆ P˜? =∆ {f}
{˜f} =∆ P?
If R 6= {f} then R˜ 6= {f} and
O˜
R = (Bvar(R) \
O
R) is reduced and var(R) = var(R˜).
Let us comment the definitions of these operators. Conjunction of two strict
process-filters R and S, for instance, is obtained by first building the extension
of the generators
O
R and
O
S on the union of the sets of their controlled variables;
then the intersection of these processes, which is also a process (set of behaviors)
is considered; since this operation may result in some variables becoming free (not
controlled), the reduction of this process is taken; and finally, the result is the
process-filter generated by this reduction. The same mechanism, with union, is
used to define disjunction. And the complementary of a strict process-filter R is
the process-filter generated by the complementary of its generator
O
R.
The process-filter conjunction RuS of two strict process-filters R and S is the
greatest process-filter T = RuS that accepts all processes that are accepted by R
and by S.
Example 3.4 Let x, a variable taking values in {0,1,2,3} and u, y, v three variables
taking values in {0,1}; let r ∈ P{u, x, y}, s ∈ P{x, y, v}, two reduced processes defined
by
r = {b|b(u) ∈ {0, 1} ∧ b(x) ∈ {0, 1} ∧ b(y) ∈ {0, 1}} ∪ {{(u, 1), (x, 2), (y, 0)}}
s = {b|b(x) ∈ {0, 1} ∧ b(y) ∈ {0, 1} ∧ b(v) ∈ {0, 1}} ∪ {{(x, 3), (y, 1), (v, 0)}}
We observe that r {u, x, y}; u and y are free in r when x is 0 or 1; v is free whatever
the value of x is in r. We also have s {x, y, v}; y and v are free in s when x is 0 or
1; thus u is free whatever the value of x is in s. From the above definitions, we have
that p =∆ r ∩ s = {b|b(u) ∈ {0, 1} ∧ b(x) ∈ {0, 1} ∧ b(y) ∈ {0, 1} ∧ b(v) ∈ {0, 1}}
and
O
p = {b|b(x) ∈ {0, 1}}.
The process-filter disjunction RunionsqS of two strict process-filters R and S is the
smallest process-filter T = RunionsqS that accepts all processes that are accepted by R
or by S.
Example 3.5 Let x, a variable taking values in {0,1,2,3} and u, y, v three variables
taking values in {0,1}; let r ∈ P{u, x, y}, s ∈ P{x, y, v}, two reduced processes such that
r = {b|b(u) ∈ {0, 1} ∧ b(x) ∈ {0, 1} ∧ b(y) = 0}
s = {b|b(x) ∈ {0, 1} ∧ b(y) = 1 ∧ b(v) ∈ {0, 1}}
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Hence, p =∆ r ∪ s = {b|b(u) ∈ {0, 1} ∧ b(x) ∈ {0, 1} ∧ b(y) ∈ {0, 1} ∧ b(v) ∈ {0, 1}}
and
O
p = {b|b(x) ∈ {0, 1}}.
Now we can state a first main result, which is that process-filters form a Boolean
algebra.
Theorem 3.6 (Φ,v) is a Boolean algebra with P? as 1, {f} as 0 and the comple-
mentary R˜.
Variable elimination operators are defined on process-filters.
Definition 3.7 [Variable elimination in process-filter] Let x be a variable, R a
process-filter, and X =∆ var(R). The E-elimination of x in R, noted R|∃x, is
the projection of R on controlled variables other than x. The generator of the U-
elimination of x in R (U-elimination of x in R is noted R|∀x) contains the behaviors
of
O
R restricted on X\{x} for which x is free in
O
R.
R|∃x=∆

̂
(
O
R)|X\{x}, x ∈ X
R, otherwise
R|∀x =∆
˜˜R|∃x
Notice that R|∀x v R v R|∃x.
Example 3.8 Let R, a process-filter generated by ((x > 0) ⇒ (y > 0)) ∧ ((y >
0) ⇒ (z > 0)). Then R|∃x is generated by ((y > 0) ⇒ (z > 0)) and R|∀x is
generated by ((y > 0) ∧ (z > 0)).
4 An algebra of contracts
We define the notion of assume/guarantee contract and propose a refinement rela-
tion on contracts.
Definition 4.1 [Contract] A contract C = (A,G) is a pair of process-filters. var(C),
the variable set of C = (A,G), is defined by var(C) =∆ var(A) ∪ var(G). C =∆
Φ×Φ is the set of contracts.
Usually, an assumption A is an assertion on the be-
havior of the environment (it is typically expressed on
the inputs of a process) and thus defines the set of be-
haviors that the process has to take into account. The
guarantee G defines properties that should be guar-
anteed by a process running in an environment where
behaviors satisfy A.
Figure 7 depicts a process p satisfying the contract
(A,G) (p̂ is the process-filter generated by the reduc-
tion of p).
Figure 7. A process p satisfying
a contract (A,G).
A process p satisfies a contract C = (A,G) if all its behaviors that are accepted
by A (i.e., that are behaviors of some process in A), are also accepted by G; this
is made more precise and formal by the following definition.
Definition 4.2 [Satisfaction] Let C = (A,G) a contract; a process p satisfies C,
written p  C, iff (p̂ u A) v G.
Property 4.3 p  C ⇐⇒ p̂ v (A˜ unionsq G)
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We define a preorder relation that allows to compare contracts. A contract
(A1,G1) is finer than a contract (A2,G2), written (A1,G1) ;(A2,G2), iff all pro-
cesses that satisfy the contract (A1,G1) also satisfy the contract (A2,G2).
Definition 4.4 [Satisfaction preorder](A1,G1);(A2,G2) iff ( ∀ p ∈ P)((p  (A1,G1))
=⇒ (p  (A2,G2)))
The preorder on contracts satisfies the following property:
Property 4.5 (A1,G1) ;(A2,G2) iff (A˜1 unionsq G1) v (A˜2 unionsq G2)
Definition 4.6 [Refinement of contracts] A contract C1 = (A1,G1) refines a con-
tract C2 = (A2,G2), written C1 4 C2, iff (A1,G1) ;(A2,G2), (A2 v A1) and G1
v (A1 unionsq G2).
Refinement of contracts amounts to relaxing assumptions and reinforcing promises
under the initial assumptions. The intuitive meaning is that for any p that satisfies
a contract C, if C refines D then p satisfies D. Our relation of refinement formalizes
substitutability.
Figure 8. Refinement of contracts.
Figure 8 depicts a contract (A1,G1)
that refines a contract (A2,G2).
Among contracts that can be used to
refine an existing contract (A2,G2), we
choose those contracts (A1,G1) that
“scan” more processes than (A2,G2)
(A2 vA1) and that guarantee less pro-
cesses than those of A1unionsqG2. But other
choices could have been made.
By definition of the satisfaction pre-order, we can express the refinement relation
in the algebra of process-filters as follows:
Property 4.7 (A1,G1)4 (A2,G2) iff A2 vA1, (A2uG1)vG2 and G1 v (A1unionsqG2).
The refinement relation (4) defines the poset of contracts, which is shown to be
a lattice. In this lattice, the union or disjunction of contracts is defined by their
least upper bound and the intersection or conjunction of contracts is defined by
their greatest lower bound.
Lemma 4.8 (Composition of contracts) Two contracts C1 = (A1,G1) and C2
= (A2,G2) have a greatest lower bound C = (A,G) , written (C1 ⇓ C2), defined
by:
A = A1unionsqA2 and G = ((A1uA˜2uG1)unionsq(A˜1uA2uG2)unionsq(G1uG2))
and a least upper bound D = (B,H), written (C1 ⇑ C2), defined by:
A = A1uA2 and G = (A˜1uG1)unionsq(A˜2uG2)unionsq(A1uG2)unionsq(A2uG1)
A Heyting algebra H is a bounded lattice such that for all a and b in H there
is a greatest element x of H such that the greatest lower bound of a and x refines
b [6]. For all contracts C1 = (A1,G1), C2 = (A2,G2), there is a greatest element
X = (I,J) of C such that the greatest lower bound of C1 and X refines C2, with:
I = (A˜1uA2)unionsq(A1uA2uG1uG˜2) J = G2unionsq(A1uA˜2)unionsq(A1uG˜1)unionsq(A˜2uG˜1)
Then our contract algebra is a Heyting algebra. In particular, it is distributive.
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Theorem 4.9 (C, 4) is a Heyting algebra with supremum ({f},P?) and infimum
(P?,{f}).
Let x a variable, C = (A,G) a contract, the elimination of x in C is the contract
C\x defined by C\x =∆ (A|∀x,G|∃x).
Property 4.10 A contract C refines the elimination of a variable in C: C 4 C\x
5 Application to the Signal language
In the synchronous multiclocked model of Signal [19], a process (noted p), consists of
the synchronous composition (noted p |q) of equations on signals (noted x = y f z).
A signal x consists of an infinite flow of values that is discretely sampled according
to the pace of its clock. A set of tags t is to denote symbolic periods in time
during which transitions take place. It samples a signal over a countable series of
causally related tags. Then the events, signals, behaviors and processes are defined
as follows:
- an event e is a pair consisting of a tag t and a value v,
- a signal s is a function from a chain of tags to a set of values,
- a behavior b is a function from a set of names to signals,
- a process p ∈ P is a set of behaviors that have the same domain.
Synchronous composition p |q consists of the simultaneous solution of the equa-
tions in p and q at all times.
Definition 5.1 [Synchronous composition of processes] The synchronous compo-
sition of two processes p,q ∈ P is defined by: p |q =∆ { b ∪ c | (b, c) ∈ p × q ∧
b|var(p) ∩ var(q) = c|var(p) ∩ var(q) }
In the context of component-based or contract-based engineering, refinement
and substitutability are recognized as being fundamental requirements [9]. Refine-
ment allows one to replace a component by a finer version of it. Substitutability
allows one to implement every contract independently of its context of use. These
properties are essential for considering an implementation as a succession of steps
of refinement, until final implementation. As noticed in [27], other aspects might be
considered in a design methodology. In particular, shared implementation for dif-
ferent specifications, multiple viewpoints and conjunctive requirements for a given
component.
Considering the synchronous compositon of Signal processes and the greatest
lower bound as a composition operator for contracts, we have:
Property 5.2 Let two processes p,q ∈ P, and contracts C1, C2, C′1, C′2 ∈ C.
(1) C1 4 C2 =⇒ ((p  C1) =⇒ (p  C2)) (4) ((p  C1) ∧ (q  C2)) =⇒ ((p |q)  (C1 ⇓ C2))
(2) C1 ;C2 ⇐⇒ ((p  C1) =⇒ (p  C2)) (5) ((p  C1) ∧ (p  C2)) ⇐⇒ (p  (C1 ⇓ C2))
(3) If C′1 4 C1 and C′2 4 C2 then C′1 ⇓ C′2 4 C1 ⇓ C2
(1) and (2) relate to refinement and implementation; (3) and (4) allow for
subtitutability in composition; (5) addresses multiple viewpoints.
In [13], we develop a module system based on our paradigm of contract for the
Signal formalism, and applied it to the specification of a component-based design
process. This module system, embedding data-flow equations defined in Signal
syntax, has been implemented in OCaml. It produces a proof tree that consists of
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1/ an elaborated Signal program, that hierarchically renders the structure of the
system described in the original module expressions, 2/ a static type assignment,
that is sound and complete with respect to the module type inference system, 3/
a proof obligation consisting of refinement constraints, that are compiled as an
observer or a temporal property in Signal.
The property is then tended to Signal’s model-checker, Sigali [21], which allows
to prove or disprove that it is satisfied by the generated program. Satisfaction im-
plies that the type assignment and produced Signal program are correct with the
initially intended specification. The generated property may however be used for
other purposes. One is to use the controller synthesis services of Sigali [20] to auto-
matically generate a Signal program that enforces the property on the generated
program. Another, in the case of infinite state system (e.g. on numbers), would be
to generate defensive simulation code in order to produce a trace if the property is
violated.
We now illustrate the distinctive features of our contract algebra by considering
the specification of a four-stroke engine and its translation into observers in the
synchronous language Signal.
Figure 9. State machine of 4-stroke engine cycle.
Figure 9 represents a state ma-
chine that denotes the successive
operation modes of a 4-stroke en-
gine: Intake, Compression, Com-
bustion and Exhaust. They are
driven by the camshaft whose po-
sition is measured in degrees.
The angle of the camshaft defines a discrete timing reference, the clock cam, mea-
sured in degrees CAM◦, of initial value 0. Transitions in the state machine are trig-
gered by measures of the camshaft angle. The variables cam, Intake, Compression,
Combustion, Exhaust model the behavior of the engine. We wish to define a con-
tract to stipulate that intake always takes place in the first quarter on the camshaft
revolution. To do this, we define the generator of a process-filter for the assumption.
It should be a measure of the environmental variable cam. Namely cam should be
in the first quarter. Under these assumptions, the state machine should be guar-
anteed to be in the intake mode, hence the generator of the process-filter for the
guarantee: AIntake=∆(cam mod 360 < 90) GIntake=∆Intake
The generic structure of processes in contracts finds a direct in-
stance and compositional translation into the synchronous multi-
clocked model of computation of Signal. Using Signal equations:
AIntake = true when(cam mod360 < 90)GIntake = true when intake default false
A subtlety of the Signal language is that the contract not only talks about the
value, true or false, of the signals, but also about the status of the signal names,
present or absent. Hence, the signal AIntake is present and true iff cam is present
and less than 90. Hence, in Signal, the complementary of the assumptions is
simply defined by A˜Intake = false when AIntake default true to mean that it is
true iff cam is absent or bigger than 90. Notice that, for a trace of the assumptions
AIntake, the set of possible traces corresponding to A˜Intake is infinite (and dense)
since it is not defined on the same clock as AIntake.
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AIntake = 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 and A˜Intake = 0 0 0 0 0 or 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 . . .
It is also worth noticing that the clock of A˜Intake (its reference in time) need not be
explicitly related to or ordered with AIntake or GIntake: it implicitly and partially
relates to the cam clock.
Notice that our model of contract is agnostic as to a particular model of com-
putation and accepts a generic domain of behaviors. Had we instead considered
executable specifications, such as synchronous observers [22], it would have been
more difficult to compositionally define the complementary of a proposition with-
out referring to a global reference of time in the environment (e.g., a clock for the
camshaft), hence abstracting every assumption or guarantee with respect to that
global clock. This does not need to be the case in the present example. Beside
its Boolean structure, our algebra supports the capability to compositionally refine
contracts (without altering or abstracting individual properties) and accepts both
synchronous and asynchronous specifications.
Figure 10. Model of 4-stroke engine cycle.
For instance, consider a more precise
model of the 4-stroke engine found
in [3](Figure 10). To additionally require
that, while in the intake mode, the engine
should reach the EC state (Exhaust closes)
between 5 and 20 degrees, one will simply
compose (greatest lower bound) the intake
contract with the additional one:
AEC = true when(4 < cam mod 360 < 21) GEC = true when EC default false
Contracts can be used to express exclusion properties. For instance, when the
engine is in the intake mode, one should not start compression.
Aexcl=∆OTDC Gexcl=∆¬FBDC
In addition to the above safety properties, contracts can also be used to express
liveness properties. For instance, consider the protocol for starting the engine. A
battery is used to initiate its rotation. When the engine has successfully started,
the battery can be turned off. We can specify a contract to guarantee that engine
cycles are properly counted. We write cycle′ for the next value of the variable cycle.
Acount=∆Exhaust Gcount=∆cycle′ = cycle + 1
Another contract is defined to specify that the starter battery (starter) will even-
tually be turned off after a few cycles. We write F () for the future property of LTL.
Alive=∆(cycle > 0) Glive=∆F (¬starter)
6 Related work
The use of contracts has been advocated for a long time in computer science [23,14]
and, more recently, has been successfully applied in object-oriented software engi-
neering [25]. In object-oriented programming, the basic idea of design-by-contract
is to consider the services provided by a class as a contract between the class and
its caller. The contract is composed of two parts: requirements made by the class
upon its caller and promises made by the class to its caller.
In the context of software engineering, the notion of assertion-based contract has
been adapted for a wide variety of languages and formalisms but the central notion
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of time and/or trace needed for reactive system design is not always taken into
account. For instance, extensions of OCL with linear or branching-time temporal
logics have been proposed in [28,11], focusing on the expressivity of the proposed
constraint language (the way constraints may talk about the internals of classes and
objects), and considering a fixed “sequence of states”. This is a serious limitation
for concurrent system design, as this sequence becomes an interleaving of that of
individual objects.
In the theory of interface automata [2], the notion of interface offers benefits
similar to our notion of contracts and for the purpose of checking interface com-
patibility between reactive modules. In that context, it is irrelevant to separate the
assumptions from guarantees and only one contract needs to be and is associated
with a module. Separation and multiple views become of importance in a more
general-purpose software engineering context. Separation allows more flexibility
in finding (contra-variant) compatibility relations between components. Multiple
views allows better isolation between modules and hence favor compositionality. In
our contract algebra as in interface automata, a contract can be expressed with
only one filter. To this end, a filtering equivalence relation [12] (that defines the
equivalence class of contracts that accept the same set of processes) may be used
to express a contract with only one guarantee filter and with its hypothesis filter
accepting all the processes (or, conversely, with only one hypothesis filter and a
guarantee filter that accepts no process).
In [7], a system of assume-guarantee contracts with similar aims of genericity is
proposed. By contrast to our domain-theoretical approach, the EC Speeds project
considers an automata-based approach, which is indeed dual but makes notions such
as the complementary of a contract more difficult to express from within the model.
The proposed approach also leaves the role of variables in contracts unspecified, at
the cost of some algebraic relations such as inclusion.
In [16], the authors show that the framework of interface automata may be
embedded into that of modal I/O automata. [27] further develops this approach
by considering modal specifications. This consists of labelling transitions that may
be fired and other that must. Modal specifications are equipped with a parallel
composition operator and refinement order which induces a greatest lower bound.
The GLB allows addressing multiple-viewpoint and conjunctive requirements. With
the experience of [7], the authors notice the difficulty in handling interfaces having
different alphabets. Thanks to modalities, they propose different alphabet equal-
izations depending on whether parallel composition or conjunction is considered.
Then they consider contracts as residuations G/A (the residuation is the adjoint of
parallel composition), where assumptions A and guarantees G are both specified as
modal specifications. The objectives of this approach are quite close to ours. Our
model deals carefully alphabet equalization. Moreover, using synchronous compo-
sition for processes and greatest lower bound for process-filters and for contracts,
our model captures both substitutability and multiple-viewpoint.
In [22], a notion of synchronous contracts is proposed for the programming
language Lustre. In this approach, contracts are executable specifications (syn-
chronous observers) timely paced by a clock (the clock of the environment). This
yields an approach which is satisfactory to verify safety properties of individual
49
Y. Glouche, P. Le Guernic, J-P. Talpin, T. Gautier
modules (which have a clock) but can hardly scale to the modeling of globally
asynchronous architectures (which have multiple clocks).
In [8], a compositonal notion of refinement is proposed for a simpler stream-
processing data-flow language. By contrast to our algebra, which encompasses the
expression of temporal properties, it is limited to reasoning on input-output types
and input-output causality graph.
The system JASS [5] is somewhat closer to our motivations and solution. It
proposes a notion of trace, and a language to talk about traces. However, it seems
that it evolves mainly towards debugging and defensive code generation. For em-
bedded systems, we prefer to use contracts for validating composition and hope to
use formal tools once we have a dedicated language for contracts. Like in JML [17],
the notion of agent with inputs/outputs does not exist in JASS, the language is
based on class invariants, and pre/post-conditions associated with methods.
Our main contribution is to define a complete domain theoretical framework for
assume-guarantee reasoning. Starting from a domain-theoretical characterization of
behaviors and processes, we build a Boolean algebra of process-filters and a Heyting
algebra of contracts. This yields a rich structure which is: 1/ generic, in the way it
can be implemented or instantiated to specific models of computation; 2/ flexible,
in the way it can help structuring and normalizing expressions; 3/ complete, in the
sense that all combinations of propositions can be expressed within the model.
Finally, a temporal logic that is consistent with our model, such as for instance
the ATL (Alternating-time Temporal Logic [4]) can directly be used to express
assumptions about the context of a process and guarantees provided by that process.
7 Conclusion
Starting from the choice of an abstract characterization of behaviors as functions
from variables to a domain of values (Booleans, integers, series, sets of tagged
values, continuous functions), we introduced the notion of process-filters to formally
characterize the logical device that filters behaviors from process much like the
assumption and guarantee of a contract do. In our model, a process p fulfils its
requirements (or satisfies) (A,G) if either it is rejected by A (it is then out of the
scope of the contract (A,G)), or it is accepted by G.
Our main results are that the structure of process-filters is a Boolean algebra
and that the structure of contracts is a Heyting algebra, respectively. This rich
structure allows for reasoning on contracts with great flexibility to abstract, refine
and combine them. Moreover, contracts are not limited to expressing safety prop-
erties, as is the case in most related frameworks, but encompass the expression of
liveness properties. This is all again due to the central notion of process-filter.
In the aim of assessing the generality and scalability of our approach, we are
designing a module system based on the paradigm of contract for Signal and ap-
plying it to the specification of a component-based design process. The paradigm
we are putting forward is to regard a contract as the behavioral type of a module or
component and to use it for the elaboration of the functional architecture of a sys-
tem together with a proof obligation that validates the correctness of assumptions
and guarantees made while constructing that architecture.
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Abstract
Software engineering uses models to design and analyse systems. The current state-of-the-art, various forms
of model-driven development, uses diagrams with defined abstract syntax but relatively-lose translational
approaches to semantics, which makes it difficult to perform rigorous analysis and verification of models.
Here, we present work-in-progress on tool support for formal verification of diagrammatic models. The
work builds on Ama´lio’s rigorous template-based approach to formalisation, which formally expresses the
intended semantics of both the diagram notation and modelled system, along with standard correctness
conjectures and, in many cases, proof of these conjectures.
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1 Introduction
In practical software engineering, diagrammatic approaches are widely used for
sketching, specifying and designing systems. There are challenges in applying formal
analysis to these approaches, either because the semantics is inadequately defined,
or because the level of detail of the semantics does not admit interesting or use-
ful formal analysis. Conversely, the formal notations used in verification of critical
systems and in academia are considered inaccessible by many practical engineers
[21,12,27]. If it were possible to provide access to formal analysis without great
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cost, the rigour and reliability of diagrammatic models could be significantly en-
hanced. For many years, people have sought to combine formal and diagrammatic
approaches so that formal type-checking and proof of properties can be used to
explore the correctness and internal consistency of diagrams. However, few inte-
grations have found favour, either because formalisation does not meet engineering
needs, or because engineers are exposed to the formalisation and formal model.
In an attempt to bring formalisms into practical engineering, Ama´lio [3] pro-
poses a generative framework for rigorous model engineering (GeFoRME) that ap-
plies template-based translation to diagrammatic models. Formal templates cap-
ture the intended semantics of diagram concepts as well as the modelled system. A
well-founded template language (the formal template language, FTL [3,8]) makes
it possible to generate not only formal models but also standard consistency con-
jectures and, in many cases, their proofs. Ama´lio demonstrates an instance of
GeFoRME called UML+Z, comprising a library of templates that capture the ob-
ject semantics of UML. Instantiating the templates with details from UML diagrams
results in a Z model that conforms to Ama´lio’s object-oriented (OO) Z structuring,
ZOO [4,7,3,10]. UML+Z has been used on small case studies [3,9] of conventional
object-oriented models including UML class and state diagrams and Catalysis [19]
snapshots. It has also been used in an attempt to formalise part of the meta-object
facility [2] and on a model of autonomous objects [10]. The GeFoRME approach
provides ease of construction, strong semantic support, and traceability between
the formal and diagrammatic models. If templates adequately capture the seman-
tics of source-model concepts, and the source model is syntactically correct, then
the transformation produces a type-correct formal model, on which the conjectures
constructed by template translation are true by construction [6,8].
In all the work with UML+Z, however, a major inhibiting factor is the lack of tool
support for management and instantiation of templates. The GeFoRME approach
employs a formal translation. Translation is a conventional way of considering “in-
tegrated methods” (reviewed in, for example, [17]), but it is essentially the same
as the model transformations that are characteristic of model-driven development
(MDD) – the family of approaches to tool-supported practical software development
that focuses on the construction and manipulation of primarily-diagrammatic mod-
els [29]. As in formal translation, MDD model transformation defines a mapping
from a source model to a target model [11]. The mapping, or transformation defi-
nition, comprises transformation rules which specify how each modelling construct
is transformed. In transforming diagrammatic models to formal models, we ap-
ply a model-to-text (as opposed to model-to-model) transformation. Model-to-text
transformation is most commonly used for code generation [1], so is appropriate for
generating, for instance, the LATEX (or any other) markup for a formal notation.
This paper presents a tool for the management and instantiation of FTL tem-
plates. The tool currently supports the UML+Z translation, as well as a means
to extend the template base; the tool and GeFoRME are sufficiently generic that
the approach could also support other diagrammatic source and formal target lan-
guages. The tool provides the interaction necessary for a na¨ıve user to generate a
formal model and automatically verify it using existing Z tools. In addition, the
tool supports expert users who wish to extend the template repertoire or provide
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new specialisations of the tool.
In the next section, we introduce Ama´lio’s template-based formalisation. In
section 3 we describe the tool support, and in section 4 we illustrate the capabilities
of UML+Z, the translation tool and support for different user levels. In section
5, we discuss the advantages and limitation of the work so far, and consider the
extensions to the tool and the template library.
2 Ama´lio’s Template-based Formalisation
In [9], Ama´lio motivates his work by identifying some shortcomings of diagrammatic
approaches to software engineering that can be addressed by practical formalisation.
He notes the need to model concepts that cannot be expressed diagrammatically
– constraints and model properties – and considers the general problem of seman-
tics. Diagrammatic approaches such as entity-relationship modelling and UML are
widely used in practical software engineering, and the notations have well-defined
abstract syntax (for instance, UML is defined using metamodels, based on the con-
cept of reflectivity). However, the semantics of concepts such as class, association
and generalisation, are under-specified. In most cases, the semantics is clarified
only when a diagrammatic model is converted to code – thus, a class diagram that
forms the basis for a Java program assumes a Java semantics, but the same dia-
gram used to create a C++ program assumes a C++ semantics. In the case of
UML (and related domain-specific modelling notations), annotations are added to
diagrams using notations such as the object constraint language, OCL. The rela-
tionship between the modelling notations and the constraint language is defined at
the abstract syntax level. An obvious connotation of this situation is that whilst
properties of models can be demonstrated informally (for example, by animation),
analysis of consistency or model properties is not consistent across modellers or
modelling tools. In practice, little attention is paid to consistency across model-
views or between diagrams and constraint expressions. Note that this problem is
not unique to diagrammatic models: insufficient semantic underpinning was also a
problem for Z, ultimately addressed in its ISO standardisation.
Most attempts to associate formal semantics to diagrammatic modelling assign
a specific formal meaning to each diagrammatic concept. Whilst this significantly
reduces ambiguity, and admits formal analysis, the formalisation assumes a single,
fixed semantics for each concept [9] – and the semantics that is assumed is often
only apparent to the formalist. One well-known example is the UML to Object-Z
translation, which imposes the semantics of Object-Z inheritance on UML general-
isation [15,14]. By contrast, Ama´lio’s approach [3] builds on ideas of pattern-based
development [20] and problem-driven methods [22] to advocate a framework for
rigorous, but practical MDD [9]; concept semantics are captured explicitly in the
templates, so a different semantics simply requires use of a different set of tem-
plates. The traceability provided by the template transformation approach allows
engineers to work with the diagrams, which, in effect, form a graphical interface
for the formality that lies beneath. In many cases, Ama´lio’s approach allows the
formalism to be completely hidden from the developer.
Ama´lio devised the Formal Template Language (FTL) [3,8] as the rigorous un-
3
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derpinning to the GeFoRME framework, supporting proof with template represen-
tations. Having captured patterns of formal development (e.g. a model structure) in
FTL, reasoning can be applied at the pattern level using meta-proof. For example, a
precondition of an operation can be calculated or an initialisation conjecture proved
to establish meta-theorems that apply when the concept templates are instantiated
[3,8]. The FTL templates and translation process are illustrated in Figure 1 (which
also shows the subsequent automation, covered in section 3).
The existing UML+Z templates and meta-theorems relate to Ama´lio’s ZOO
structuring for Z [7,3]. ZOO uses standard Z – and can easily adapt to pre-
standardisation dialects such as the Z/Eves variant. Unlike Object-Z [30], ZOO
does not require any extension to the Z language or its tool support. Ama´lio shows
how a ZOO model is built incrementally using template instantiation. Structural
components are views representing the main OO concepts: objects, classes, associa-
tions and system. An object is an atom, a member of the set of all possible objects
and of the set of possible objects of its class [10]. The class structure uses a promoted
Z abstract data type [16]; it is represented by an intensional structure that defines
the common properties of the class’s objects, and an extensional structure, that
defines the class as the set of its objects. The formal association structure forms
tuples of the classes’ objects using a Z relation. A system is an ensemble of classes
and associations. Additional properties (constraints, conjectures) are expressed on
the appropriate views.
2.1 Template Instantiation: Ama´lio’s Bank Case Study
One of Ama´lio’s case studies is a banking system. Ama´lio’s formalisation of two
classes from his example demonstrates in outline how template instantiation works.
Ama´lio gives further descriptions in [3,9,8,6,4].
The class diagram, figure 2, shows two classes – Customer and Account. The
association, holds, allows an instance of Customer to have zero or more accounts,
and an instance of Account to have exactly one customer. The Account class has
operations to withdraw money, to deposit money, to getBalance for an account; to
suspend and to reactivate an account. The state changes caused by the Account
operations are described in figure 3. The formalisation is demonstrated here for the
Account class, illustrated in figure 1.
Select FTL templates The templates needed to instantiate the Account class
comprise those for the intensional and extensional definition of a class, and those
for the initialisation of the class (initialisation is a formal technique that captures
a potential start-state for the system, and then proves that this is a valid state
of the system) – see “FTL Template (Typeset from Latex)” in figure 1.
Select class diagram concepts and instantiate templates Each template is
instantiated by replacing placeholders (e.g. <x> : <t> ) with relevant con-
cept and type names from the UML diagram. Where a template includes a FTL
list (e.g. J. . .K(sep,empty) ), the statement is instantiated once for each element –
shown in figure 1 as the instantiation of attributes of the Account class.
Select operation templates and identify operation effects For each opera-
tion on a class, the template instantiation depends on the type of operation.
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Fig. 1. The steps of a UML+Z Translation, with examples of the type-set and LATEX formats involved
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Customer
name: NAME = name?
address : ADDRESS = address?
ctype : CUSTTYPE = ctype?
withdraw(in amount : NAT)
deposit(in amount : NAT)
getBalance(out bal : INT)
suspend()
reactivate()
accountNo : ACCID = accountNo?
balance : INT = 0
atype : ACCTYPE = atype?
Account
holds
1 0..*
Fig. 2. Extract from Ama´lio’s bank system class diagram [3]
active suspended
[balance=0]delete[balance=0]delete
withdraw,
deposit,
getBalance deposit,
getBalancesuspend
reactivate
Fig. 3. Extract from Ama´lio’s bank system state diagram [3]
Details of the operation are not included in class diagrams, but can be extracted
from other UML diagrams or from diagram annotations, or can be entered by
the user. For instance, the withdraw operation is identified as an update oper-
ation that changes the state of the system (the alternative is observe). Here,
the attribute value that changes is balance, and the operation uses the formula,
balance − amount?, where amount? is the input to the operation.
Identify states from state diagram The state diagram shows which system
states need to be represented, but these have to be interpreted in terms of the
classes and attributes. For instance, in figure 3, the two states are active and
suspended. The appropriate template instantiation adds an “attribute”, st: ac-
countST, to the formal representation of Account. Template instantiation then
constructs the formal definition of the attribute type accountST, which here re-
sults in the expression, accountST ::= active|suspended, shown in figure 1.
Instantiate initialisation templates Initialisation in Z is an operation that has
only an after-state, represented in post-condition predicates. Unlike other oper-
ations, it can be generated automatically by setting all attributes to a default
value or an input. The initialisation template is shown in “FTL Template (Type-
set from Latex)” of figure 1, and its instantiation is shown in the “Generated Z
part-specification”. Note that primed components (e.g. Account’ ) are the after-
states of an operation, and queried components (e.g. atype? ) are inputs. The
initialisation of the state attribute st’ is derived from the state diagram, since the
start event in the state diagram points to the first state of the system – in the Ac-
count example, st’ = active. In addition to the initialisation specification shown
in figure 1, a Z conjecture is generated, that the initialisation state is a valid state
of the system. This is associated to one of the meta-theorems (discussed above),
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and is true by construction if the Z model is type-correct.
3 The AUtoZ Tool
The AUtoZ tool (www.jamesrobertwilliams.co.uk/autoz.php) provides automa-
tion for Ama´lio’s UML+Z process, outlined in section 2.1. This section describes
design criteria for the tool. It then outlines the design of the Automatic formalisa-
tion of UML to Z tool framework, AUtoZ.
3.1 Tool Rationale
The motivation of enhancing the rigour of practical software engineering means that
the tool has to be readily accessible to software engineers. The tool should integrate
with existing software engineering tools, and should be able to inter-operate directly
with existing diagramming and formal support tools.
Ama´lio’s GeFoRME is a generic framework, which can be specialised for different
diagrammatic and formal notations, so the tool needs to be modifiable to other
notations.
The tool needs to catalogue the existing UML+Z templates efficiently and sup-
port the addition of new templates and meta-proofs: there is potential to extend the
existing UML+Z templates with a wide range of alternative concept semantics. This
requirement highlights the need to provide support for both basic transformation-
and-analysis use, and expert maintenance of the template libraries.
3.2 Tool Design
The AUtoZ tool is a framework on which different instance tools can be built. The
two instances that currently exist are AUtoCADiZ and AUtoZ/Eves. AUtoZ is a
plug-in for the Eclipse development environment, which is used as the basis for
many modelling and model-management activities in software engineering.
The tool requires serialised input of a diagram whose concepts (abstract syntax)
can be selected. Common MDD diagramming tools provide serialised XMI output,
and are underpinned by a metamodel that defines the abstract syntax (concepts) of
the notation. This allows concepts and their labels to be automatically extracted
from diagrams, to instantiate the FTL templates. Here, we use the existing Eclipse
modelling plug-in, UML2 (www.eclipse.org/uml2/), since it supports UML 2.x
modelling, uses a standard metamodel-based approach to abstract syntax, and sits
within the Eclipse development environment. However, in principle AUtoZ could
use XMI output from many other modelling tools.
To represent the FTL templates as model transformation mappings, we convert
the FTL format to Epsilon EGL. Epsilon (www.eclipse.org/gmt/epsilon) pro-
vides a suite of integrated model-management tools [25,24], as part of the Eclipse-
GMT project. EGL, the Epsilon Generation Language, supports model-to-text
transformation. An EGL run configuration specifies a file containing the XMI source
model, and a file containing EGL transformation rules to be executed on the source
model, as described in [26]. The AUtoZ Eclipse plug-in is a customised EGL run
configuration that executes the transformations on a UML2 XMI source model to
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Fig. 4. AUtoZ workflow. UML2 and Epsilon are existing Eclipse facilities. The theorem prover can be any
suitable formal analysis tool, and is called automatically by the AUtoZ tool instance.
Table 1
Some of the FTL-to-EGL conversions
FREE TEXT: FTL (typeset) subCl : CLASS → CLASS
FTL (LATEX) subCl : CLASS \to CLASS
EGL subCl : CLASS \to CLASS
PLACEHOLDER: FTL (typeset) <x> : <t>
FTL (LATEX) \ltdelm x \rtdelm : \ltdelm t \rtdelm
EGL [%=x.name%] : [%=x.type.name%]
LIST: FTL (typeset) J. . .K(sep,empty)
FTL (LATEX) \llbracket ...\rrbracket {sep,empty}
EGL [% var append : Boolean := false;
for (...){
if (append){%] sep [%}
...;
append := true;
} %]
generate Z LATEX markup, which is then input directly to the formal support tool
for analysis. Figure 4 summarises the workflow of AUtoZ. A developer provides the
UML model; the tool calls an AUtoZ run configuration file; Eclipse plug-ins convert
UML to Z LATEX via EGL, and call the relevant Z tool. The result of the formal
analysis is returned to the user.
The EGL transformation rules are also templates, in a format that is very similar
to FTL (though without any formal underpinning). Three typical FTL templates
are shown in Table 1 with their LATEX source, and the corresponding EGL rules.
Many of the FTL concepts have a direct equivalent in EGL, and others, such as
FTL lists, follow a common pattern in EGL.
The component architecture of AUtoZ (figure 5) facilitates development of tool
specialisations and instances integrated with different formal analysis tools. The
AUtoZ framework component is the framework common to any UML+Z tool in-
stantiated from the AUtoZ framework, and comprises two Eclipse plug-ins: common
provides the necessary Eclipse features (dialogues, wizards, tools and launchers),
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Common Engine
<<implements>>
User Interface
AUtoZ Framework
Implementation
Fig. 5. The generic architecture layers of AUtoZ
and engine defines the interfaces that specialisations must deploy. The user in-
terface component represents the specific tool implementation, also developed as
Eclipse plug-ins. This allows different versions of AUtoZ using different formal
tools to co-exist in the same Eclipse installation.
The activities required to transform UML to Z LATEX markup, and to present the
LATEX to the formal tool are designed to be completely transparent. This is necessary
to support the basic user, a developer who is well-versed in diagrammatic modelling
but has little interest in formal methods. For such a user, the AUtoZ tools just
extend conventional modelling tools with press-button validation of models, with
no exposure to the formal underpinning.
For the expert user, the AUtoZ tool creates an AUtoZ Eclipse project to manage
files and support creation and editing of new FTL (EGL) templates. The expert user
needs to be familiar with formal methods and able to interact directly with formal
notations and tools, in order to develop new FTL templates and meta-theorems and
to write and edit EGL transformation rules corresponding to the FTL templates
– perhaps to capture the variant semantics of particular source models. In some
circumstances, an expert user may be needed to complete validation, for instance
where a particular model has a property that is not captured in a meta-theorem or
cannot be discharged automatically.
4 Using AUtoCADiZ
AUtoZ is a generic tool framework. To illustrate its use, we consider an instance of
AUtoZ that uses the CADiZ Z tool. We describe both the basic and expert uses.
Space does not allow a detailed analysis, so we simply present a usage scenario for
both the basic and the expert user; further examples are considered in [31].
4.1 Basic Use to Validate a UML2 Model
AUtoZ implementations are installed in the Eclipse IDE, and can be selected from
the AUtoZ folder. A basic user wishing to validate the bank model shown in figures
2 and 3 would use the AUtoCADiZ implementation of the tool as described in the
following workflow.
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Fig. 6. Part of the dialogue used to create a new AUtoCADiZ project.
Start a new project The user opens the Eclipse IDE, and uses the File menu to
open a new project dialogue. An AUtoCADiZ project is set up and named, in
normal Eclipse style. For example, the user might name the project Spec1, and
save the generated Z LATEX markup to file Spec1.tex. Completion of the set-up
(clicking Finish) results in the new project appearing in the Eclipse Project
Explorer view. A screenshot from this dialogue is shown in figure 6.
Diagram creation AUtoCADiZ is linked to the Eclipse UML2 plug-in, which the
user can use to create diagrams such as figures 2 and 3. Some design conventions
have to be followed to facilitate the transformation, notably the definition of
attribute types (used to generate Z given sets and other user-defined types). At
this stage, the state diagram is associated to the class diagram Account class
by naming conventions only, and the transition labelling is simply a list of the
operations responsible for each change of state. On completion, the user saves
the diagrams to the Models directory.
Create a run configuration Using the Eclipse Run Configurations dia-
logue, the user selects the AUtoCADiZ Template option and New launch
configuration, associating these to the Spec1 project and Spec1.tex output
file. The user opts to print the CADiZ output to the console. This run configu-
ration is saved.
Execute the formalisation Transformation is initiated by running the saved run
configuration. Almost all of the target Z model is generated directly from the
serialised output of the diagramming tool, with no user interaction. However,
as in GeFoRME, the Z model of class operations requires detail not in the pre-
pared diagrams. Currently, the tool presents a simple dialogue (figure 7) to guide
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(a) Specifying which attributes change (b) Specifying how an attribute changes
Fig. 7. Part of the user dialogue for input of details for operations. Attributes are taken from the class
diagram. The change formula options reflect the Z types of the selected attributes.
the user in adding the required operation details (see section 5.1 for proposed
extensions).
The tool then completes the generation of the Z LATEX markup, which is passed to
CADiZ for type-checking and analysis. The user receives the output from CADiZ at
the console, as requested. Ama´lio has shown that his templates and meta-theorems
produce type-correct Z when run on a syntactically-correct and consistent UML
model [3]. In most cases, therefore, the basic user can expect to get a simple
confirmation message from CADiZ. We return to this in section 5.1 below.
4.2 Expert Use: Working with Templates
An expert user needs some understanding of the template languages (EGL, FTL),
and the formalisation process. The AUtoZ tools then provide an interface for adding
and changing templates. The dialogue to create a project (outlined for AUtoCADiZ,
above) provides the appropriate options, which result in a Templates directory be-
ing made available for the project, in the Eclipse Project Explorer view. Tem-
plates can be edited and added to subfolders containing EGL transformation rules.
For example, consider the addition of a new template which lists all of the
classes in the system, named AllClasses(). When creating a new AUtoZ project,
the expert user selects an option to include the template catalogue in the project
directory. A file is added to the catalogue containing the new EGL template: 
1 [∗ Template to l i s t a l l c l a s s e s ∗ ] [% operation A l l C l a s s e s
( ) {
2 for ( c in Class . a l lOfType ) { %]
3 [%=c . name%] \\
4 [%]}
5 }%] 
This template can be used in an instantiation by editing the EGL logic file in
the template catalogue (Logic.egl) to include the following:
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 
30 . . .
31 [∗ import new operat ion ∗ ]
32 import ’ A l l C l a s s e s . eg l ’ ;
33 . . .  
54 . . .
55 \ chapter{[%=p . name%] Package}
56
57 [∗ Cal l the new operat ion ∗ ]
58 \ s e c t i o n { L i s t o f C la s s e s in [%=p . name%] Package}
59 A l l C l a s s e s ( ) ; . . . 
To use the modified logic file, the expert uses the run configuration dialogue
to select the customised file, in place of the default template catalogue (stored in
the Eclipse plug-in bundle).
Further examples of expert use, including template creation, tool customisation,
and tool instance creation can be found in [31].
5 Discussion
Development of the AUtoZ tool is work in progress. To date, the template instantia-
tion of Ama´lio’s bank case study has been completely replicated in the AUtoCADiZ
tool, and parts have been replicated in AUtoZ/Eves, including the verification of
instantiated conjectures and meta-theorems. In this section, we outline a number
of future directions for this work.
5.1 Research Areas
Two aspects of the tool support require further research, namely the formal speci-
fication of operations from UML diagrams, and the handling of messages from the
formal tools.
Operations Formally specifying UML operations in Z is not a straightforward task,
because the details needed to instantiate templates are scattered across UML di-
agrams, require interpretation from diagrams, or are simply not amenable to
recording in diagrams. The current approach using user dialogues does not scale
– even modest UML diagrams often have very large numbers of operations. Fur-
ther research is needed to find patterns and commonalities in operation construc-
tion that can be used to automatically incorporate operation details from other
diagrams and minimise user interaction. Furthermore, the tools, and Ama´lio’s
UML+Z approach, need extending to exploit pre- and post-conditions written in
OCL – an existing body of work on the use of OCL in formalisation (with B or
Object-Z target models) [13,28,23] provides a starting point.
Error Handling As noted above, the AUtoCADiZ tool currently outputs CADiZ
error messages direct to the user. This is unsatisfactory, as the interpretation of
typical CADiZ messages requires some expertise both in CADiZ and in Z. Clearly,
the tools cannot truly accessible to modellers and software engineers until the
error messages generated by the Z tools can be related back to the templates,
and thus to the inconsistent parts of the UML models.
In general, relating the error messages to diagrammatic models is the most
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important hurdle to overcome if non-expert practitioners are to be able to use
formally-underpinned tools to analyse diagrammatic models. One direction would
be to develop another intermediate language into which formal tool messages can
be translated, and have the intermediate language manage the mapping back to
diagrammatic model components. This task is complicated by the diverse ways
in which formal tools present messages. There is some new work on traceability
and message generation using Epsilon, which may offer a way forward [18].
5.2 Extensions to the Tool
Automatic template translation In describing the tool, we have shown that
FTL maps readily on to EGL, and we note that an expert user involved in tem-
plate maintenance would need to be familiar with both languages. FTL is also
needed for meta-theorems and proof work, because of its formal underpinnings
[3]. We have the groundwork for an automatic translation from FTL to EGL;
when implemented it will allow the expert user to maintain templates using either
FTL or EGL.
Template catalogue Williams [31] discussed various necessary improvements to
the cataloguing of Ama´lio’s FTL templates, but the tool currently relies on copy-
ing the templates to the AUtoZ project. A better solution would be to have a
central, physically browsable catalogue, and annotated templates, as well as ways
to add custom templates to the general catalogue. Note that it is not enough
to provide an interactive catalogue; we need to provide support for template-
validation, using Ama´lio’s approach to meta-theorems and the relevant formal
analysis tools.
Examples and help Whilst the AUtoZ tools present a solution to the shortage of
formally-trained software engineers, potential basic users of the tool still need to
understand how to validate models with the tools. We would like to add example
models and Z specifications as training and reference literature. The Eclipse
Examples Project (www.eclipse.org/examples) could host such examples and
help for new tool users.
Improved run configuration The current run configuration does not provide
suitable checkpoints in the process of generation and analysis of formal mod-
els. For example, the user has to generate a complete Z specification and pass
it to the formal tool for analysis; if the run configuration has not been set up
properly, and the connection to the formal tool is not achieved (for example, an
environment variable has not been set), then the user has to start again and re-
generate the Z specification. This could be addressed by providing some checking
of the run configuration file before execution. Furthermore, generated Z mod-
els could easily be saved to file before being passed to the formal analysis tool.
A logical next step would then be lazy re-generation, which only re-generates
parts of models that have changed. Epsilon tools can be used to compare models,
though some further work is needed to identify the FTL template connotations
of changes to diagrams.
Inclusion of Ama´lio’s templates for inheritance and composition Several
parts of UML+Z are not yet included in the AUtoZ tool template repertoire. In
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particular, Ama´lio considers various semantics of inheritance [3] and proposes
templates for the formalisation of composition relations [5], including the proof
that models remain consistent on deletion of a composed class.
Linkage to CZT The Community Z Tools (CZT) initiative (czt.sourceforge.
net) offers a range of support tools for Z, including parsers, translators, type-
checking and a Unicode markup for Z. It would be useful to investigate integration
of AUtoZ tools into this formal project.
Generalising tool support Ama´lio [3] developed a generic formalisation frame-
work, GeFoRME, of which UML+Z is one specialisation. The AUtoZ tool could
be made more generic by converting the components of the AUtoZ framework
layer to a GeFoRME Framework, upon which any GeFoRME Framework appli-
cation could be built. Under this development, AUtoZ would be constructed as a
specific instance of the GeFoRME framework, with AUtoCADiZ, AUtoZ/Eves as
implementations. Other GeFoRME frameworks, such as a UML+B Framework,
could be built upon the same structures. Such a product-line architecture would
allow massive reuse of components and powerful tools. There is also the potential
to generalise the handling of source models.
6 Conclusion
The AUtoZ tools are a practical contribution to the verification, through formal
analysis, of diagrammatic models. The work exploits the component-based UML+Z
formalisation of Ama´lio, itself motivated by the desire to make formal analysis
accessible to diagrammatic modellers. We have described the tools, the levels of
use that they support, and the potential for generalisation and extension. Working
within the Eclipse IDE and an established MDD tool suite, makes this style of
formalisation both practical and usable in state-of-the-art diagram-based software
modelling, and in model-driven engineering.
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Abstract
In previous work we defined a conservative representation, capturing the behavior of an abstraction of
a component-based system and a protocol (based on interactions) to be verified. We have achieved to
modelling unbound concurrency and unbound recursion within this abstraction. It turned out that the
protocol checking problem is undecidable. Therefore an overapproximation of this protocol checking problem
is used. This overapproximation is checked for counterexamples. Due to the overapproximation, some
of these counterexamples are spurious, i. e. they cannot occur. In this work we introduce an a priori
approach to avoid spurious counterexamples. More concrete, when searching for a counterexample in the
overapproximation we cut branches in the search space that will definitely lead to spurious counterexamples.
Keywords: verification, protocol conformance, component-based systems, components, model checking,
static analysis, process rewrite systems
1 Motivation
Developing software contains nowadays a big share of reusing previously developed
software called components. Often these components were developed a long time ago
by different developers, third party companies, in different programming languages,
supplied as binary code, or as distributed components (e. g., web services). Thus,
there is a big interest in components which can be composed to reliable systems. We
support this with a verification process [2]. Here, we will improve the verification.
This reduces the additional costs of the verification and raises the quality of the
verification results.
Creating reliable stateful components is not easy, because the developer has
to prevent and catch every possible error, which might possibly be caused by a
different sequence of interactions with this component. We bypass this problem
by allowing the developer to define sequences of allowed interactions (with the
1 Email: andreas.both@informatik.uni-halle.de and wolf.zimmermann@informatik.uni-halle.de
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considered component) called protocol. The user of a component is responsible for
the protocol being obeyed (protocol conformance). A tool should support the user
of components to verify the protocol conformance. Hence, an error caused by an
unexpected interaction can be discovered statically. Moreover, only the abstractions
of the used components are required. It is not necessary to know the source code.
This ensures a better (re)usability of previously developed components.
In [3,2] we have shown how we can use Process Rewrite Systems (PRS) [14]
to capture the behavior of source code conservatively. PRS unify Petri nets
and Pushdown Automata. Hence they allow recursion and parallelism without
restrictions on the calling depth of procedures and the number of concurrent threads,
respectively. In the rest of this article, we call this unbound recursion and unbound
parallelism. Moreover, in these works we defined a process implementing the static
verification of the interactions of applications.
It turned out that the protocol conformance checking problem is undecidable [3].
Therefore we overapproximated the protocol conformance checking by representing
at least the behavior of the forbidden interactions and the behavior of the consid-
ered program as a PRS, named Combined Abstraction. If there is no derivation from
the initial to a final state in the Combined Abstraction, then there is no forbidden
interaction according to the protocol, i. e., the protocol conformance is guaranteed.
However, if such a derivation is found, it might be a counterexample. Due to the
undecidability of the protocol conformance checking problem, this counterexample
does not necessarily lead to a forbidden interaction. We call such counterexamples
spurious. In a previous work [4] we defined a counterexample-guided abstraction
refinement loop (CEGAR-loop) improving the verification speed. For this ap-
proach we took the advantages of the PRS-hierarchy, which classifies the PRS by
the allowed operators. Since a counterexample is checked after it has been found,
we call such approaches a posteriori. Because of the fact that all counterexamples
of a conservative approximation have to be verified in the real software (manually
or tool supported), every spurious counterexample causes an expensive checking
in detail. Thus, a large number of spurious counterexamples reduces the practical
applicability of a verification.
In this work, we improve the search for counterexamples by cutting off branches
in the search tree that definitely lead to spurious counterexamples. The problem
of finding a derivation from an initial to final state is at least EXPSPACE-hard
(because of the subsumed Petri net, cf. [11]).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the protocol confor-
mance problem, introduce PRS, and we shortly review our verification process. Also
we further discuss the idea behind the construction of the Combined Abstraction.
In Section 3 we analyze reasons for spurious counterexamples, while in Section 4
we show how to avoid these spurious counterexamples by using a specialized search
strategy. Moreover, we present an algorithm implementing this search. Thereby
branches are cut off by precomputing infeasible paths. The paper finishes with a
consideration of the related work in Section 5 and the conclusion and future work
in Section 6.
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interface I0 {
sync void n(I1); }
interface I1 {
sync void z();
sync void p();
sync void m();
async void o(); }
interface I2 {
sync void a();
sync void b();
}
I1
I0
 n*
I1   zpm*(op|po)
I1
I2 
 component C0 impl. I0
void main() {
// initializations
new Thread(C2.a());
C2.b();
C1.p();
}
void n(I1 ref) {
if (…) {
ref.m();
} else {
C1.o();
C1.p();
}
}
I2
(ba+)*
I2I0
 component C1 impl. I1
void z() {
if(…){this.m();}
}
void p() {
// calculations
}
void m() {
if(…){C0.n(this);}
}
void o() {
C2.b();
}
p1
p2
p3
p4
p5
p6
p7
p8
p9
p10
p11
p12
 component C2 impl. I2
void a() {
C1.z();
this.val = 1;
}
void b() {
r=param/this.val;
this.val--;
}
p14
p15
p16
p17
Calculations influencing only the dataflow and result types are omitted. Relevant program points are
marked with pi. Synchronous remote method calls are performed blocking, asynchronous remote method
calls are performed non-blocking.
Fig. 1. Example with three interfaces and derived components.
2 Foundations
2.1 Protocols
A protocol describes the allowed use of all callable operations (cf. interfaces) of a
single component or instance 2 , respectively. It can be used to verify (incoming
remote) invocations dynamically, and also to verify statically, if the component is
always used in the manner specified by the protocol. In this work, we consider
static verification. Among other scopes of applications, protocols can be used to
avoid uncaught exceptions (cf. [3]) during the execution of a component or to obey
business rules (cf. [2]).
Creating and verifying service protocols can help to ensure the restrictions of
business rules. For example, we use an SSO-component 3 with the following actions:
register and sign in (action a), sign in (b), optionally change password (c), logout
(d). The component could have the following protocol (business rule) formulated as
regular expression: ((a|b)c∗d)∗. This protocol should be obeyed by every caller of
the component. We will check automatically, using the mentioned SSO-component
protocol, whether an application (assembled from components) obeys the defined
constraints.
In accordance with other works [22,19,7] we use finite state machines
(short: FSM) to represent the protocol PC of a component C. The FSM
PC=ˆ(QPC ,ΣPC ,→PC , IPC , FPC ) is defined as usual, i. e., QPC is a finite set of states,
ΣPC is a finite set of atomic actions, →PC⊆ QPC ×ΣPC ×QPC is a finite set of tran-
sition rules, IPC ∈ QPC is the initial state, FPC ⊆ QPC is the set of final states.
The protocol we use here contains only the callable operations (not the abstrac-
tion of the component as in e. g., [18]). Thus the protocol can be fixed, while the
component implementation is exchanged.
Figure 1 shows an example of a component system implementing different in-
2 We use the term component for simplification.
3 Single Sign On. A component which provides the functionality of a login/logout/session management, so
different applications can use this mechanism to verify a user.
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((p2||((p6||p3).p7))||((p3||p5).p9.p4)).p1
p3
p5
p9
p4
p1
p3
p7
p2
p6
Fig. 2. Example of process-algebraic expression and corresponding cactus stack.
terfaces. The protocols of the interfaces are shown as regular expressions. We will
consider only the protocol of the component C2 4 . This component might crash
on a division by zero exception, if it is called e. g., with the sequence a b b. If the
protocol (ba+)∗ is obeyed, this crash can be avoided.
The use of a component C in a system S assembled from components is the
set of all possible sequences of method invocations to C (described in the following
subsection). Thus, this can also be modeled as a language L(ΠS,C). Hence the
protocol conformance checking is equivalent to check whether L(ΠS,C) ⊆ L(PC),
where L(PC) is a regular language defined by the protocol PC of the component C.
2.2 Process Rewrite Systems (PRS)
Many approaches (e. g., [19,7,16]) model the use of required interfaces in component-
based systems by regular languages obtained by finite transducers. In [22] it is shown
that this approach leads to false positives if recursion is present. Thus we need
a representation for the abstraction of the behavior of the source code that can
capture every control-flow path conservatively to find all possible errors.
The natural execution model for capturing unbound recursion and unbound
concurrency uses states that are represented as a cactus stack (tree of stacks). If
a procedure call in a process is executed, a stack frame is pushed on a stack. If a
new parallel process is started, a new stack grows for this process (like in a saguaro
stack, cf. Figure 2). Hence an execution transforms a cactus stack into a cactus
stack.
A cactus stack naturally represents a process-algebraic expression (and vice
versa). If a procedure frame p1 is called on a stack p, this is represented by p1.p. If
a fork to a process p2 on a stack p with the frame p1 happens, this is represented
by (p1||p2).p. Thus, we can model state transformations by transforming process-
algebraic expressions into process-algebraic expressions. Process Rewrite Systems
[14] are a descriptive technique for such transformations. Let PEX(Q) be the
set of process-algebraic expressions over a finite set Q of atomic processes and the
binary operators ”.” (for sequential composition, associative) and ”||” (for parallel
composition, commutative and associative).
A Process Rewrite System is defined as Π=ˆ(Q,Σ, I,→, F ), where Q is a finite set
of atomic processes, Σ is a finite alphabet over actions, I ∈ Q is the initial process,
→⊆ PEX(Q)×(Σunionmulti{λ})×PEX(Q) is a set of process rewrite rules, F ⊆ PEX(Q)
is a finite set of final processes. The process ε denotes the empty process. It is the
identity on ”||” and the left identity on ”.”.
We introduce a special action λ /∈ Σ, denoting no relevant interac-
tion or empty word. The process rewrite rules define a derivation relation
4 All other protocols can be checked using the similar way.
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Abstraction
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c
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Fig. 3. Verification process.
p1
λ→ p3||p2, p2 a→ p14.p2′, p2′ λ→ ε, p5 λ→ p6,
p3
b→ p16.p4, p4 p→ p10.ε, p5 λ→ p7, p6 m→ p11.ε,
p7
o→ p12||p8, p8 p→ p10.ε, p9 m→ p11.ε, p9 λ→ ε,
p10
λ→ ε, p11 n→ p5.ε, p11 λ→ ε, p12 b→ p14.ε,
p14
z→ p9.p15, p15 λ→ ε, p16 λ→ p17, p17 λ→ ε
(a) Constructed system abstraction ΠS of the ex-
ample in Figure 1.
p1
λ→ p3||p2, p2 a→ p14.p2′, p2′ λ→ ε, p5 λ→ p6,
p3
b→ p16.p4, p4 λ→ p10.ε, p5 λ→ p7, p6 λ→ p11.ε,
p7
λ→ p12||p8, p8 λ→ p10.ε, p9 λ→ p11.ε, p9 λ→ ε,
p10
λ→ ε, p11 λ→ p5.ε, p11 λ→ ε, p12 b→ p14.ε,
p14
λ→ p9.p15, p15 λ→ ε, p16 λ→ p17, p17 λ→ ε
(b) ΠS,C2, considers only the interactions of com-
ponent C2 in Figure 4a.
Fig. 4. Example: Constructed system abstraction ΠS of the example in Figure 1 and ΠS,C2.
⇒∈ PEX(Q)× Σ∗ × PEX(Q) by the following inference rules (a ∈ Σ, x ∈ Σ∗):
(t1
a→ t2) ∈ Π
t1
a⇒ t2
,
t1
a⇒ t2
t1.t3
a⇒ t2.t3
,
t1
a⇒ t2
t1||t3 a⇒ t2||t3
,
t1
a⇒ t2
t3||t1 a⇒ t3||t2
,
t1
x⇒ t2 t2 a⇒ t3
t1
x a=⇒ t3
The second rule formalizes that only the frames on the top of the stacks of a cactus
stack can be considered for transformations. The third and forth rule specify that
any stack in a cactus stack can be considered (i. e., each of the processes currently
being executed can be selected for state transformations). Thus, these two rules
model interleaving semantics.
L(Π)=ˆ{w : ∃f ∈ F |I w⇒ f} is the language accepted by Π.
Pushdown automata are represented by the class of PRS, which allow no parallel
operator. In contrast Petri nets are represented by the class of PRS, which allow
no sequential operator. Thus PRS allowing the use of both operators unify the
behavior of pushdown automata and Petri nets.
Mayr shows in [14] that the rules of any PRS can be transformed into a normal
form, i. e., the LHS and the RHS has one of the forms t1, t1.t2 or t1||t2, where t1
and t2 are atomic processes. We assume in this work that every PRS has been
transformed into a PRS in normal form, and that the LHS contains at most the
||-operator. In [14] this restriction is called Process Algebra Nets (PAN). It can han-
dle unbound recursion and unbound parallelism including synchronization. In this
work, we use PAN as representation of the behavior of the considered components.
The verification process (cf. Figure 3) creates an abstraction ΠS of the system
behavior. Each possible interaction between components is represented by ΠS .
In Figure 4a we see the abstraction of the system composed by the abstractions
of the components C1, C2 and C3 (cf. Figure 1). The transformation takes the
control-flow into account. Thus every execution path is captured by the abstraction.
The abstraction can be made compositional by adding a variation of PRS to the
components description. The process of obtaining this description is fully automatic.
For details we refer to [3,2]. For checking protocol conformance to a component C,
only interactions to C of ΠS are considered. This can be achieved by replacing all
interactions by λ, that do not belong to the interfaces of C by λ, cf. Figure 4b. We
denote this PRS by ΠS,C .
Now, a PRS ΠCS is constructed such that L(Π
C
S ) ⊇ L(PC) ∩ L(ΠS,C), i. e., ΠCS
contains all sequences of interactions that are forbidden 5 by the protocol PC of one
5 These sequences are represented by the inverted protocol, i. e., the inverted FSM PC accepting the
complement L(PC)=ˆΣ
∗ \ L(PC).
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R1C = {(v, p, v′′) a−→ (v′, p′, v′′) : (v a→PC v′) ∧ (p
a→ΠS,C p′) with v′′ ∈ QPC }
RλC = {(v, p, v′) λ→ (v, p′, v′) : (p λ→ΠS,C p′); with v, v′ ∈ QPC }
R1Seq = {(v, p, v′′′) a−→ (v′, p′, v′′).(v′′, p′′, v′′′) :(v a→PC v′) ∧ (p
a→ΠS,C p′.p′′) with v′′, v′′′ ∈ QPC }
RλSeq = {(v, p, v′′) λ→ (v, p′, v′).(v′, p′′, v′′) : (p λ→ΠS,C p′.p′′) with v′, v′′ ∈ QPC }
R1PFork = {(v, p, v′′) a−→ (v′, p′, v′′)||(v′, p′′, v′′) : (v a→PC v′) ∧ (p
a→ΠS,C p′||p′′) with v′′ ∈ QPC }
RλPFork = {(v, p, v′) λ→ (v, p′, v′)||(v, p′′, v′) : (p λ→ΠS,C p′||p′′) with v, v′ ∈ QPC }
R1PSync = {(v, p, v′′)||(v, p′, v′′) a−→ (v′, p′′, v′′) : (v a→PC v′) ∧ (p||p′
a→ΠS,C p′′) with v′′ ∈ QPC }
RλPSync = {(v, p, v′)||(v, p′, v′) λ→ (v, p′′, v′) : (p||p′ λ→ΠS,C p′′) with v, v′ ∈ QPC }
R0 = {(v, p, v′′) λ→ (v′, p, v′′) : (v a→PC v′) with p ∈ QΠS,C }
Rε = {(v, ε, v) λ→ ε : with v ∈ QPC }
Fig. 5. Rules for creating the Combined Abstraction ΠCS .
component C (i. e., PC) but nevertheless exists in the program S. It is not possible
to construct a PAN such that L(ΠCS ) = L(PC) ∩ L(ΠS,C) since it is undecidable
whether L(ΠS,C) ⊆ L(PC) [3], but it is decidable whether L(ΠCS ) = ∅ [14]. The
Combined Abstraction ΠCS is also a PRS in the same class of the PRS-hierarchy (cf.
[14]) as ΠS . Thus every error can be found, because the Combined Abstraction ΠCS
contains all paths from the initial program point to the final state: I ∗⇒ ε.
The transition rules→ΠCS = R
1
C∪RλC∪R1Seq∪RλSeq∪R1PFork∪RλPFork∪R1PSync∪
RλPSync ∪ R0 ∪ Rε of the Combined Abstraction ΠCS are computed by using the
directives in Figure 5. The construction is similar to the intersection of PDA and
FSM (cf. [9]). All process constants are triples (vi, pk, vj) where vi, vj ∈ QPC and
pk ∈ QS . A triple (vi, pk, vj) encodes the situation, where pk should be rewritten to
the empty process pk
w⇒ΠS ε, while the state vi of the FSM PC is transformed into
vj accepting the same word w: vi
w⇒PC vj . A constant (vj , ε, vj) is equivalent to the
empty word, because the targeted protocol state is reached and process constants
have been eliminated (cf. Rε in Figure 5). Technical details of the construction of
the Combined Abstraction ΠCS can be found in [2].
Finally, the ΠCS is model checked. The result contains counterexamples c. These
derivation paths c : I0
w⇒ ε of ΠCS are equivalent to possible sequences of interactions
w. In Figure 7 a counterexample c0 is constructed while model checking a given
Combined Abstraction. In Step 1 and Step 2 of the derivation a rule is used included
in R1PFork and R1C , respectively. The resulting term (v1, p1, v2)||(v2, ε, v2) contains
two subterms with a different first entry of the triple, but the protocol can only be
in one state (because it is defined globally). To synchronize these entries in step 3
the rule ((v1, p1, v2)
λ→ (v2, p1, v2)) ∈ R0 is used.
The transition rules of the sets R1C , R1Seq, R1PFork and R1PSync are called action
rules, because the protocol states and the process constants are changed while per-
forming an interaction between components. On the other hand RλC , RλSeq, RλPFork,
RλPSync perform no protocol action. They are called λ-rules. The set R0 contains
rules, which we call sleep rules. These are needed to anticipate the interactions per-
formed in a parallel thread (interleaving semantics) and to synchronize the protocol
states of the transition rules.
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process-
algebraic
expressions:
cactus stacks:
protocol states:
p2
p1
v1=v1
(v2, p1, v3)||(v2, p3, v3)
p2
p1
v26=v1
(v1, p1, v3)||(v2, p3, v3) λ⇒
p2
p1
v1=v1
(v1, p1, v3)||(v1, p2, v3) b⇒
With the transition rules (v1, p2, v3)
b→ (v2, p3, v3) ∈ R1C and (v1, p1, v3)
λ→ (v2, p1, v3) ∈ R0.
Fig. 6. Example: Synchronization of cactus stack in Combined Abstraction.
Given system abstraction (initial constant p0): p0
a→ p1||p1 p1 b→ ε p1 λ→ ε
Given inverted protocol (initial state v0, final state v2): v0
a→ v1 v1 b→ v2
Generated Combined Abstraction (initial constant (v0, p0, v2), only rules required for counterexamples):
(v0, p0, v2)
a−→ (v1, p1, v2)||(v1, p1, v2) (v1, p1, v2) b−→ (v2, ε, v2) (v1, p1, v2) λ→ (v2, p1, v2)
(v1, p1, v2)
λ→ (v1, ε, v2) (v1, ε, v2) λ→ (v2, ε, v2) (v2, p1, v2) λ→ (v2, ε, v2)
(v0, p0, v2)
λ→ (v1, p0, v2) (v1, p0, v2) λ→ (v2, p0, v2)
Computed counterexamples:
c0=ˆ(v0, p0, v2)
a⇒(v1, p1, v2)||(v1, p1, v2) b⇒(v1, p1, v2)||(v2, ε, v2) λ⇒(v2, p1, v2)||(v2, ε, v2)
λ⇒ (v2, ε, v2)||(v2, ε, v2) λ⇒ (v2, ε, v2) λ⇒ ε
c1=ˆ(v0, p0, v2)
a⇒(v1, p1, v2)||(v1, p1, v2) λ⇒ (v1, p1, v2)||(v1, ε, v2) λ⇒(v1, p1, v2)||(v2, ε, v2)
λ⇒ (v1, ε, v2)||(v2, ε, v2) λ⇒(v2, ε, v2)||(v2, ε, v2) λ⇒ (v2, ε, v2) λ⇒ ε
c2=ˆ(v0, p0, v2)
a⇒(v1, p1, v2)||(v1, p1, v2) b⇒(v1, p1, v2)||(v2, ε, v2) λ⇒ (v1, p1, v2) b⇒(v2, ε, v2) λ⇒ ε
Fig. 7. Example: Spurious False Negatives.
An example can be seen in Figure 6. There we represent a part of the derivation
c0 in Figure 7. The first applied transition rule (action rule) changes the protocol
state in the second triple only. Thus two protocol states v1 and v2 exist in the term.
This is not possible, because the protocol state is global. To translate the protocol
state v1 into v2 a sleep rule is applied in the second step.
However, some of the counterexamples might not occur (e. g., because of over-
approximation). We call these counterexamples false negatives. False negatives
cannot generally be avoided, since the protocol conformance checking problem is
undecidable, as soon as unbound parallelism and unbound recursion are taken into
account [3].
Table 1 summarizes the notations in this paper.
3 Structure of False Negatives
While solving the model checking problem for protocol conformance checking, a big
issue is to ensure that not too many false negatives are created. This is important,
because every reported counterexample has to be validated in the verified source
code because of the conservative approximation of the behavior. This is an expensive
task, thus the effort should be reduced as much as possible.
False negatives can be classified into the following categories:
• Real false negatives: Because the source code abstractions are created without
any data flow or detailed control flow analysis, it is possible that a trace could be
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Notation Description
PC protocol of a component C (represented as FSM or regular expression)
ΠS system abstraction of a full component-based system
ΠS,C system abstraction, considering only the interactions of a component C
ΠCS Combined Abstraction of a component C
PEX(Q) set of process-algebraic expressions
s, t process-algebraic terms, s, t ∈ PEX(Q)
v states of an (inverted) protocol, v ∈ PC
a, b, λ interactions in the considered system, a, b ∈ Σ, no interaction λ /∈ Σ
w, x, y, λ sequences of interactions, w, x, y ∈ Σ∗, empty sequence of interactions λ
p, ε atomic processes, p ∈ Q, empty process, ε ∈ Q
Table 1
Notations used in this paper.
contained in the component abstraction that does not correspond to any execution
path of the implementation.
• Spurious false negatives: We construct an approximated intersection of the lan-
guages described by the system and by the considered inverted protocol. There-
fore it is possible to get false negatives.
If a precise behavior abstraction is assumed, spurious counterexamples caused by
an inappropriate number of interactions are likely to occur. While computing coun-
terexamples it is possible that these contain too many or too few interactions. The
reachability analysis for PRS may compute counterexamples, e. g., in Figure 7:
(i) The counterexample c1 has too few interactions. The sleep rules are used for
reaching the final state of the protocol without interactions. Due to state
changes in the system abstraction without interactions, the final state ε can be
reached.
(ii) The counterexample c2 has too many interactions. Consecutive applications of
action rules lead to a process-algebraic expression that can be reduced to ε if
additional action rules are applied.
Remark: The full setting of the example in Figure 7 can be found in the appendix.
4 Reducing the Number of False Negatives
In this section we will describe an extension of the reachability analysis of PAN,
while using the information about interactions of the considered software encoded
in the Combined Abstraction. This will eliminate the false negatives caused by an
inappropriate number of interactions.
4.1 Basic Idea
A counterexample c is a sequence of interactions w used to create a derivation
from the initial constant I to the final constant ε: I w⇒ ε. This sequence has to be
contained in the language of the inverted protocol PC (inverted protocol FSM), thus
we can check w ∈ L(PC). Using this approach we can eliminate the counterexamples
c1 and c2 of Figure 7.
However, this check requires the explicit construction of a spurious counterex-
ample. Here, our goal is to avoid this explicit construction. First, this leads to a
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Given system abstraction rules (initial constant p0): p0
a→ p1||p1, p1 b→ ε, p1 λ→ ε
Given inverted protocol (initial state v0, final state v2): v0
a→ v1, v1 b→ v2, v2 b→ v2
A computable counterexample: c2 of Figure 7
Fig. 8. Adapted example of Figure 7: language inclusion results in an impractical output (impractical,
because it is difficult to capture the invalidity of the computed counterexample).
more efficient search for counterexamples. Second, the above might give false hints
to how counterexamples can be derived. The latter is demonstrated by the example
of Figure 8: The counterexample c2 can be constructed in the same way as in Figure
7. However, the language inclusion check does not fail, because the word w of c2 is
contained in the language of the inverted protocol: w = abb ∈ L(abb∗). A closer look
shows, that c2 contains two transitions from the protocol state v1 to v2 using the in-
teraction b. As we know this is not possible, because only one interaction is allowed
at one point in time (interleaving semantics). This situation is confusing, since de-
velopers might conclude erroneously from c2, that it is a false negative. Hence this
approach looses some pieces of information about the generated counterexamples.
The idea is now, when a protocol state change happens in one of the terms where
a rule is applicable (head terms), then we first change the protocol state in the other
head terms before we continue the search. We call this heuristic the Round-robin
reachability. The derivation of c0 in Figure 7 follows this strategy.
4.2 The Round-robin Reachability Algorithm
In this section we prove that this heuristic does not exclude non-spurious counterex-
amples. Figure 9 shows a backtracking algorithm implementing this strategy.
It uses the following notations:
• As can be seen from the inference rules defining the derivations, the derivation re-
lation in a term (p1.u1|| . . . ||pn.un).un+1, where n > 0, u1, . . . , un+1 ∈ PEX(Q),
p1, . . . , pn ∈ Q is only applied to one of the terms pi. Formally, we define
the notion of the set of heads H(t) for a process-algebraic term t ∈ PEX(Q)
inductively as follows: The multiset of (atomic) heads H(t) and the multiset of
synchronization possibilities S(t) of a PRS term t is defined as follows:
H(p)=ˆ{{p}} S(t)=ˆ{{pi||pj : pi, pj ∈ H(t), pi 6= pj ∨ ξA(t)(pi) ≥ 2}}
H(t1.t2)=ˆH(t1)
H(t1||t2)=ˆH(t1)||H(t2)
Where ξA(t) denotes the number of elements in
a multiset A and p, p1, p2 ∈ Q, t1, t2 ∈ PEX(Q)
Intuitively the heads are the top stack frames in a cactus stack. E. g., the
heads in Figure 2 are {{p2, p3, p3, p5, p6}} and the synchronization possibilities
are {{p2||p3, p2||p3, p2||p5, p2||p6, p3||p3, p3||p5, p3||p6, p3||p5, p3||p6, p5||p6}}. As we
can see the synchronization properties are an overapproximation – e. g., p5||p6
can not be transformed using PRS rules into the given cactus stack – but this
definition satisfies our needs.
Property 1 If in a PRS Π a rule δ : t1
b→ t2 is applied to process-algebraic term
t (i. e., t b⇒ t′), then there is a head h ∈ H(t) or a synchronization possibility
h ∈ S(t), s. t. t′ is obtained from t by replacing h by h′ by the same rule δ, where
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(1) Algorithm newReach :
(2) Input: PRS Term t
(3) Output: Derivation t
w⇒ ε if it exists, false otherwise
(4) if t = ε then return ε;
(5) let R be the set of rules applicable to t;
(6) foreach δ ∈ R do
(7) t′ := t;
(8) case δ of
(9) t1
λ→ t2:
(10) t′ := apply δ to t′;
(11) if newReach(t′) = t′ w⇒ ε
(12) then return t
λ⇒ t′ w⇒ ε ;
(13) t1
a→ t2:
(14) choose h ∈ H(t′) ∪ S(t′)
(15) t′ := apply δ at h of t′ ;
(16) d := t
a⇒ t′;
(17) foreach h′ ∈ H(t′) ∧ ps(h′) 6= ps(t2)
(18) let δ′ be the corresponding sleep rule of δ;
(19) t′ := apply δ′ at h′ of t′
(20) d := d
λ⇒ t′;
(21) od;
(22) esac
(23) if newReach(t′) = t′ w⇒ ε return d aw⇒ ε;
(24) od;
(25) return false;
Fig. 9. Round-robin reachability algorithm in pseudo code.
h
b⇒ h′.
Property 1 states that any action rule is either applied to a top frame of a cactus
stack or it synchronizes two threads (i. e., it merges two stacks into one).
• Corresponding sleep rule: A rule δ ∈ R0 of the considered Combined Abstraction
ΠCS which is created by using a rule v
a→ v′ of the protocol PC is called the sleep
rule corresponding to an action rule t1
a→ t2.
• A protocol state of a process-algebraic term is the set of protocol states. The
protocol state of a triple (v, p, v′) is v. Formally we define the function ps(t) for
a process-algebraic term t ∈ PEX(Q) as follows: ps(t) = {v : (v, p, v′) ∈ H(t)}.
In the algorithm (cf. Figure 9) it is valid: if an action rule δ is applied to one
head, all other heads are rewritten to the corresponding protocol state by using
sleep rules corresponding to δ (cf. line 17-21).
At line 14 of the algorithm we choose one head h ∈ H(t) or one synchronization
possibility h ∈ S(t) of the current term t to apply δ: h a⇒ h′. Following the definition
of action rules this means that the protocol state of h could differ from the one of
h′. At line 17 we ensure that all other heads are imitating rewriting of the protocol
state in h′ while applying a corresponding sleep rule.
Thus in every derivation step, if one action rule δ has been applied, then all
heads are translated into the same protocol state by applying the corresponding
sleep rules of δ to extend the derivation d. Hence the problems of the language
inclusion are eliminated:
• It is ensured that only one protocol transition is performed in one derivation step
of the Combined Abstraction.
• It is checked in every derivation step, whether such a derivation will create spu-
rious false negatives.
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The following theorem states that each non-spurious counterexample can be
constructed by the Round-robin reachability.
Theorem 4.1 Let ΠS,C be a system abstraction (considering component C), PC
be the inverted protocol of component C, and w ∈ Σ∗, such that t w⇒ΠS,C ε for
a term t ∈ PEX(QΠS,C ) and v w⇒PC f for a protocol state v ∈ QPC and a final
protocol state f ∈ FPC . Then there is a process-algebraic expression s ∈ QΠCS over
the Combined Abstraction such that s w⇒ ε and |ps(s)| = 1, i. e., the protocol states
in the heads are equal.
The proof of Theorem 4.1 requires some technical definitions and lemmas. Let
s ∈ PEX(QΠCS ) be a process-algebraic expression over the Combined Abstraction
ΠCS . The process-algebraic expression F(s) ∈ PEX(QΠS,C ) over the system abstrac-
tion ΠS,C ”forgets” the protocol states in s. Formally:
F((v, p, v′)) = p ∀(v, p, v′) ∈ QΠCS
F(s.s′) = F(s).F(s′) ∀s, s′ ∈ PEX(QΠCS )
F(s||s′) = F(s)||F(s′) ∀s, s′ ∈ PEX(QΠCS )
E. g., F((v1, p2, v5)||(v1, p3, v2).(v2, p4, v5)) = p2||p3.p4. Furthermore let F−1(t) =
{s|F(s) = t}.
The following lemma states that ”λ-derivations” t λ⇒ΠS,C t′ in the system ab-
straction ΠS,C can be transformed into corresponding λ-derivations s
λ⇒ΠCS s
′ in the
Combined Abstraction ΠCS :
Lemma 4.2 Let t, t′ ∈ PEX(QΠS,C ) such that t λ⇒ΠS,C t′. Then, for all s′ ∈
F−1(t′), there is an s ∈ F−1(t) such that the following properties are satisfied.
(i) s λ⇒ΠCS s
′ using only rules δ ∈ RλC ∪RλSeq ∪RλPFork ∪RλPSync.
(ii) (v, p, v′) ∈ H(s) iff there is a p′ ∈ QΠS,C such that either (v, p′, v′) ∈ H(s′) or
(v, p, v) ∈ H(s′).
Remark: 2. implies that ps(s) = ps(s′), i. e., no state change in the protocol happens.
Proof. Straightforward induction on the construction of t λ⇒ΠS,C t′. 2
Lemma 4.3 states that the Round-robin derivation can always be constructed,
if there is exactly one protocol state change, i. e., an action rule is applied (cf. line
14-21 in Figure 9).
Lemma 4.3 Let t1, t2 ∈ PEX(QΠS,C ) two process-algebraic expressions over the
system abstraction ΠS,C such that t1
a⇒ΠS,C t2 for an a ∈ Σ by application of a
single rule δ. If in the protocol PC , there is a state transition v
a→PC v′, then for
any s2 ∈ F−1(t2) satisfying ps(s2) = {v′}, there is a s1 ∈ F−1(t1) such that the
following properties are satisfied:
(i) ps(s1) = {v}
(ii) s1
a⇒ΠCS s
′ λ⇒ΠCS s2 where s1
a⇒ΠCS s
′ uses a single rule δ ∈ R1C∪R1Seq∪R1PFork∪
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R1PSync and s′ λ⇒ΠCS s2 only uses rules δ which are corresponding sleep rules of
v
a→PC v′.
Proof. (of Lemma 4.3)
Case 1: δ=ˆ(p a→ΠS,C p′) or δ=ˆ(p a→ΠS,C p′||p′′) or δ=ˆ(p||p′′ a→ΠS,C p′). Then, there
must be a protocol state v′′ ∈ QPC such that (v′, p′, v′′) ∈ H(s2). Suppose that
H(s2) \ {(v′, p′, v′′)} = {(v′, p1, v1), . . . , (v′, pn, vn)}. Then a derivation s′n λ⇒ΠCS
s′n−1
λ⇒ΠCS . . .
λ⇒ΠCS s
′
1
λ⇒ΠCS s
′
0 = s2 where s
′
i−1 is the result of the application of
the rule (v, pi, vi)
λ→ΠCS (v
′, pi, vi) at head (v, pi, vi) of term s′i, i = n, . . . , 1. Thus,
only corresponding sleep rules of v a→ΠCS v
′ are applied, and (v′, p′, v′′) ∈ H(s′n) is
the only atomic process with a protocol state different from v. By induction on
the construction of t1
a⇒ΠS,C t2, one can prove that s a⇒ΠCS s
′
n using (v, p, v
′′) a→ΠCS
(v′, p, v′′), (v, p, v′′)||(v, p′, v′′) a→ΠCS (v
′, p′′, v′′) for a v′′ ∈ QPC , or (v, p, v′′) a→ΠCS
(v′, p′, v′′)||(v′, r′′, v′′), respectively.
Case 2: δ = p a→ΠS,C p′||p′′. Then there is a protocol state v′′ ∈ QPC such that
(v′, p′, v′′) ∈ H(s2), and (v′, p′′, v′′) ∈ H(s2). The rest of the proof is analogous
except that H(s2) \ {{(v′, p′, v′′), (v′, p′′, v′′)}} is used. 2
Proof. (of Theorem 4.1)
Induction on w:
w = λ: By Lemma 4.2, there is a s ∈ F−1(t) such that s λ⇒ΠS,C ε and, since v λ⇒PC f
implies v = f , H(s) = {{f}}.
w = ax: for an a ∈ Σ and x ∈ Σ∗.
Then, t ax⇒ΠS,C ε has the form t λ⇒ΠS,C t1 a⇒ΠS,C t2 x⇒ΠS,C ε, and v w⇒PC f has the
form v a⇒PC v′ x⇒PC f .
By induction hypothesis, there is an s2 ∈ PEX(QΠCS ) such that s2
a⇒ΠCS ε and
|ps(s2)| = 1. By Lemma 4.3, there is an s1 ∈ PEX(QΠCS ) such that s1
a⇒ΠCS s2,
where ⇒ΠCS is constructed according to Round-robin reachability. By Lemma 4.2,
there is an s ∈ PEX(QΠCS ) such that s
λ⇒ΠCS s1 only using rules of R
0 and |ps(s)| =
1. Thus s λ⇒ΠCS s1
a⇒ΠCS s2
x⇒ΠCS ε. 2
Corollary 4.4 If w ∈ L(ΠS,C) ∩ L(PC), then there is a Round-robin reachability
derivation t w⇒ΠCS ε in the Combined Abstraction Π
C
S , where t ∈ QΠCS is the initial
state of ΠCS .
Hence the reachability problem can be solved by using the Round-robin reach-
ability and will create fewer false negatives. This leads to a better applicability
because a component developer or quality management representative has to check
a lower number of counterexamples. Moreover, because we cut branches during the
verification, it will probably be finished faster.
Finally, considering the example in Figure 7, the counterexamples c1 and c2 are
not created while using the Round-robin reachability. This will also reduce the
number of false negatives in Figure 1, because Figure 7 was a simplification of the
behavior of the system abstraction shown in Figure 4b.
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5 Related Work
Many works on static protocol-checking of components consider local protocol check-
ing on FSMs. The same approach can also be applied to check protocols of objects in
object-oriented systems. The idea of static type checking by using FSMs goes back
to Nierstrasz [15]. His approach uses regular languages to model the dynamic behav-
ior of objects, which is less powerful than context-free grammars (CFG). Therefore,
the approach cannot handle recursive call-backs. In [12] object-life cycles for the
dynamic exchange of implementations of classes and methods using a combination
of the bridge/strategy pattern are considered. This approach also bases on FSMs.
The approach comprises dynamic as well as static conformance checking. Tenzer
and Stevens [21] investigate approaches for checking object-life cycles. They assume
that object-life cycles of UML-classes are described using UML state-charts and that
for each method of a client, there is a FSM that describes the calling sequence from
that method. In order to deal with recursion, Tenzer and Stevens add a rather
complicated recursion mechanism to FSMs. It is not clear whether this recursion
mechanism is as powerful as pushdown automata and therefore could accept general
context-free languages. All these works are for sequential systems. Schmidt et al. [8]
propose an approach for protocol checking of concurrent component-based systems.
Their approach is also FSM-based and unable to deal with recursive call-backs.
An alternative approach for an investigation of protocol conformance is the use of
process algebras such as CSP (e. g., [1]). These approaches are more powerful than
FSMs and context-free grammars. However, mechanized checking requires some
restrictions on the specification language. For example, [1] uses a subset of CSP
that allows only the specification of finite processes. At the end the conformance
checking is reduced to checking FSMs similar to [8].
In [16] behavioral protocol conformance is used to describe a problem similar to
ours. In contrast to our approach the developer has to define not only the allowed
receivable calls but also the calls of the component. This approach can not handle
recursive callbacks, since the verification is reduced to finite state model checking.
Many works use process algebras as abstractions for the formal (behavioral)
analysis of e. g., BPEL applications. In [6] FSP were used, while in [20] CCS was
used. Process algebras are similar to PAN considered in our work. These works do
not verify behavior in our sense (protocol conformance).
The approach improved in this paper is represented in [2]. It is a generalization
of [22,3]. In [22] recursion is modeled by CFG, so only sequential behavior is con-
sidered. Moreover, recursive callbacks are already respected. The model checking
problem is discussed in [5].
In our previous work [3,2] (1, G)-PRS (named PA-processes) and (P,G)-PRS
(named PAN) are used to model the abstraction of components and we show the
applicability of this process for verifying component-based systems. This requires
another model checking algorithm, which is already defined [13], but to our knowl-
edge not implemented yet.
Other works discuss the model checking of PRS. While [17] generates overap-
proximations of the execution paths, underapproximations of the reachable configu-
rations are computed in [10] (bounded model checking). In contrast to these works
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we only focus on the interpretation of the information included in our representation
model.
To our knowledge no other work exists, where an a priori approach is imple-
mented to reduce the number of false negatives during the model checking.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
Our verification approach ensures properties based on interaction protocols of pro-
grams which include unbound recursion and unbound parallelism. This leads to a
higher quality of software, because the protocol conformance can be checked before
the deployment. Every error will be found.
In this paper we have shown how we can use the special properties of the repre-
sentation defined in earlier works to reduce the number of false negatives. We call
this approach Round-robin reachability, because it balances the derivation steps
applied on each parallel term. This improvement reduces the costs of the quality
check, because fewer counterexamples have to be reviewed to find the real errors.
We assume that, most spurious counterexamples might be removed in an industrial
environment.
Although this improved verification process can not reduce the complexity of the
verification in a general case, we assume that in an industrial setting the verification
will be finished much faster. To check this assumption is part of our future work.
Currently, we validate our approach in an industrial case study of component-
based systems written in Python and C/C++. We can create abstractions of source
codes written in Python, already. Presently, we are creating generator of abstrac-
tions for C/C++ source code. Early results show that our approach is capable of
finding errors or unexpected behavior in real programs. In future work we will create
abstractions of BPEL and PHP source codes, considering Java is also planned.
We thank the anonymous referees for their helpful comments.
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Complete Example of Figure 7
System abstraction: ΠS,C = ({p0, p1, p2}, {a, b, λ}, p0, {p0 a→ p1, p1 b→ ε, p1 λ→ ε}, {ε})
Inverted protocol: PC = ({v0, v1, v2}, {a, b}, {v0 a→ v1, v1 b→ v2}, v0, {v2})
Combined Abstraction: ΠCS = ({v0, v1, v2} × {p0, p1, p2} × {v0, v1, v2}, {a, b, λ},
(v0, p0, v2),R1C ∪RλC ∪R1PFork ∪R0 ∪Rε, {ε} )
Non-optimized sets of transition rules of ΠCS :
R1C = {(v1, p1, v0) b→ (v2, ε, v0), (v1, p1, v1) b→ (v2, ε, v1), (v1, p1, v2) b→ (v2, ε, v2)}
RλC = {(v0, p1, v0) λ→ (v0, ε, v0), (v0, p1, v1) λ→ (v0, ε, v1), (v0, p1, v2) λ→ (v0, ε, v2),
(v1, p1, v0)
λ→ (v1, ε, v0), (v1, p1, v1) λ→ (v1, ε, v1), (v1, p1, v2) λ→ (v1, ε, v2),
(v2, p1, v0)
λ→ (v2, ε, v0), (v2, p1, v1) λ→ (v2, ε, v1), (v2, p1, v2) λ→ (v2, ε, v2)}
R1PFork = {(v0, p0, v0) a→ (v1, p1, v0)||(v1, p1, v0), (v0, p0, v1) a→ (v1, p1, v1)||(v1, p1, v1),
(v0, p0, v2)
a→ (v1, p1, v2)||(v1, p1, v2)}
R0 = {(v0, p0, v0) λ→ (v1, p0, v0), (v0, p0, v1) λ→ (v1, p0, v1), (v0, p0, v2) λ→ (v1, p1, v2), (v0, p1, v0) λ→
(v1, p1, v0), (v0, p1, v1)
λ→ (v1, p1, v1), (v0, p1, v2) λ→ (v1, p1, v2), (v1, p0, v0) λ→ (v2, p0, v0),
(v1, p0, v1)
λ→ (v2, p0, v1), (v1, p2, v2) λ→ (v2, p1, v2), (v1, p1, v0) λ→ (v2, p1, v0), (v1, p1, v1) λ→
(v2, p1, v1), (v1, p1, v2)
λ→ (v2, p2, v2), (v0, ε, v0) λ→ (v1, ε, v0), (v0, ε, v1) λ→ (v1, ε, v1), (v0, ε, v2)
λ→ (v1, ε, v2), (v1, ε, v0) λ→ (v2, ε, v0), (v1, ε, v1) λ→ (v2, ε, v1), (v1, ε, v2) λ→ (v2, ε, v2)}
Rε = {(v0, ε, v0) λ→ ε, (v1, ε, v1) λ→ ε, (v2, ε, v2) λ→ ε}
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Abstract
The reachability problem in component systems is PSPACE-complete. We show here that even the reacha-
bility problem in the subclass of component systems with “tree-like” communication is PSPACE-complete.
For this purpose we reduce the question if a Quantified Boolean Formula (QBF) is true to the reachability
problem in “tree-like” component systems.
Keywords: Component-Based Modeling, Architectural Constraints, Reachability, PSPACE-Completeness
1 Introduction
In component-based modeling techniques the size of the global state space of a
system is in the worst case exponential in the number of its components. This
problem is often referred to as the effect of state space explosion. Thus, checking
properties of a component-based system by exploring the state space very quickly
becomes inefficient. Here we explore the complexity-theoretical classification of
reachability.
As a formal model for component-based systems we consider here interaction
systems [8], a formalism for component-based modeling which offers in general an
arbitrary degree of synchronization. Reachability in general interaction systems was
proved to be PSPACE-complete [15] similar to results in 1-safe Petri nets [6].
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Tree-like component systems are component systems where the communication
structure forms a tree. This is an important class of systems which has been early
studied e.g. in [9,5] and more recently e.g. in [4,12].
Here we show that even in the subclass of tree-like interaction systems the
reachability problem (and therefore proving deadlock-freedom as well) is PSPACE-
complete. We also sketch that deciding progress in tree-like interaction systems is
PSPACE-complete.
2 Interaction Systems
Interaction systems are a component-based formalism, i.e. a system is composed
of subsystems called components. Components are put together by some kind of
glue-code. Interaction systems are defined in two layers. The first layer, the in-
teraction model, describes the interfaces of the components and the glue-code of a
system by connecting the interfaces of the components. The second layer describes
the behavior of the components, which is here given in form of labeled transition
systems.
Definition 2.1 Let K = {1, . . . , n} be a finite set of components. For each i ∈ K
let Ai be a finite set of ports such that ∀
i,j∈K
i 6= j ⇒ Ai ∩ Aj = ∅. An interaction
model is a tuple IM := (K, {Ai}i∈K , C), where C is a set such that
a) ∀c ∈ C : c ⊆ ⋃
i∈K
Ai,
c)
⋃
c∈C
c =
⋃
i∈K
Ai.
b) ∀c ∈ C∀i ∈ K : |c ∩Ai| ≤ 1 and
The elements of C are called connectors. Let for c ∈ C and i ∈ K i(c) := c∩Ai
be the set of ports of i which participate in c, i.e. |i(c)| ≤ 1.
Let Ti = (Qi, Ai,→i, q0i ) for i ∈ K be a labeled transition system with a finite
set of states Qi, a transition relation →i⊆ Qi×Ai×Qi and an initial state q0i ∈ Qi.
A transition system Ti for i ∈ K models the behavior of component i. We will write
qi
ai→i q′i instead of (qi, ai, q′i) ∈→i.
Definition 2.2 An interaction system is a tuple Sys := (IM, {Ti}i∈K). The
behavior of Sys is given by the transition system
T = (QSys, C,→, q0) where
a) QSys :=
∏
i∈K
Qi is the state space,
b) q0 = (q01, . . . , q
0
n) ∈ QSys is the initial state and
c) →⊆ QSys × C × QSys is the transition relation with q c→ q′ iff for all i ∈ K
qi
i(c)→i q′i if i(c) 6= ∅ and qi = q′i otherwise.
Definition 2.3 Let Sys be an interaction system and T = (QSys, C,→, q0) the
associated global transition system. A global state q ∈ QSys is called reachable iff
there is a path that leads from the initial state q0 to q in T .
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As mentioned we focus on a structural constraint on interaction systems. More
precisely we look at the important class of interaction systems such that the glue-
code describes a tree-like communication pattern, i.e. components never form a
cycle with respect to their connectors.
A tree-like communication structure induces an important class of component-
based systems. Many interesting systems belong to this class, e.g. hierarchical
systems or networks built by a master-slave operator [9]. For these reasons, this
class of component systems has been studied intensely e.g. in [3,4,5,12].
Definition 2.4 Let IM = (K, {Ai}i∈K , C) be an interaction model. The interac-
tion graph G∗ = (K,E) of IM is an undirected graph with {i, j} ∈ E iff there is
a connector c ∈ C with i(c) 6= ∅ and j(c) 6= ∅.
An interaction model IM is called tree-like iff the associated interaction graph
G∗ is a tree. An interaction system Sys is called tree-like if its associated interaction
model is tree-like.
Remark 2.5 Note, that a tree-like interaction system with a set C of connectors
implies that on all c ∈ C |c| ≤ 2.
Example 2.6 Consider the dining philosophers problem with n philosophers and
n forks. The philosophers, respectively the forks, are labeled with 0, . . . , n− 1. The
philosophers are placed in order around a table such that between philosopher i and
i+1 (we assume modulo n arithmetics) fork i is placed. We construct an interaction
system such that each philosopher and each fork corresponds to a component. Let
i ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} then philosopher i is modeled by component Phili with the set of
ports APhili := {t lefti, t righti, p lefti, p righti} such that the ports are modeling,
from left to right: “take left fork”, “take right fork”, “put left fork back on the table”
and “put right fork back on the table”. Fork i is modeled by component Forki with
the set of ports AForki := {takei, releasei}.
The following connectors describe the synchronization between the philosophers
and the forks, corresponding to the seating order.
take lefti := {t lefti, takei} take righti := {t righti, takei−1}
put lefti := {p lefti, releasei} put righti = {p righti, releasei−1}
Consider the problem for n = 3 philosophers, then the set K of components is given
by K = {Phil0, Phil1, Phil2, Fork0, Fork1, Fork2} and the set C of connectors by
C := {take lefti, take righti, put lefti, put righti|i = 0, . . . , 2}. The interaction
model is given by IM = (K, {Ai}i∈K , C). The corresponding interaction graph G∗
for IM is given in Figure 1 and forms a cycle.
3 QBF Reduction to Tree-Like Interaction Systems
We will show that reachability in tree-like interaction systems is PSPACE-complete.
The PSPACE-hardness will be proved by a reduction from QBF [7]. PSPACE-
hardness of reachability in general interaction systems was shown by a reduction
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Phil0
Fork0
Phil1
Fork1
Phil2
Fork2
Fig. 1. Interaction graph G∗ for the interaction model IM .
from reachability in 1-safe Petri nets [15]. To show the PSPACE-hardness of reach-
ability in 1-safe Petri nets a reduction from QBF was used [6].
3.1 Reduction
Reachability in tree-like interaction systems is in PSPACE. Given a tree-like inter-
action system and a global state q one can guess a sequence of connectors (because
PSPACE=NPSPACE) and check in linear space if it leads from the initial state q0
to q. At any time we story exactly one global state from which we guess a valid
successor state. To prove the PSPACE-hardness we present a reduction from the va-
lidity problem for Quantified Boolean Formulas (QBF) to the reachability problem
in tree-like interaction systems.
3.1.1 QBF
An instance of QBF [7] is given as a well-formed quantified Boolean formula where
its variables x1, . . . , xn are all bound and distinct. Without loss of generality we
look at QBF instances over the grammar
P ::= x|¬P |P ∧ P |∃x.P.
In the following we will assume that a QBF formula is built over this grammar. Let
H be a QBF then the question is if H is true. The language TQBF is defined as
the set of true QBF instances and is well known to be PSPACE-complete.
There is a straightforward, recursive algorithm called eval to determine whether
a QBF P given over the grammar above is in TQBF.
Algorithm 1
1 eval(P )
2 if(P = x)
3 return value(x)
4 if(P = ¬P ′)
5 return ¬eval(P ′)
6 if(P = P ′ ∧ P ′′)
7 return eval(P ′) ∧ eval(P ′′)
8 // P = ∃x.P ′ is the only remaining possibility
9 return eval(P ′x=true) ∨ eval(P ′x=false)
In line 9 P ′x=true denotes the subformula P ′ with true assigned to the variable x.
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In line 3 value(x) returns the truth value that is assigned to x. This is possible
because every variable x in H is bound by an existential quantifier and therefore a
truth value is assigned in line 9. Obviously, H ∈ TQBF ⇔ eval(H) = true.
3.1.2 RIST
Let IST be the class of tree-like interaction systems. For Sys ∈ IST let Reach(Sys) ⊆
QSys be the set of reachable states. Let
RIST :=
⋃
Sys∈IST
({Sys} ×QSys) .
For (Sys, q) ∈ RIST we want to decide if q is reachable in Sys. Let TRIST ⊆ RIST
be the set of true RIST instances, i.e.
TRIST =
⋃
Sys∈IST
({Sys} ×Reach(Sys)) .
In the following we will introduce for a QBF H a tree-like interaction system SysH
and a global state qt such that
i) H ∈ TQBF ⇔ (SysH , qt) ∈ TRIST and
ii) the size of SysH is polynomial in the size of H.
The idea for the construction of SysH can be sketched as follows: the interaction
system basically simulates the evaluation of the formula H, as in algorithm eval
(see Algorithm 1), based on the syntax tree of H. The subformulas of H are the
components of the system, and the interaction model describes the propagation of
truth values between the nodes of the syntax tree.
Example 3.1 Consider the formula H = ¬∃x1.(x1 ∧ ¬x1). The associated inter-
action graph G∗H of IMH is given in Figure 2 where components with highlighted
frames denote components that do not model subformulas ofH. IMH is constructed
accordingly to the following reduction.
H′
H=¬P1
∃x1.P2
P3 ∧ P4
x11 ¬P5
x21
x′1
Fig. 2. Interaction graph G∗H of IMH .
We now describe in detail how SysH is constructed:
3.1.3 Components
Let H be a QBF with variables x1, . . . , xn and K2 = {x′i|xi is a variable in H}. The
set of components K2 is needed to avoid cycles in the interaction graph. Generally,
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there may be several occurrences of a variable xi in H. Let xi occur ki times for
i = 1, . . . , n as a subformula in H, then we assume that the jth occurrence of
variable xi is renamed in H as x
j
i for j ∈ {1, . . . , ki}.
Let KH = K1 ∪K2 ∪ {H ′} be a set of components such that
K1 = {P |P is a subformula of H}. The component H ′ is an auxiliary component
which simplifies the definition of the behavior of the components in K1.
Given a truth assignment to the variables, subformulas are assigned true or false.
Therefore, when we mention an assignment to a component in K1 ∪K2 we refer to
the assignment of the subformula that is modeled by this component.
In the following we will give the port sets of the components. Many ports, in
different components, serve the same purpose and only differ in their subscripts.
Once such a port is introduced it will not be explicitly explained again.
Port sets of components modeling variables
For i = 1, . . . , n and j = 1, . . . , ki the component P = x
j
i ∈ K1 represents the jth
occurrence of variable xi in H. The set AP of ports is given by
AP := {aP , tP , fP , rP t} ∪ {rPxlt, rPxlf |l = 1, . . . , n}.
• aP abbreviates “activate P” and starts the evaluation of P .
• tP respectively fP confirm that currently true respectively false is assigned to P.
• rPxlt abbreviates “P receives instruction to set xl true”. If l = i then true is
assigned to P . For i 6= l rPxlt has no effect on P . The same applies to rPxlf
setting xl to false.
• rP t has the function to assign true to P .
Port sets for negated formulas
A component modeling a negation, i.e. a subformula of the form P = ¬P1 has the
following set of ports AP
AP := {e1P , aP , sub1P t, sub1P f, tP , fP , rP t, s1P t} ∪
{rPxlt, rPxlf, s1Pxlt, s1Pxlf |l = 1, . . . , n}.
• e1P abbreviates “evaluate the first subformula of P” and evaluates the subformula
P1.
• sub1P t (abbreviates “subformula 1 is true”) respectively sub
1
P f affirm that P1 was
evaluated true respectively false.
• According to the structure of a negation fP (abbreviates “P = ¬P1 is false”) is
enabled if P1 was evaluated true. Conversely tP is enabled if P1 was evaluated
false.
• As above rPxlt models that P receives the instruction to set xl true. On the
other hand s1Pxlt (“set xl true in the first subformula of P”) models that P itself
sends the instruction to set xl to true to P1. The same applies to s1Pxlf if xl
needs to be set to false.
• s1P t has the function to set the truth assignment of P ’s subformula P1 to true.
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Port sets for conjunctions
The component that models a conjunction, i.e. a subformula of the form P = P1∧P2
has the set of ports
AP := {aP , e1P , e2P , sub1P t, sub1Pf, sub2P t, sub2P f, tP , fP , rP t, s1P t, s2P t} ∪
{rPxlt, rPxlf, s1Pxlt, s1Pxlf, s2Pxlt, s2Pxlf |l = 1, . . . , n}.
This is the only formula that has two direct subformulas. P = P1 ∧ P2 needs
to evaluate P1 and P2, therefore there are ports e1P and e
2
P . Similarly there are
sub1P t, sub
1
Pf , sub
2
P t, sub
2
Pf for actually receiving the truth values of P1 and P2.
Likewise, s1Pxlt and s
2
Pxlt model that P needs to set xl to true in its first and second
subformula and respectively s1Pxlf and s
2
Pxlf to false.
Port sets for existentially quantified formulas and associated component x′i
In the interaction system SysH a component for a subformula of the form P =
∃xi.P1 with i = 1, . . . , n needs to have access to the current truth assignment of the
variable xi. For this purpose the set of components K2 was introduced. Let xi be
the variable that is quantified by the subformula P = ∃xi.P1. The component x′i
models the truth assignment of xi. The set of ports Ax′i is given by
Ax′i := {rxit, rxif, txi , fxi}.
txi respectively fxi affirm that the current state of x
′
i is true respectively false. rxit
assigns x′i true. Analogously rxif switches the assignment to false.
The port set AP for P = ∃xi.P1 is given by
AP := {aP , e1P , sub1P t, sub1P f, tP , fP , xit, xif, sxit, sxif, rP t, s1P t} ∪
{rPxlt, rPxlf, s1Pxlt, s1Pxlf |l = 1, . . . , n}.
aP , e1P , sub
1
P t, sub
1
Pf , tP and fP act similarly to the corresponding ports of the
other components specified above. xit confirms that true is assigned to xi, and sxit
sets xi to true if the current assignment is false. On the other hand xif confirms
that false is assigned to xi, and sxif assigns false to xi if that is not the case.
Port set for the auxiliary component H ′
Given the syntax tree for H, whose root is labeled H, H ′ can be interpreted as a
direct dummy predecessor formula of H without any logical operator. The set of
ports AH′ is given by
AH′ := {e1H′ , sub1H′t, sub1H′f, s1H′t, endH′}.
All ports but endH′ act exactly as the ports described above. It will be shown that
the formula H is in TQBF iff the component associated with H is evaluated true,
i.e. sub1H′t can interact eventually. When the evaluation of the QBF H has been
simulated, i.e. H ′ reached a state that represent the fact that H was evaluated true
or false, then the port endH′ becomes enabled. This only assures that the behavior
of H ′ does not deadlock.
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3.1.4 Connectors
We will now define a set C of connectors. Let P ∈ K1∪{H ′} be a subformula which
is not an occurrence of a variable. P can have one direct subformula which is P1
or two direct subformulas P1 and P2. If P needs the truth value of Pk, k ∈ {1, 2},
to be evaluated then the evaluation in Pk needs to be activated. This is realized by
the synchronization of ekP and aPk . Furthermore P can ask Pk for its current truth
value. These interactions are realized by
eval P → Pk := {ekP , aPk} P ask Pk true := {subkP t, tPk}
P ask Pk false := {subkP f, fPk}
for k ∈ {1, 2}. These connectors already connect all components in K1 ∪ {H ′} and
result in an interaction graph that is related to the syntax tree of the QBF H.
If P needs all occurrences of variable xi to be set to true or false a direct
interaction with the components that model these variables would lead to a cycle
in the associated interaction graph. Therefore, P passes this information to its
subformulas, i.e. skPxit in P has to synchronize with rPkxit in Pk where Pk is a direct
subformula of P . Let i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The following connectors, for k ∈ {1, 2}, realize
the synchronizations needed to propagate the information to switch a variable.
set xi true P → Pk := {skPxit, rPkxit}
set xi false P → Pk := {skPxif, rPkxif}
If the QBF H is true, we need all components to be in one fixed state – this
will be a state that models the assignment true. In fact, the component H ′ will
observe if H is true and reach a fixed state. To assure that all components can
reach a fixed state, a similar technique as above is used. A component can set the
truth assignment of the components that represent its subformulas to true by the
following connector for k ∈ {1, 2}.
set Pk true P → Pk := {skP t, rPkt}
Consider a subformula of the form P = ∃xi.P1 ∈ K1 and the associated compo-
nent x′i ∈ K2. The component representing P can assign x′i the truth value true or
false and can ask x′i whether the current truth assignment is true or false. This is
realized by
set x′i true := {sxit, rxit} ask truex′i := {xit, txi}
set x′i false := {sxif, rxif} ask falsex′i := {xif, fxi}
IF H ′ reaches a state that indicates that H was evaluated true or false, i.e. the
simulation of the evaluation of H is finished, then the unary connector evaluated :=
{endH′} becomes enabled.
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Let C be the set of connectors given by
{eval P → Pk, P ask Pk true, P ask Pk false|P ∈ K1 ∪ {H ′} with succ. Pk}∪
{set x′i true, set x′i false, ask truex′i , ask falsex′i |x′i ∈ K2}∪
{set Pk true P → Pk|P ∈ K1 ∪ {H ′} with succ. Pk}∪
{set xi true P → Pk, set xi false P → Pk|P ∈ K1with succ. Pk, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}}∪
{evaluated}.
So far we have the interaction model IMH := (KH , {AP }P∈KH , C). This way
any QBF formula H over the grammar, given above, can be mapped to an interac-
tion model IMH .
Remark 3.2 The interaction graph G∗H , associated to IMH , is a tree, as it is
constructed along the syntax tree and augmented with the components H ′ and x′i
for i = 1, . . . , n without forming cycles.
3.1.5 Local Behavior
The local behavior of the components is given by labeled transition systems. Every
system has one state labeled t and one labeled f . These states model the fact that
either true respectively false was assigned to this component or it was evaluated
true respectively false. The initial state will be denoted by an ingoing arrow.
Figure 3(a) depicts the transition system of the component modeling the jth
occurrence of variable xi. Figure 3(b) gives the local behavior of a component x′i ∈
K2. The behavior of H ′ is given in 3(c). The transition systems for a variable x
j
i and
a x′i ∈ K2 are self-explanatory. If in TH′ the port e1H′ is performed, i.e. component
H needs to be evaluated, then TH′ waits to perform either sub1H′t or sub
1
H′f . This
ports can only be performed if TH reaches its state labeled t respectively f . It will
be shown that this indicates whether the associated QBF is true or false.
t
f
rP xif
rP xit,
rP t
tP ,aP ,
rP xlt(l = 1, . . . , n),
rP xlf(l 6= i)
fP , aP ,
rP xlf(l = 1, . . . , n),
rP xlt(l 6= i)
(a) P = xji
t
f
rxifrxit
txi
fxi
(b) x′i
f
t
e1
H′
sub1
H′ t sub
1
H′f
s1
H′t
endH′
endH′
(c) H′
Fig. 3. Transition systems T
x
j
i
for a component xji (a), Tx′i
for x′i (b) and TH′ for the component H
′ (c).
In Figure 4 the transition system for a component of the form P = ¬P1 is
pictured. Note, that for better readability, the transition system in Figure 4(a)
is not completely displayed. In system 4(a) the transitions and states pictured in
Figure 4(b) and 4(c) have to be included between the states labeled t and f for
l = 1, . . . , n.
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f t
e1P
sub1P t sub
1
P f
aP aP
fP tP
(a) P = ¬P1
f t
rP xlt
rPxlf
rP xlt
rP xlf
s1Pxlt
s1P xlf
(b) Section of 4(a)
and 5(a), for l ∈
{1, . . . , n}
f t
rP t rP t
s1P t
(c) Section of 4(a)
Fig. 4. Main section of the transition systems T¬P1 (a), part of T¬P1 for l ∈ {1, . . . , n} (b), part of T¬P1
(c).
In Figure 5 the transition system for a component of the form P = ∃xi.P1
is pictured. For better readability, the transition system in Figure 5(a) is not
completely displayed. In system 5(a) the transitions and states pictured in Figure
4(b) and 5(b) have to be included between the states labeled t and f for l = 1, . . . , n.
t
f
sxit
s1P xit
xit
e1P
sub1P f sub
1
P t
sxif
s1P xif
xif
aP
aP
tP
fP
(a) P = ∃xi.P1
f t
rP t rP t
sxit, xit s1P t
(b) Section of 5(a)
Fig. 5. Main sections of the transition system T∃xi.P1 (a), part of T∃xi.P1 (b).
In Figure 6 the transition system for a component of the form P = P1 ∧ P2 is
pictured. Note, that the transition system in Figure 6(a) is not completely displayed.
The transitions and states pictured in Figure 6(b) and 6(c) have to be included
between the states labeled t and f for l = 1, . . . , n.
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f
t
e1P
sub1P f sub
1
P t
aP
e2P
sub2P f
sub2P t
aP
fP
tP
(a) P = P1 ∧ P2
f t
rP xlt
rP xlf
rP xlt
rP xlf
s1P xlt
s1P xlf
s2P xlt
s2P xlf
(b) Section of 6(a),
for l ∈ {1, . . . , n}
f t
rP t rP t
s1P t s
2
P t
(c) Section of 6(a)
Fig. 6. Transition system TP1∧P2 .
The resulting interaction system is denoted by SysH := (IMH , {TP }P∈KH ).
Theorem 3.3 Let H be a QBF over the grammar P ::= x|¬P |P ∧ P |∃x.P and
SysH the associated interaction system obtained from the reduction. Let qt be the
global state in which all components are in their state labeled t, then
H ∈ TQBF ⇔ (SysH , qt) ∈ TRIST.
The proof of Theorem 3.3 can be found in the Appendix of [14].
4 QBF Reduction to Progress in Tree-Like Interaction
Systems
By minor modification of the reduction given above it is possible to show the
PSPACE-completeness of the progress property in tree-like interaction systems. At
first we give some definitions to introduce progress in interaction systems and then
give an overview why it is PSPACE-complete to decide this property in tree-like
interaction systems. In general interaction systems progress is PSPACE-complete
[15], so progress in tree-like interaction systems is in PSPACE.
Definition 4.1 Let Sys be an interaction system and T = (QSys, C,→, q0) the
associated global transition system. A global state q ∈ QSys is called a deadlock if
no connector is enabled in q, i.e. there is no c ∈ C and q′ ∈ QSys such that q c→ q′.
A system Sys is free of deadlocks if there is no reachable state q ∈ QSys such
that q is a deadlock.
Definition 4.2 Let Sys be a deadlock-free interaction system. A run of Sys is
an infinite sequence σ
q0
c1→ q1 c2→ q2 . . . ,
with ql ∈ QSys and cl ∈ C for l ≥ 1.
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Definition 4.3 Let Sys be a deadlock-free interaction system with components K.
k ∈ K may progress in Sys if for every run σ k participates infinitely often in σ.
An instance of the progress problem in interaction systems is given by a tuple
(Sys, k) where Sys is a deadlock-free interaction system with components K and
k ∈ K. The question is if k may progress in Sys.
We modify SysH as follows:
We introduce an additional component called pro with the set of ports Apro :=
{tpro} and the behavior given by the transition system Tpro in Figure 7. The idea
is to embed pro in SysH such that tpro will participate infinitely often in every run
σ iff H is true.
t tpro
Fig. 7. Transition system Tpro for the component pro.
In addition we modify the component H ′ as follows. The set of ports AH′ of the
component H ′ is now given by
AH′ := {e1H′ , sub1H′t, sub1H′f, s1H′t, end trueH′ , end falseH′},
i.e. endH′ is removed and the ports end trueH′ and end falseH′ are added. The
modified behavior of H ′ is given by the transition system TH′ in Figure 8.
f
t
e1
H′
sub1
H′t sub
1
H′f
s1
H′ t
end falseH′
end trueH′
Fig. 8. Modified transition system TH′ for the component H
′.
In addition, the connector evaluated is removed von the set C of connectors,
and the two following connectors are added.
evaluated true := {end trueH′ , tpro},
evaluated false := {end falseH′}.
It is easy to see that the connector evaluated true is the only connector that is
enabled if the state qt is reached. In this case, evaluated true will perform in-
finitely often, i.e. the component pro will participate infinitely often. Therefore the
component pro may progress iff H is true.
5 Conclusion and Related Work
We investigated a complexity issue for component-based systems. In [6] the reach-
ability in 1-safe Petri nets was proven to be PSPACE-complete and [15] used this
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result to show the PSPACE-completeness of the reachability problem in component-
based systems. Here we restricted ourselves to tree-like systems and showed that
even in this class deciding reachability is PSPACE-complete.
We conjecture that this result can be still strengthened such that it should
be possible to show that even for the class of linear interaction systems, where
the interaction graph forms a sequence of components, the reachability problem
is PSPACE-complete. Given these complexity issues it makes sense to look for
conditions that can be tested in polynomial time and guarantee a desired property.
For general component systems this is pursued e.g. in [1,2,10,11,13,16]. For
tree-like component systems [3,4,5,12] have followed this approach and in particular
established conditions that ensure deadlock-freedom.
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Abstrat
Composition of Web servies onsists of the interleaving of the sequene of ations exeuted by the ele-
mentary servies in aordane with a lient speiation. We model Web servies as automata exeuting
ations and also sending and reeiving messages. This paper provides a theoretial study for three servie
omposition problems, and in partiular for the problem of omputing a Boolean formula whih exatly
haraterises the onditions required for servies to answer the lient's request. New omplexity results are
established for these problems within the framework of servie omposition with onstraints.
Keywords: Composition, Déidability.
1 Introdution and Related Work
Servie oriented omputing [23℄ is a programming paradigm whih onsiders ser-
vies as elementary omponents. From these omponents, distributed appliations
are realised in aordane with a lient speiation. To realise some distributed
appliations, elementary omponents have to be omposed. The omposition prob-
lem has been investigated sine the 2000's with many solutions proposed [3,2,17℄.
Often, servies are seen as nite automata. In this ase, the lient speiation is
given by a nite automaton whih represents all omputations that a lient wants
the servies to exeute. By exeuting their transitions, servies modify their envi-
ronment and that of the lient. The problem of ombining servies beomes that of
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omposing automata, like in [3,2℄. In other ases, servies are able to send and to
reeive messages. Client speiation is then given by a logial formula whih repre-
sents lient's goals he wants servies to reah. By ommuniating together, servies
modify their knowledge and those of their lient (see, e.g., [17℄). This paper follows
the line of reasoning suggested in [5,6,7,8℄, whih onsists in giving the semantis
of servies by means of automata. The paper partiularly fouses on the following
problem: Given servies A1, . . ., An and the request A of a lient, an A1, . . ., An
be organised as to answer A? The originality of our approah onsists in modeling
the servies by Boolean automata, i.e. nite automata extended with parametri
Boolean onditions. The main motivation for using this model is to manage ondi-
tional ations or ommuniations of A1, . . ., An. For instane, a onditional ation
may be, for some i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, that Ai aepts to ommuniate with Aj if and
only if Aj has a seurity ertiate given by some authority. A onditional ation
may also be, for some i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, that Ai aepts to answer Aj only if the IP
address of Aj is in a seleted area. This kind of onditions frequently appear when
speifying servies. As far as we know, the omposition problems studied in the
literature do not handle this kind of onditions. This paper provides a theoretial
study for three servie omposition problems, and in partiular for the problem of
omputing a Boolean formula φ whih exatly haraterises the onditions required
for A1, . . ., An to answer the lient's request. The paper is organised as follows.
Setion 2 introdues the formal bakground. In Setion 3, we formally dene the
valuation deision problem, the Boolean formula deision problem and the Boolean
formula synthesis problem for both simulation-based relations and trae-based re-
lations. Setions 4 and 5 ontains our omplexity results. Finally we onlude in
setion 6.
Related Work In the ontext of nite automata, many researh works on omplex-
ity results for various nite automata ompositions have been done.
In [10℄, the authors investigated the following problem: given n +m nite au-
tomata A1, . . . ,An+m, what is the omplexity of deiding whether A1 × . . .×An is
equivalent to An+1× . . .×An+m. The lass of problems onsidered in [10℄ is for non
at systems, i.e. one requires that n ≥ 2 andm ≥ 2. Another ruial dierene w.r.t.
our work onerns the produt. In [10℄, the produt is partially synhronised but,
ontrarily to our work, synhronisation does not produe ε-transition but labeled
transitions. Their main result shows that the above deision problem is EXPTIME-
hard for any relation between the simulation preorder and bisimulation, and that it
is EXSPACE-hard for any relation between trae inlusion and the intersetion of
ready trae equivalene.
A more general problem is onsidered in [20℄ where the produt is loser to ours
sine some ations an be hidden, i.e. replaed by an ε-transition. The author proved
that for non at systems the equivalene heking is PSPACE-hard for any relation
between bisimilarity and trae equivalene, and that the problem is EXPSPACE-
omplete for trae equivalene, and EXPTIME-omplete for bisimilarity. It was
also onjetured in [20℄ that the problem is EXPTIME-hard for any relation be-
tween bisimilarity and trae equivalene. This onjeture was enhaned and proved
in [22℄: the problem is EXPTIME-hard for any relation between bisimilarity and
trae preorder.
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In [15℄, it is shown that deiding whether A is simulated by A1× . . .×An is still
EXPTIME-hard. In this work, the onsidered produt is asynhronous.
Several reent works fous on the use of nite automata based models to address
Web servies omposition problems. In [18,17℄, the authors propose a model where
Web servies ompositions expressed in BPEL are formally dened by state transi-
tion systems with ommuniating and internal (unobservable) ations. In [17℄, this
model was enrihed using a knowledge base, and in [9℄ using a theory. These ap-
proahes were applied to pratial appliations in [24,12,11℄. In [1,21℄, Web servies
are dened by PWL-S douments and modelled by guarded nite automata. A sim-
ilar approah is investigated in [16℄ where Web servies are dened in BPEL. In [14℄,
the authors model by Input/Output automata Web servies interfaes desribed in
BPEL, OWLS and WSDL.
2 Preliminaries
Let P be a nite set of Boolean variables (with typial members denoted p, p′, . . .),
Σa be a ountable set of asynhronous ations (with typial members denoted α,
β, . . .) and Σs be a ountable set of synhronous ations (with typial members
denoted σ, τ , . . .). We will assume that P , Σa and Σs are disjoint.
Finite automata
A nite automaton is a tuple A = (Q,E, I, F ) where
• Q is a nite set of states,
• E is a funtion from Q×Q into the set of all nite subsets of Σa∪({?, !}×Σs)∪{ǫ},
• I ⊆ Q is the set of initial states and F ⊆ Q is the set of nal states.
For all x ∈ {?, !}, for all σ ∈ Σs, (x, σ) will be denoted xσ.
A is said to be ǫ-free i E is a funtion from Q × Q into the set of all nite
subsets of Σa ∪ ({?, !} × Σs). We shall say that A is weakly asynhronous i E
is a funtion from Q × Q into the set of all nite subsets of Σa ∪ {ǫ}. A is said
to be strongly asynhronous i E is a funtion from Q × Q into the set of all
nite subsets of Σa. Given a weakly asynhronous automaton A, let E∗ be the
funtion from Q × Q into the set of all nite subsets of Σa suh that for all q, r ∈
Q, for all α ∈ Σa, α ∈ E∗(q, r) i there are sequenes (q0, q1, . . . , qm), (r0, r1, . . . ,
rn) ∈ Q+ suh that
•
for all positive integers i, if i ≤ m then ǫ ∈ E(qi−1, qi),
•
for all positive integers j, if j ≤ n then ǫ ∈ E(rj−1, rj),
• α ∈ E(qm, r0),
• q0 = q and rn = r.
In this ase, a run of A on a sequene (α1, . . . , αk) ∈ Σ∗a is a sequene (q0, q1, . . . ,
qk) ∈ Q+ suh that for all positive integers i, if i ≤ k then αi ∈ E∗(qi−1, qi), q0 ∈
I and qk ∈ F . Moreover, the traes of A, denoted tr(A), is the set of all sequenes
(α1, . . . , αk) ∈ Σ∗a suh that there is a run of A on (α1, . . . , αk).
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A1 : q1 q2
(p1 ∨ p2, α)
(¬p2, !σ1)
(¬p1 ∧ p2, ?σ2)
A2 : r1 r2
(p3, ?σ1)
(¬p3, α)
Figure 1. Boolean automata A1 and A2.
Boolean automata
The set B(P ) of all Boolean formulas (with typial members denoted φ, ψ, . . .)
is dened by: φ ::= p | ⊥ | ¬φ | (φ ∨ φ), with p ∈ P . The other onstruts are
dened as usual. In partiular, ⊤ = ¬⊥ and (φ ∧ ψ) = ¬(¬φ ∨ ¬ψ). A valuation
is a funtion from P into {0, 1}. Every valuation V gives rise to a funtion V̂ from
B(P ) into {0, 1} in the usual way. A Boolean automaton is a tuple A = (Q,E, I, F )
where
• Q is a nite set of states,
• E is a funtion from Q×Q into the set of all nite subsets of B(P )×(Σa∪({?, !}×
Σs) ∪ {ǫ}),
• I ⊆ Q is the set of initial states and F ⊆ Q is the set of nal states.
The notions of ǫ-freeness, weak asynhroniity and strong asynhroniity are
dened for Boolean automata in the same way as they are dened for nite automata.
As example, take the ase of the Boolean automata A1 and A2 from Fig. 1, with
Σa = {α} and Σs = {σ1, σ2}.
Synhronisation
Let A1 = (Q1, E1, I1, F1), . . ., An = (Qn, En, In, Fn) be ǫ-free Boolean automata.
Their synhronisation, denoted A1 ⊗ . . .⊗An, is the weakly asynhronous Boolean
automaton A = (Q,E, I, F ) dened by:
• Q = Q1 × . . .×Qn,
• E is the funtion from Q×Q into the set of all nite subsets of B(P )× (Σa∪{ǫ})
suh that for all q, r ∈ Q, for all φ ∈ B(P ),
· for all α ∈ Σa, (φ, α) ∈ E(q, r) i there is i ∈ {1, . . . , n} suh that q ≡i r and
(φ, α) ∈ Ei(qi, ri),
· (φ, ǫ) ∈ E(q, r) i there are i1, i2 ∈ {1, . . . , n}, there are φi1 , φi2 ∈ B(P ),
there is σ ∈ Σs suh that i1 6= i2, q ≡i1,i2 r, either (φi1 , (?, σ)) ∈ Ei1(qi1, ri1)
and (φi2 , (!, σ)) ∈ Ei2(qi2 , ri2) or (φi1 , (!, σ)) ∈ Ei1(qi1 , ri1) and (φi2 , (?, σ)) ∈
Ei2(qi2 , ri2) and φ = φi1 ∧ φi2 .
• I = I1 × . . . × In and F = F1 × . . . × Fn,
the binary relations ≡i,≡i1,i2 ⊆ Q× Q being suh that for all q, r ∈ Q, q ≡i r i
for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, if i 6= j then qj = rj and q ≡i1,i2 r i for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n},
if i1 6= j and i2 6= j then qj = rj. Consider, as example, the Boolean automata A1
and A2 from Fig. 1 and A1 ⊗A2 from Fig. 2.
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q1, r1 q2, r1 q1, r2 q2, r2
(p1 ∨ p2, α)
(p3 ∧ ¬p2, ǫ)
(p1 ∨ p2, α)
(¬p3, α) (¬p3, α)
Figure 2. Boolean automata A1 ⊗A2.
A : q1 q2
(p1 ∨ p2, α)
(¬p2, !σ1)
(¬p1 ∧ p2, ?σ2)
V (p1) = 0, V (p2) = 1
AV : q1 q2
α
?σ2
Figure 3. Boolean automaton A and the assoiated automaton AV .
From Boolean automata to nite automata
Let A = (Q,E, I, F ) be a Boolean automaton and V be a valuation. The inter-
pretation of A through V , denoted AV , is the nite automaton A′ = (Q′, E′, I ′, F ′)
dened by:
• Q′ = Q,
• E′ is the funtion from Q′ ×Q′ into the set of all nite subsets of Σa ∪ ({?, !} ×
Σs) ∪ {ǫ} suh that for all q, r ∈ Q′,
· for all α ∈ Σa, α ∈ E′(q, r) i there is φ ∈ B(P ) suh that (φ, α) ∈ E(q, r) and
V̂ (φ) = 1,
· for all x ∈ {?, !}, for all σ ∈ Σs, xσ ∈ E′(q, r) i there is φ ∈ B(P ) suh that
(φ, xσ) ∈ E(q, r) and V̂ (φ) = 1,
· ǫ ∈ E′(q, r) i there is φ ∈ B(P ) suh that (φ, ǫ) ∈ E(q, r) and V̂ (φ) = 1,
• I ′ = I and F ′ = F .
As example, take the ase of A and AV from Fig. 3.
Trae inlusion and trae equivalene
Let A = (Q,E, I, F ), A′ = (Q′, E′, I ′, F ′) be weakly asynhronous nite au-
tomata. We shall say that A is trae-inluded in A′, denoted A ⊑ A′, i tr(A) ⊆
tr(A′). A is said to be trae-equivalent to A′, denoted A ≡ A′, i A ⊑ A′ and A′
⊑ A.
Simulation and bisimulation
Let A = (Q,E, I, F ), A′ = (Q′, E′, I ′, F ′) be weakly asynhronous nite au-
tomata. We dene a binary relation Z ⊆ Q × Q′ suh that dom(Z) ∩ I 6= ∅ and
ran(Z)∩ I ′ 6= ∅ to be a simulation of A by A′, denoted Z: A ←− A′, i for all q ∈
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Q, for all q′ ∈ Q′, if q Z q′ then
•
for all α ∈ Σa, for all r ∈ Q, if α ∈ E∗(q, r) then there is r′ ∈ Q′ suh that r Z
r′ and α ∈ E′∗(q′, r′),
•
if q ∈ I then q′ ∈ I ′ and if q ∈ F then q′ ∈ F ′.
Note: dom(Z) and ran(Z) respetively denote the domain of Z and the range of Z.
If there is a simulation Z of A by A′ then we write A ←− A′. We dene a binary
relation Z ⊆ Q×Q′ to be a bisimulation between A and A′, denoted Z: A ←→ A′,
i Z: A ←− A′ and Z−1: A′ ←− A. If there is a bisimulation between A and A′
then we write A ←→ A′.
3 Composition of Servies
3.1 Formal denitions
Let R ∈ {⊑,≡,←−,←→}. The valuation deision (VD) problem for R is dened
by:
•
input: a strongly asynhronous nite automaton A = (Q,E, I, F ) and ǫ-free
Boolean automata A1 = (Q1, E1, I1, F1), . . ., An = (Qn, En, In, Fn),
•
output: hek if there is a valuation V suh that A R (A1 ⊗ . . . ⊗An)V .
The Boolean formula deision (BFD) problem for R is dened by:
•
input: a strongly asynhronous nite automaton A = (Q,E, I, F ), ǫ-free Boolean
automata A1 = (Q1, E1, I1, F1), . . ., An = (Qn, En, In, Fn) and a Boolean formula
φ,
•
output: hek if for all valuations V , A R (A1 ⊗ . . .⊗An)V i V̂ (φ) = 1.
The Boolean formula synthesis (BFS) problem for R is dened by:
•
input: a strongly asynhronous nite automaton A = (Q,E, I, F ) and ǫ-free
Boolean automata A1 = (Q1, E1, I1, F1), . . ., An = (Qn, En, In, Fn),
•
output: nd out a Boolean formula φ suh that for all valuations V , A R (A1 ⊗
. . .⊗An)V i V̂ (φ) = 1.
The questions we are interested in are: Is there a valuation of these servies suh
that the desired omposition is possible (VD problem)? How to ompute a boolean
formula φ over these prediates that is true i the desired omposition is possible
(BFS problem)?
3.2 Motivating Example
Consider three servies S1, S2, S3.
Servie S1 provides an on-line booking for European football math plaes that
will take plae in Madrid. This servie is modeled by the automaton A1 in Fig. 4.
When S1 reeives a request for a football plae (ticket_req) booking, it heks
whether there is available plaes having the desired prie (ation c_v). This hek
an be done if and only if the request is provided by a non blak listed supporter
(prediate ¬pblack). If there is no available plae, S1 informs the requester by the
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A1 : q1 q2
(⊤, ticket_req) (¬pblack, c_v)
q3 q4
(⊤, !ask_bank1)
(⊤, no_ticket)
q5
(⊤, ?resp_bank1)(⊤, send_ticket)
Figure 4. Boolean automaton A1
A2 : q1 q2
(⊤, flight_req) (psh ∨ pnat, c_f)
q3 q4
(⊤, !ask_bank2)
(⊤, no_flight)
q5
(⊤, ?resp_bank2)(⊤, send_flight)
Figure 5. Boolean automaton A2
A3 : q1
q2
(pcert1, ?ask_bank1)
q3
(pcc ∨ ppp, pay_ok)
q4
(pcert2, ?ask_bank2)
q5
(pcc ∨ ppp, pay_ok)
(⊤, !resp_bank1)
(⊤, !resp_bank2)
Figure 6. Boolean automaton A3
ation no_ticket. If there is a tiket, S1 asks the bank servie (S3) for the tiket
payment (ations !ask_bank1). If the bank answers the payment is Ok (message
?resp_bank1), the tiket is sent to the requester (ation send_ticket).
Servie S2 sells ight tikets. It is modeled by the automaton A2 in Fig. 5.
S2 works like S1 but sells tikets only for people who do not need a Visa for
oming to Spain, thus either people whose nationality is in a given list (prediate
pnat), or if the starting point of the ight is in the Shengen Spae (prediate psh).
The servie S3 is the bank servie modeled by the automaton A3 in Fig. 6.
S3 aepts request from servies having a seurity ertiate (prediate pcerti
means that Si has suh a ertiate). Then, if the buyer has either a redit ard
(prediate pcc) or a paypal aount (prediate ppp), and if the payment is OK (in
order to not overload the example, we do not model this ommuniating point; we
just enode it by the ation pay_ok), the bank validates the payment to the related
servie.
As the reader an see, servies an be omposed to provide the intented servie
S (depited in Fig. 7), with several onditions on the value of prediates pnat, pcert1,,
et.
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A : q1 q2
ticket_req
q3
c_v
no_ticket
q4
flight_req
q5
c_f
no_flight
q6
pay_ok
pay_ok
q7
send_ticket
send_flight
Figure 7. Automaton A
4 Trae Inlusion and Trae Equivalene
Let us reall that given two nite automata A1 and A2, testing whether A1 ⊑ (A2
an be done in PSPACE.
Upper bound
Let A = (Q,E, I, F ) be a strongly asynhronous nite automaton and A1 =
(Q1, E1, I1, F1), . . ., An = (Qn, En, In, Fn) be ǫ-free Boolean automata. We now de-
ne a deterministi algorithm whih returns the value aept i there is a valuation
V suh that A ⊑ (A1 ⊗ . . . ⊗An)V :
(i) for all valuations V
(a) ompute (A1 ⊗ . . . ⊗An)V ;
(b) hek if A ⊑ (A1 ⊗ . . .⊗An)V ;
(ii) if one of these alls returns the value aept then return the value aept
else return the value rejet;
Obviously, the deterministi algorithm above is exponential-spae-bounded. Simi-
larly, an exponential-spae-bounded deterministi algorithm whih returns the value
aept i there is a valuation V suh that A ≡ (A1 ⊗ . . .⊗An)V an be dened.
As a result,
Proposition 4.1 Let R ∈ {⊑,≡}. The VD problem for R is in EXPSPACE.
Similarly,
Proposition 4.2 Let R ∈ {⊑,≡}. The BFD problem for R is in EXPSPACE.
Let A = (Q,E, I, F ) be a strongly asynhronous nite automaton and A1 =
(Q1, E1, I1, F1), . . ., An = (Qn, En, In, Fn) be ǫ-free Boolean automata. We now
dene a deterministi algorithm whih returns a Boolean formula φ suh that for all
valuations V , A ⊑ (A1 ⊗ . . .⊗An)V i V̂ (φ) = 1:
(i) φ := ⊥;
(ii) for all maximal onsistent onjuntions ψ of P -literals
(a) ompute the unique valuation V suh that V̂ (ψ) = 1;
(b) ompute (A1 ⊗ . . . ⊗An)V ;
() if A ⊑ (A1 ⊗ . . .⊗An)V then φ := φ ∨ ψ;
Obviously, the deterministi algorithm above is exponential-spae-bounded. Simi-
larly, an exponential-spae-bounded deterministi algorithm whih returns a Boolean
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formula φ suh that for all valuations V , A ≡ (A1⊗ . . .⊗An)V i V̂ (φ) = 1 an be
dened. As a result,
Proposition 4.3 Let R ∈ {⊑,≡}. The BFS problem for R is solvable by means of
an exponential-spae-bounded deterministi algorithm.
Lower bound
To prove that the VD problem for ⊑ is EXPSPACE-hard, we give a polynomial
time redution of the universality problem for regular expressions with squaring,
whih is known to be EXPSPACE-hard [13℄, to the VD problem for ⊑. The set of
all regular expressions with squaring (with typial members denoted exp, exp′, . . .)
is dened by:
exp ::= α | ǫ | (exp ◦ exp) | (exp ∪ exp) | exp+ | exp2.
The number of ourrenes of operators ǫ, ◦, ∪, + and 2 in regular expression exp with
squaring is denoted op(exp). Every regular expression exp with squaring gives rise
to a language denoted lang(exp) in the usual way. Let σ1, σ2, . . . be an enumeration
of Σs. Given a regular expression exp with squaring, let n = 2× op(exp). Let A =
(Q,E, I, F ) be the strongly asynhronous nite automaton dened as follows: Q =
{q}, E is the funtion from Q×Q into the set of all nite subsets of B(P )×Σa suh
that for all q, r ∈ Q, for all φ ∈ B(P ), for all α ∈ Σa, (φ, α) ∈ E(q, r) i φ = ⊤, I =
{q} and F = {q}. For all positive integers i, if i ≤ n then let Ai = (Qi, Ei, Ii, Fi) be
the ǫ-free Boolean automaton dened as follows: Qi = {q1i, q2i}, Ei is the funtion
from Qi×Qi into the set of all nite subsets of B(P )× (Σa∪ ({?, !}×Σs)) suh that
for all q, r ∈ Qi, for all φ ∈ B(P ),
•
for all α ∈ Σa, (φ, α) 6∈ Ei(q, r),
•
for all x ∈ {?, !}, for all σ ∈ Σs, (φ, xσ) ∈ Ei(q, r) i φ = ⊤, x = ?, σ = σi, q =
q1i and r = q2i or φ = ⊤, x = !, σ = σi, q = q2i and r = q1i,
Ii = {q1i} and Fi = {q2i}. Let A0 = (Q0, E0, I0, F0) be the ǫ-free Boolean automaton
dened by indution on exp as follows:
Basis: Case exp = α. In this ase, A0 = (Q0, E0, I0, F0) is dened as follows: Q0
= {qI , qF}, E0 is the funtion from Q0 × Q0 into the set of all nite subsets of
B(P )× (Σa ∪ ({?, !} × Σs)) suh that for all q, r ∈ Q0, for all φ ∈ B(P ),
•
for all β ∈ Σa, (φ, β) ∈ E0(q, r) i q = qI , r = qF , φ = ⊤ and β = α,
•
for all x ∈ {?, !}, for all σ ∈ Σs, (φ, xσ) 6∈ E0(q, r),
I0 = {qI} and F0 = {qF }. The Boolean automaton A0 is represented in Fig. 8. The
reader may easily verify that for all valuations V , lang(exp) = tr(AV0 ). Remark
that 0 = n. Note also that I0 and F0 are singletons.
qI qF(⊤, α)
Figure 8. Finite automaton A0 in the ase exp = α.
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Hypothesis: exp′ and exp′′ are regular expressions with squaring suh that there
is an ǫ-free Boolean automaton A′0 = (Q′0, E′0, I ′0, F ′0) suh that for all valuations
V , lang(exp′) = tr((A′0 ⊗ A1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ An′)V ) where n′ = 2 × op(exp′) and there
is an ǫ-free Boolean automaton A′′0 = (Q′′0 , E′′0 , I ′′0 , F ′′0 ) suh that for all valuations
V , lang(exp′′) = tr((A′′0 ⊗A1 ⊗ . . . ⊗An′′)V ) where n′′ = q × op(exp′′). We also
assume that I ′0, F ′0, I ′′0 and F ′′0 are singletons.
Step: The ases exp = ǫ, exp = exp′ ◦ exp′′, exp = exp′ ∪ exp′′ and exp = exp′+
are similar.
Case exp = exp′2. In this ase, A0 = (Q0, E0, I0, F0) is dened as follows: Q0 =
Q′0∪{qI , q, r, qF }, E0 is the funtion from Q0×Q0 into the set of all nite subsets
of B(P )× (Σa ∪ ({?, !} × Σs)) suh that for all s, t ∈ Q0, for all φ ∈ B(P ),
•
for all β ∈ Σa, (φ, β) ∈ E0(s, t) i s, t ∈ Q′0 and (φ, β) ∈ E′0(s, t),
•
for all x ∈ {?, !}, for all σ ∈ Σs, (φ, xσ) ∈ E0(s, t) i s, t ∈ Q′0 and (φ, xσ) ∈
E′0(s, t) or s = qI , t = q′I , φ = ⊤, x = ! and σ = σn′+1 or s = q′F , t = q, φ =
⊤, x = ! and σ = σn′+2 or s = q, t = qI , φ = ⊤, x = ? and σ = σn′+1 or s =
q′F , t = r, φ = ⊤, x = ? and σ = σn′+2 or s = r, t = qF , φ = ⊤, x = ? and σ
= σn′+1,
I0 = {qI} and F0 = {qF}. The Boolean automaton A0 is represented in Fig. 9.
The reader may easily verify that for all valuations V , lang(exp) = tr((A0⊗A1⊗
. . .⊗An′ ⊗An′+1⊗An′+2)V ). Remark that n′+2 = n. Note also that I0 and F0
are singletons.
A′0
qI q′I q
′
F
r qF
q
(⊤, !σn′+1)
(⊤, ?σn′+2)
(⊤, !σn′+2)
(⊤, ?σn′+1)
(⊤, ?σn′+1)
Figure 9. Finite automaton A0 in the ase exp = exp′2.
The reader may easily verify that lang(exp) = Σ∗a i there is a valuation V suh that
A ⊑ (A0 ⊗A1 ⊗ . . .⊗An)V . Similarly, the reader may easily verify that lang(exp)
= Σ∗a i there is a valuation V suh that A ≡ (A0 ⊗A1 ⊗ . . .⊗An)V . As a result,
Proposition 4.4 Let R ∈ {⊑,≡}. The VD problem for R is EXPSPACE-hard.
Similarly,
Proposition 4.5 Let R ∈ {⊑,≡}. The BFD problem for R is EXPSPACE-hard.
Aording to Meyer and Stokmeyer [13℄, for all deterministi Turing mahines
M solving the universality problem for regular expressions with squaring, there exists
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a onstant c > 1 suh that M needs at least spae cn on some input of length n for
innitely many n. Suppose that there is a deterministi algorithm f solving the BFS
problem for R and suh that for all onstants c > 1, f needs at least spae cn on
some input of length n for nitely many n only. Let Mf be the deterministi Turing
mahine that behaves as follows given a regular expression exp with squaring:
(i) Mf omputes n = 2× op(exp);
(ii) Mf omputes the strongly asynhronous nite automaton A = (Q,E, I, F )
dened as above;
(iii) for all positive integers i, if i ≤ n then Mf omputes the ǫ-free Boolean au-
tomaton Ai = (Qi, Ei, Ii, Fi) dened as above;
(iv) Mf omputes the ǫ-free Boolean automaton A0 = (Q0, E0, I0, F0) dened by
indution on exp as above;
(v) Mf simulates f on input A and A0 and A1, . . ., An until it is about to return
a value φf ;
(vi) if φf is a Boolean tautology then return the value aept else return the value
rejet;
Obviously, Mf solves the universality problem for regular expressions with squaring
and for all onstants c > 1 Mf needs at least spae cn on some input of length n for
nitely many n only: a ontradition. As a result,
Proposition 4.6 Let R ∈ {⊑,≡}. For all deterministi algorithms f solving the
BFS problem for R, there exist a onstant c > 1, suh that f needs at least spae cn
on some input of length n for innitely many n.
5 Simulation and Bisimulation
Let us reall that given two nite automata A1 and A2, testing whether A1 simulates
A2 an be done in polynomial time.
Upper bound
Let A = (Q,E, I, F ) be a strongly asynhronous nite automaton and A1 =
(Q1, E1, I1, F1), . . ., An = (Qn, En, In, Fn) be ǫ-free Boolean automata. We now de-
ne a deterministi algorithm whih returns the value aept i there is a valuation
V suh that A ←− (A1 ⊗ . . .⊗An)V :
(i) for all valuations V
(a) ompute (A1 ⊗ . . . ⊗An)V ;
(b) hek if A ←− (A1 ⊗ . . .⊗An)V ;
(ii) if one of these alls returns the value aept then return the value aept
else return the value rejet;
Obviously, the deterministi algorithm above is exponential-time-bounded. Simi-
larly, an exponential-time-bounded deterministi algorithm whih returns the value
aept i there is a valuation V suh that A ←→ (A1⊗ . . .⊗An)V an be dened.
As a result,
Proposition 5.1 Let R ∈ {←−,←→}. The VD problem for R is in EXPTIME.
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Let A = (Q,E, I, F ) be a strongly asynhronous nite automaton, A1 =
(Q1, E1, I1, F1), . . ., An = (Qn, En, In, Fn) be ǫ-free Boolean automata and φ be
a Boolean formula. We now dene a deterministi algorithm whih returns the
value aept i for all valuations V , A ←− (A1 ⊗ . . .⊗An)V i V̂ (φ) = 1:
(i) for all valuations V
(a) ompute (A1 ⊗ . . . ⊗An)V ;
(b) ompute V̂ (φ);
() hek if A ←− (A1 ⊗ . . .⊗An)V i V̂ (φ) = 1;
(ii) if all these alls returns the value aept then return the value aept else
return the value rejet.
Obviously, the deterministi algorithm above is exponential-time-bounded. Simi-
larly, an exponential-time-bounded deterministi algorithm whih returns the value
aept i for all valuations V , A←→ (A1⊗ . . .⊗An)V i V̂ (φ) = 1 an be dened.
Proposition 5.2 Let R ∈ {←−,←→}. The BFD problem for R is in EXPTIME.
Let A = (Q,E, I, F ) be a strongly asynhronous nite automaton and A1 =
(Q1, E1, I1, F1), . . ., An = (Qn, En, In, Fn) be ǫ-free Boolean automata. We now
dene a deterministi algorithm whih returns a Boolean formula φ suh that for all
valuations V , A ←− (A1 ⊗ . . . ⊗An)V i V̂ (φ) = 1:
(i) φ := ⊥;
(ii) for all maximal onsistent onjuntions ψ of P -literals
(a) ompute the unique valuation V suh that V̂ (ψ) = 1;
(b) ompute (A1 ⊗ . . . ⊗An)V ;
() if A ←− (A1 ⊗ . . .⊗An)V then φ := φ ∨ ψ;
Obviously, the deterministi algorithm above is exponential-time-bounded. Simi-
larly, an exponential-time-bounded deterministi algorithm whih returns a Boolean
formula φ suh that for all valuations V , A ←→ (A1 ⊗ . . .⊗An)V i V̂ (φ) = 1 an
be dened. As a result,
Proposition 5.3 Let R ∈ {←−,←→}. The BFS problem for R is solvable by means
of an exponential-time-bounded deterministi algorithm.
Lower bound
By giving a polynomial time redution of the simulation problem of a strongly
asynhronous nite automaton by means of a produt of strongly asynhronous nite
automata, whih is known to be EXPTIME-hard [15℄, to the VD problem for←−,
we prove that the VD problem for ←− is EXPTIME-hard. Given a strongly
asynhronous nite automaton A = (Q,E, I, F ) and strongly asynhronous nite
automata A1 = (Q1, E1, I1, F1), . . ., An = (Qn, En, In, Fn), let A′1 = (Q′1, E′1, I ′1, F ′1),
. . ., A′n = (Q′n, E′n, I ′n, F ′n) be the ǫ-free Boolean automata dened as follows: Q′i =
Qi, E
′
i is the funtion from Q
′
i×Q′i into the set of all nite subsets of B(P )× (Σa ∪
({?, !} × Σs)) suh that for all q, r ∈ Q′i, for all φ ∈ B(P ),
•
for all α ∈ Σa, (φ, α) ∈ E′i(q, r) i φ = ⊤ and α ∈ Ei(q, r),
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•
for all x ∈ {?, !}, for all σ ∈ Σs, (φ, xσ) 6∈ E′i(q, r),
I ′i = Ii and F
′
i = Fi. The reader may easily verify that A ←− A1⊗ . . .⊗An i there
is a valuation V suh that A ←− (A′1 ⊗ . . .⊗A′n)V . As a result,
Proposition 5.4 The VD problem for ←− is EXPTIME-hard.
Similarly,
Proposition 5.5 The BFD problem for ←− is EXPTIME-hard.
Proof We prove that the Boolean formula deision problem for←− is EXPTIME-
hard by giving a polynomial time redution of the simulation problem of a
strongly asynhronous nite automaton by means of a produt of strongly
asynhronous nite automata, whih is known to be EXPTIME-hard [15℄,
to the Boolean formula deision problem for ←−. Given a strongly asyn-
hronous nite automaton A = (Q,E, I, F ) and strongly asynhronous nite au-
tomata A1 = (Q1, E1, I1, F1), . . ., An = (Qn, En, In, Fn), let A′1 = (Q′1, E′1, I ′1,
F ′1), . . ., A′n = (Q′n, E′n, I ′n, F ′n) be the ǫ-free Boolean automaton dened as above
and φ = ⊤. Suppose that A ←− A1 ⊗ . . . ⊗An. Hene, there is a simulation Z of
A by A1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ An. Let V be a valuation. Obviously, Z is a simulation of A by
(A′1⊗ . . .⊗A′n)V . Therefore, for all valuations V , A ←− (A′1⊗ . . .⊗A′n)V i V̂ (φ) =
1. Reiproally, suppose that for all valuations V , A←− (A′1⊗ . . .⊗A′n)V i V̂ (φ) =
1. Let V be a valuation. Thus, there is a simulation Z of A by (A′1⊗. . .⊗A′n)V . Ob-
viously, Z is a simulation of A by A1⊗. . .⊗An. Consequently, A←−A1⊗. . .⊗An.2
We prove that the VD problem for←→ is PSPACE-hard by giving a polynomial
time redution of the aeptane problem of a linear-spae-bounded deterministi
Turing mahine, whih is known to be PSPACE-hard, to the VD problem for
←→. Let acc, α1, α2, . . . be an enumeration of Σa. Given a linear-spae-bounded
deterministi Turing mahineM = (QM , q0M , q
1
M ,ΣM , δM ) and a word w ∈ Σ∗M , let n
be the length ofw. Let Σf = {acc, α1, . . . , αn}. Let A = (Q,E, I, F ) be the strongly
asynhronous nite automaton dened as follows: Q = (QM ×{1, . . . , n})∪ {⊥}, E
is the funtion from Q×Q into the set of all nite subsets of B(P )× Σf suh that
for all (q, i), (r, j) ∈ Q, for all φ ∈ B(P ),
•
for all α ∈ Σf , (φ, α) ∈ E((q, i), (r, j)) i φ = ⊤, α = αi and there are u, v ∈ ΣM ,
there is d ∈ {−1,+1} suh that δM (q, u, r, v, d) is dened and j = i+ d or φ = ⊤,
α = acc, q = q1M , r = q
1
M and j = i,
•
for all α ∈ Σf , (φ, α) ∈ E((q, i),⊥) i φ = ⊤, α 6= acc and α 6= αi or for all r ∈
QM , for all u, v ∈ ΣM , for all d ∈ {−1,+1}, δM (q, u, r, v, d) is not dened,
•
for all α ∈ Σf , (φ, α) 6∈ E(⊥, (r, j)),
•
for all α ∈ Σf , (φ, α) ∈ E(⊥,⊥) i φ = ⊤ and α 6= acc,
I = {(q0M , 1)} and F = ∅. Let A1 = (Q1, E1, I1, F1), . . ., An = (Qn, En, In, Fn) be
the ǫ-free Boolean automata dened as follows: Qi = (QM ×ΣM) ∪ {⊥i}, Ei is the
funtion from Qi×Qi into the set of all nite subsets of B(P )× (Σf ∪ ({?, !}×Σs))
suh that for all (q, u), (r, v) ∈ Qi, for all φ ∈ B(P ),
•
for all α ∈ Σf , (φ, α) ∈ Ei((q, u), (r, v)) i φ = ⊤, α = αi and there is d ∈ {−1,+1}
suh that δM (q, u, r, v, d) is dened,
111
Balbiani, Cheikh, Heam and Kouchnarenko
•
for all α ∈ Σf , (φ, α) ∈ Ei((q, u),⊥i) i φ = ⊤, α 6= acc and α 6= αi or for all r
∈ QM , for all v ∈ ΣM , for all d ∈ {−1,+1}, δM (q, u, r, v, d) is not dened,
•
for all α ∈ Σf , (φ, α) 6∈ Ei(⊥i, (r, v)),
•
for all α ∈ Σf , (φ, α) ∈ Ei(⊥i,⊥i) i φ = ⊤ and α 6= acc,
•
for all x ∈ {?, !}, for all σ ∈ Σs, (φ, xσ) 6∈ Ei((q, u), (r, v)),
•
for all x ∈ {?, !}, for all σ ∈ Σs, (φ, xσ) 6∈ Ei((q, u),⊥i),
•
for all x ∈ {?, !}, for all σ ∈ Σs, (φ, xσ) 6∈ Ei(⊥i, (r, v)),
•
for all x ∈ {?, !}, for all σ ∈ Σs, (φ, xσ) 6∈ Ei(⊥i,⊥i),
Ii = {(q0M , wi)} and Fi = ∅. Suppose that M does not aept w. Let Z ⊆ Q ×
(Q1 × . . .×Qn) be the binary relation suh that
• (q, i) Z ((q1, u1), . . . , (qn, un)) i q = qi and (q0M , 1,w) =⇒∗M (q, i, u1 . . . un),
• · Z (·, . . . , ·,⊥i, ·, . . . , ·),
• ⊥ Z (·, . . . , ·).
The reader may easily verify that there is a valuation V suh that Z is a bisimulation
between A and (A1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ An)V . Hene, there is a valuation V suh that A ←→
(A1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ An)V . Reiproally, suppose that there is a valuation V suh that
A ←→ (A1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ An)V . Therefore, there is a bisimulation Z between A and
(A1 ⊗ . . .⊗An)V . Obviously, M does not aept w.
Proposition 5.6 The VD problem for ←→ is PSPACE-hard. The BFD problem
for ←→ is PSPACE-hard.
6 Conlusion
This paper presented dierent new omplexity results for the VD problem and the
BFD problem within the framework of servie omposition with onstraints. To sum
up, the results are given in snapshot of our work below.
R valuation deision problem Boolean formula deision problem
≡ EXPSPACE-omplete EXPSPACE-omplete
⊆ EXPSPACE-omplete EXPSPACE-omplete
← EXPTIME-omplete EXPTIME-omplete
↔ PSPACE-hard PSPACE-hard
in EXPTIME in EXPTIME
As pointed out by the above table, a still open question is to evaluate the exat om-
plexity of the valuation deision problem for ←→ and the Boolean formula deision
problem for ←→: are they in PSPACE or are they EXPTIME-hard? Moreover,
we foused on the identiation of a relevant abstration to manage onditional
ations in the servie omposition problem. In the future, we intend to explore
pratial algorithmi approahes to handle the Boolean formula synthesis problem.
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Abstract
The Kmelia component model is an abstract formal component model based on services. It is dedicated to
the specification and development of correct components. This work enriches the Kmelia language to allow
the description of data, expressions and assertions when specifying components and services. The objective
is to enable the use of assertions in Kmelia in order to support expressive service descriptions, to support
client/supplier contracts with pre/post-conditions, and to enhance formal analysis of component-based
system. Assertions are used to perfom analysis of services, component assemblies and service compositions.
We illustrate the work with the verification of consistency properties involving data at component and
assembly levels.
Keywords: Component, Assembly, Datatype, Assertions, Property Verification
1 Introduction
The Kmelia component model [7] is an abstract formal component model dedicated
to the specification and development of correct components. A formal component
model is mandatory to check various kind of properties for component-based software
systems: correctness, liveness, safety; to find components and services in libraries
according to their formal requirements; to refine models or to generate code. The
key concepts of Kmelia are component, service, assembly and composition. One
important feature is the use of services as first class entities. A service has a state,
a dynamic behaviour which may include communication actions, an interface made
of required and provided subservices. The composition of components is based on
the interaction between their linked services. Linking components by their services
in component assemblies establishes a bridge to service oriented abstract models.
In [7] we introduced the syntax and semantics for the core model and language. It
has been incrementally enriched later. We mainly focused on the dynamic aspects of
composition: interaction compatibility in [7] and component protocols with service
composition in [6]. Following this incremental approach, we consider in this article
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an enrichment of the data and expressions in the kmelia model and its impact on
the language syntax, its semantics and the verification of properties. Our guiding
objective is twofold: 1) enable the definition of assertions (with invariant, pre/post
conditions, and properties of services, components, and compositions), 2) increase
the expressiveness of the action statements so as to deal with real size case studies.
Assertions are useful (i) to define contracts 1 on services; contracts increase the
confidence in assembly correctness and they are a pertinent information when looking
for candidates for a required service, (ii) to ensure the consistency of components
respecting the invariant. The actions implement a functional part of the services
which should then be proved to be consistent with the contracts. Therefore the
correctness verification aspects of the Kmelia model is enhanced.
Motivations. Modelling real life systems requires the use of data types to handle
states, actions and property descriptions. The state of the art shows that most of the
abstract components models [4,13,24,12]. They enable various verifications of the
interaction correctness but they lack expressiveness on the data types and do not
provide assertions mechanisms and the related verification rules. As an example,
in Wright the dynamic part based on CSP is largely detailed (specification and
verification) while the data part is minor [4]. In the proposal of [22] the data types
are defined using algebraic specifications, which are convenient to marry with the
symbolic model checking of state transition systems but this proposal does not deal
with contracts and assertions.
Contribution. In this work, we enrich the Kmelia model with data and assertions
at the service and composition levels in order to deal with safe services, component
consistency and assembly contracts. First, the Kmelia language is enriched with
data and assertions so as to cover in an homogeneous way structural, dynamic and
functional correctness with respect to assertions. Second, we deal with state space
visibility and access through different levels of nested components; in addition to
service promotion we define variable promotions and the related access rules from
component state in component compositions. Last, feasibility of proving component
correctness using the assertions is presented. We show how structural correctness is
verified and how the associated properties are expressed with the new data language.
To design it , we have established a trade off 2 between the desired expressiveness
of our language and the verification concerns. To avoid the separation of analysis
tools and to work on the same abstract model, we advocate for an approach where
both data and dynamic part are integrated in a unique Kmelia language.
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the Kmelia
abstract model and introduces its new features. In Section 3 a working example is
introduced to illustrate the use of data and assertions. The formal analysis issue
is treated in Section 4; we present various analysis to be performed and we focus
on component consistency and on checking assembly links. The formal analysis are
based on the formal descriptions of Section 2 also many details are omitted in this
paper. Section 5 concludes the article and draws some discussions and perspectives.
1 Our contract definitions are related to classical results of works such as design-by-contracts [20].
2 We thought to encapsulate statements from other formal data languages such as Z, B, OCL or CASL,
with the idea to reuse existing tool supports for checking syntax and properties. That approach was not
convincing due to a lack of expressiveness, or a weak tool support or integration problems.
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2 The Kmelia Model and its new Features
We enriched the Kmelia language of [7] to allow the description of datatypes, ex-
pressions and first order logic predicates. This section revisits the Kmelia model,
focusing on its new features.
2.1 Data types and expressions
We enrich the Kmelia language by designing a small but expressive data language.
This enables us to deal homogeneously with the expression of the properties related
to the component level and to the composition level.
Basic types such as Integer , Boolean, Char, String with their usual operators
and semantics are permitted. Abstract data types like record, enumeration, range,
arrays and sets are allowed in Kmelia. User-defined record types are built over the
above basic types. Specific types and functions may be defined and imported from
libraries. A Kmelia expression is built with constants, variables and elementary
expressions built with standard arithmetic and logical operators. An assignment is
made of a variable at the left hand side and an expression at the right hand side.
Assertions (pre-/post-conditions and invariants) are first order logic predicates.
In a post-condition of a service, the keyword old is used to distinguish the before and
after variable states. This is close to OCL’s pre or Eiffel’s old keywords. Guards
in the service behaviour are also predicates. All the assertions must conform to an
observability policy described in Section 2.3.
2.2 Components
A component is one element of a component type. A component is referenced with
a variable typed using the component type; for example c :C where c is a variable
and C a component type. The access to a state variable v of c is denoted c .v.
A component type C is a 8-tuple 〈W,A,N ,M, I,D, ν, CS〉 with:
• W = 〈T, V, type, Inv, Init〉 the state space where T is a set of types, V a set of
variables, type : V → T the function that map variables to types, Inv an invariant
defined on V and Init the initialisation of the variables of V .
• A a finite set of elementary actions (based on the expressions).
• N a finite set of service names with NP (provided services) and NR (required
services) two disjoint finite sets of names 3 : N = NP unionmultiNR.
• M a finite set of message names.
• I = IP unionmultiIR the component interface which is the union of two disjoint finite sets
of names IP and IR such that IP ⊆ NP ∧ IR ⊆ NR.
• D is the set of service descriptions with the disjoint provided services (DP ) and
required services (DR) sets: D = DP unionmulti DR.
• ν : N → D is the function mapping service names to service descriptions. More-
over there is a projection of the N partition on its image by ν:
s ∈ NP ⇒ ν(s) ∈ DP ∧ s ∈ NR ⇒ ν(s) ∈ DR
3 unionmulti denotes the disjoint union of sets
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• CS is a set of constraints related to the services of the interface of C in order to
control the usage of the services.
Observability of the component state. To preserve the abstraction and en-
capsulation of components, the state of a component is accessed only through its
provided services. Nevertheless to understand the specification of a service (i.e. its
contract) we need to observe its context (an exposed part of its component state
space). Similarly a composite component requires observable informations from its
components. Therefore we define V O as the subset of the observable variables of V .
Consequently the state invariant Inv is composed of an observable (InvO defined on
V O) and a non-observable part. The notion of observability is also applied to service
pre/post conditions with the specific rules described in section 2.3. Observability is
a kind of visibility related to contracts.
2.3 Services
The behaviour of a component relies on the behaviours of its services which are
a kind of concurrent processes. A service models a functionality activated by a
call. An activated service runs its behaviour and shares the component state with
other activated services of the same component. During its evolution a service may
activate other services by calling them or communicate with them by messages. Due
to dependencies and interactions between services, the actions of several activated
services may interleave or synchronise. Only one action of an activated service may
be observed at time. Formally a service s of a component with type C 4 is defined
by a 3-tuple 〈IS, lW,B〉 with:
• The service interface IS is defined by a 6-tuple 〈σ, µ, vW, P re, Post,DI〉 where
· σ is the service signature 〈name, param, ptype, Tres〉 with name ∈ N , param
a set of parameters, ptype : param → T the function mapping parameters to
types and Tres ∈ T the service result type;
· vW = 〈vT, vV, vtype, vInv, vInit〉 is a virtual state space with vT a set of types,
vV a set of variables, vtype : vV → vT the function mapping context variables to
types and vInv an invariant defined on vV and vInit the optional initialisation
of the variables of vV ;
· µ is a set of message signatures 〈mname,mparam,mptype〉 wheremname ∈M,
mparam and mptype are similar to those of the service signature;
· Pre is a pre-condition defined on the union of the variables in V, vV, and
param: V ∪ vV ∪ param;
· Post is a post-condition defined on V ∪ vV ∪ param ∪ { result }, where the
predefined result variable of type Tres denotes the service result;
· DI is the service dependency ; it is composed by services on which the current
service depends. DI is a 4-tuple 〈sub, cal, req, int〉 of disjoint sets where
sub ⊆ N P (resp. cal ⊆ NR, req ⊆ NR, int ⊆ N P ) contains the provided
services names (resp. the ones required from the caller, from any component or
from the component itself) in the scope of s.
4 and by extension a service of a component c : C
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• lW = 〈lT, lV, ltype, lInv, lInit〉 is the local state space where lT is a set of types,
lV a set of local variables, ltype : lV → lT the function mapping local variables to
types, lInv a local state invariant defined on lV (mostly lInv = true) and lInit
the initialisation of the variables of lV .
• The behaviour B of a service s is an extended labelled transition system (eLTS) with
state and transitions. The necessary details are given on the example of Section 3.
The full background is provided online in references [7,6].
The state space lW local to a service is used only in the service behaviour B but
not used in the assertions.
Virtual state spaces. A required service is an abstraction of a service provided by
another component. Since that component is unknown when specifying the required
service, it may be necessary to describe this “imaginary” component. We introduce
the notion of a virtual state space vW in order to abstract the service context. For
a provided service this virtual context is always empty.
Observability vs. service state space. Let s be a service of a component type C.
The distinction between observable and non-observable variables of the component
state space is revisited 5 according to the following table:
Service Variables Invariant
state space Observable part Non-observable part Observable part Non-observable part
Provided s V O V InvO Inv
Required s vV V vInv Inv
The pre-/post-conditions of s must respect the well-formedness rules related to
the observable, non-observable and virtual contexts according to the following table:
Service pre-condition post-condition
Assertions Observable Non-observable Observable Non-observable
scope PreO PreNO PostO PostNO
Provided s V O ∪ param none V O ∪ param ∪ { result } V ∪ param ∪ { result }
Required s vV ∪ param V ∪ param vV ∪ param ∪ { result } none
Figure 1 summarises (in the context of a composition as described in Section 2.4)
the relations between state spaces, observability and contracts. The boxes denote
components (a, b) and compositions (c). The grey (resp. white) "funnel" denote
provided (resp. required) services.
prov B
a : A
prov A
preO
post NOpost O
req A
C_VO V
int A
req B
preO
post O
vV
b : B
C_VO V
prov B
vmapreq A
c : C
Observability
Function call
Service call
Assembly
link
Promotion
link
preNO
Mapping
Fig. 1. State variables scope and assertion scope
5 it is not a partition here because of the supplementary variables in param and result
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The observable pre-/post-conditions of service provA (resp. reqB) refer to the
observable state V O of a (resp. the virtual state vV of reqB). These conditions will
be used to check the contracts implicitly supported by the assembly links and the
composition links. In particular the virtual state vV of reqB should map with a sub-
set of V of a. Non-observable pre-conditions (resp. post-conditions) are meaningless
for a provided service (resp. required service) because they prevent safe assembly
and promotion contracts. The non-observable pre-condition of service reqB gives
call conditions on the (caller) component state variablesV of b. The non-observable
post-condition of service provA refer locally to the whole state V of a and should
establish the non-observable part of the invariant of a.
2.4 Assembly and Composition
An assembly is a set of components that are linked (horizontal composition) through
their services. An assembly is one element of an assembly type. An assembly link
associates a required service to a provided one. Considering the rich interface of a
Kmelia service (see 2.3), we need an explicit matching mechanism, to link properly
the 6-tuples defining given service interfaces; therefore, additionally to signatures
and dependency (via sublinks) mapping we now define context and message map-
pings. When needed, message or service parameters re-ordering must be handled
through adaptation mechanisms [5].
Assembly context and message mapping. Consider a required service sr of a
component cr of type CR linked to a provided service sp of another component cp
of type CP . The virtual state space variables (vVsr) of sr must be “instantiated”
using the observable variables of sp (V OCP ) by a mapping (total) function vmap :
vVsr → exp(V OCP ) where exp(X) denotes an expression over the variables of X.
Each message name of sr is mapped to a message name of sp by a mapping (total)
function mmap : mnamesr → mnamesp.
A composition is the encapsulation of an assembly into a component (the compos-
ite) where some features (variables and services) of the nested components can be
promoted at the composite level. Promotion links are used to promote services. The
mappings and rules are similar to the ones of assembly, they are not detailed here.
State variables promotion. An observable variable vo ∈ V OC from a compo-
nent c : C can be promoted as a variable vp ∈ VCP of a composite component
cp : CP . Formally, there are a function prom : VCP → V OC which establishes the
variable promotion, i.e. a bridge between the variable names. In the Kmelia syntax,
(vp, vo) ∈ prom, is written vp FROM c.vo. The promoted variables retain their types
(type(vp) = type(vo)) and are accessed (read-only at the composite level) in their
effective contexts using a service of the sub-component that defines the variables.
This guarantees the encapsulation principle.
Now Kmelia services are equipped with expressive means (pre-/post-conditions,
observability, virtual context) to describe contracts. Section 3 illustrates them on
a working example. They are used to check services and assemblies correctness as
described in Section 4.
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3 A Working Example
The example is a simplified Stock Management application including a vending main
service. This process manages product references (catalog) and product storage
(stock). Administrators have specific rights, they can add or remove references
under some consistency business rules such as: a new reference must not be in the
catalog or a removable reference must have an empty stock level.
Function call
Service call
Assembly
link
Promotion
link
vending
authorisation
sm : StockManager
delete
Reference
store
order
authorisation
getNew
Reference
display
   ...
newReference
ask_code
increase
Item
remove
Item
decrease
Item
addItemcode
ve : Vendor
vending
StockSystem
Fig. 2. Simplified Assembly of the Stock Case Study
The system is designed as a reusable component type StockSystem. It encapsu-
lates an assembly of two components: sm:StockManager and ve:Vendor. The former
is the core business component to manage references and storage. The latter is the
system access interface. The main vending service is promoted at the StockSystem
level. In this paper we focus only on the addItem and newReference services. Ac-
cording to the vending service, a user may add a new item in the stock management
using the required service addItem of the Vendor component.
r equ i r ed addItem ( ) : I n t e g e r
I n t e r f a c e
subprov ides : { code }
V i r t ua l Va r i ab l e s
c a t a l o g F u l l : Boolean ;
cata logEmpty : Boolean // p o s s i b l y c a t a l o g S i z e
V i r t ua l I n v a r i a n t not ( cata logEmpty and c a t a l o g F u l l )
Pre not c a t a l o g F u l l
//No LTS
Post ( Re s u l t <> noRe f e r ence ) i m p l i e s ( not cata logEmpty )
End
The required service addItem is fulfilled with the provided service newReference
which gets a new reference and performs the update of the system if there is an
available new reference (see the listing 2). The links and sublinks are explicitly
defined in the composition part of a composite component, as detailed in the listing 3.
The nested services represent the service dependency DI. For example, the
required service addItem provides a special code subservice 6 . Similarly the provided
service newReference requires a ask_code service from its caller (see the calrequires
declaration in the interface of newReference in the listing 1).
Inside the components, the different arrows represent various kind of calls: func-
tion call (with no side effects), service call (according to the service dependency).
6 In Kmelia, a subservice of a service s, is a service that belongs to the interface (subprovides) of s.
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The newReference service calls the display function (declared in the predefined Kmelia
library), a service getNewReference required internally (from the same component)
and the ask_code service required to its caller.
Data types in Kmelia. The data types are explicitly defined in a TYPES clause
or in the shared libraries (predefined or user-defined). As an example, the following
library (named Stocklib ) declares some specific types, functions and constants.
TYPES
Product I tem : : s t r u c t { i d : I n t e g e r ; desc : S t r i n g ; qu an t i t y : I n t e g e r } ;
CONSTANTS
maxRef : I n t e g e r := 100 ;
emptySt r i ng : S t r i n g := "" ;
noRe f e r ence : I n t e g e r := −1 ;
noQuant i ty : I n t e g e r := −1
These data types in this part are quite concrete; more abstract data types are in the
process to be included in the predefined library.
A Kmelia component and observable state. The listing 1 is an extract from
the Kmelia specification of the StockManager component. The state of StockManager
declares among the other variables, the observable variable catalog which can be
used for context mapping in the assembly links but also in promoted variables for
composite components. Two arrays ( plabels and pstock) are used to stock the labels
of current references and their available quantity. The invariant states that: the
catalog has an upper bound; all references in the catalog have a label and a quantity;
the unknown references have no entries in the two arrays pstock and plabels . The
assertions in Kmelia are possibly named predicates; the labels in front of the invariant
lines are names used in this specification.
Listing 1: Kmelia specification StockManager State
COMPONENT StockManager
INTERFACE
prov ides : { newRefe rence , r emoveRe fe rence , s t o r e I t em , o rd e r I t em }
r e qu i r e s : { a u t h o r i s a t i o n }
USES {STOCKLIB}
TYPES
Re f e r en c e : : range 1 . .maxRef
VARIABLES
vendorCodes : setOf I n t e g e r ; // a u t h o r i s e d a dm i n i s t r a t o r s
obs c a t a l o g : setOf Re f e r en c e ; // product i d = i n d e x o f the a r r a y s
p l a b e l s : ar ray [ R e f e r en c e ] o f S t r i n g ; // produc t d e s c r i p t i o n
ps tock : ar ray [ R e f e r en c e ] o f I n t e g e r // produc t q u an t i t y
INVARIANT
obs @borned : s i z e ( c a t a l o g ) <= maxRef ,
@re f e r e n c ed : f o r a l l r e f : Re f e r en c e | i n c l u d e s ( c a t a l o g , r e f ) i m p l i e s
( p l a b e l s [ r e f ] <> emptySt r i ng and ps tock [ r e f ] <> noQuant i ty ) ,
@no t r e f e r e n c ed : f o r a l l r e f : Re f e r en c e | e x c l u d e s ( c a t a l o g , r e f ) i m p l i e s
( p l a b e l s [ r e f ] = emptySt r i ng and ps tock [ r e f ] = noQuant i ty )
INITIALIZATION
c a t a l o g := emptySet ;
vendorCodes := emptySet ; // f i l l e d by a r e q u i r e d s e r v i c e
p l a b e l s:= a r r a y I n i t ( p l a b e l s , emptySt r i ng ) ; // c o n s i s t e n t w i th . .
ps tock := a r r a y I n i t ( p s tock , noQuant i ty ) ; // . . empty c a t a l o g
A Kmelia service with its assertions. The listing 2 gives the specification of
the provided service newReference. It provides a new reference if its running goes
well. The pre-condition is that the catalog does not reach its maximal size. The
post-condition is decomposed into several observable/non-observable named parts.
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It states that we may have a result ranging in 1. .maxRef or no reference at all, in
the latter case the catalog remains unchanged.
Listing 2: Kmelia specification Provided Service with assertions
prov ided newRefe rence ( ) : I n t e g e r // Re su l t = Produc t Id or noRe f e r ence
I n t e r f a c e
c a l r e q u i r e s : {ask_code} #r e q u i r e d from the c a l l e r
i n t r e q u i r e s : { getNewReference }
Pre
obs s i z e ( c a t a l o g ) < maxRef #the c a t a l o g i s not f u l l
Var i ab l e s # l o c a l to the s e r v i c e
c : I n t e g e r ; # c : i n pu t code g i v en by the u s e r
r e s : Re f e r en c e ;
d : S t r i n g ; # produc t d e s c r i p t i o n
I n i t i a l i z a t i o n
r e s := noQuant i ty ;
Behavior
I n i t i # the i n i t i a l s t a t e
F ina l f # a f i n a l s t a t e
{ i −− c := __CALLER ! ! ask_code ( ) −−> e1 ,
# ge t s the password on the ask_code ( s e r v i c e ) channe l
e1 −− [ not ( c i n vendorCodes ) ]
d i s p l a y (" add ing a r e f e r e n c e i s not a l l owed ") −−> end ,
e1 −− [ c i n vendorCodes ] __CALLER ? msg(d ) −−> e2 ,
# ge t s the p roduc t d e s c r i p t i o n
e2 −− [ d = emptySt r i ng ]
d i s p l a y (" add ing an EmptySet d e s c r i p t i o n i s not a l l owed ") −−> end ,
e2 −− [ d <> emptySt r i ng ] r e s := __SELF ! ! getNewReference ( ) −−> e4 ,
e4 −− { c a t a l o g := i n c l u d i n g ( c a t a l o g , r e s ) ; //add new r e f e r e n c e
ps tock [ r e s ] := 0 ; // d e f a u l t s t o ck i s n u l l
p l a b e l s [ r e s ] := d // produc t d e s c r i p t i o n i s the one p r o v i d ed
}−−> end ,
end −− __CALLER ! ! newRefe rence ( r e s ) −−> f
# the c a l l e r i s i n fo rmed from the Re s u l t and the s e r v i c e ends .
}
Post
obs @resu l tRange : ( ( Re s u l t >= 1 and Re su l t <= maxRef ) or ( Re s u l t = noRe f e r ence ) ) ,
obs @r e s u l tVa l u e : ( Re s u l t <> noRe f e r ence ) i m p l i e s ( no t I n ( o l d ( c a t a l o g ) , Re su l t )
and c a t a l o g = add ( o l d ( c a t a l o g ) , Re su l t ) ) ,
obs @no r e su l tVa l u e : ( Re s u l t = noRe f e r ence ) i m p l i e s Unchanged{ c a t a l o g } ,
@refAndQuant i ty : ( Re s u l t <> noRe f e r ence ) i m p l i e s
( p s tock [ R e s u l t ] = 0 and p l a b e l s [ R e s u l t ] <> emptySt r i ng and
( f o r a l l i : Re f e r en c e | ( i <> Re su l t ) i m p l i e s
( p s tock [ i ] = o l d ( p s tock ) [ i ] and p l a b e l s [ i ] = o l d ( p l a b e l s ) [ i ] ) ) ) ,
@NorefAndQuant ity : ( Re s u l t = noRe f e r ence ) i m p l i e s Unchanged{ ps tock , p l a b e l s }
The behaviour of a service defines a list of transitions e1 −−label−−> e2 where
e1 and e2 are state names. A transition label is a guarded combination of actions
[guard] action∗. An action is either an elementary action from A (expression) or
a communication action (service interaction). The syntax of a communication ac-
tion is channel( ! | ? | ? | !! ) message(param∗) where the channel denotes a reference
in the service dependency DI, the single char operators are message interactions
(send/receive) and the double char operators are service interactions (call, result).
The channel _CALLER stands for the caller service, _SELF stands for a service of
the same component (internal call), _rs stands for a required service. In this article
we will not consider further the behaviour.
Context and message mappings. The context and message mappings (see 2.4)
are specified in assembly links. In the listing 3, variables of the virtual context
of addItem are associated with an expression on the variables of the context of
newReference i.e. the observable state variables of the component sm. In this exam-
ple, there are no message mapping because only the standard msg message (declared
in the predefined Kmelia library) is used.
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Listing 3: Kmelia specification StockSystem
COMPONENT StockSystem
INTERFACE
prov ides : { vend ing }
r e qu i r e s : { a u t h o r i s a t i o n }
COMPOSITION
Assembly
Components
sm : StockManager ;
ve : Vendor
Links // ////////// assemb ly l i n k s //////////
l r e f : p−r sm . newRefe rence , ve . addItem
con t e x t mapping
ve . cata logEmpty == empty (sm . c a t a l o g ) ,
ve . c a t a l o g F u l l == s i z e (sm . c a t a l o g ) = MaxInt
s u b l i n k s : { l c od e }
l c od e : r−p sm . ask_code , ve . code
. . .
End // assemb ly
Promotion
L inks // ////////// promot ion l i n k s //////////
l v end : p−p ve . vend ing , SELF . vend ing
l a u t : r−r sm . a u t h o r i s a t i o n , SELF . a u t h o r i s a t i o n
END_COMPOSITION
In the next section, we show how this Kmelia specification is analysed using our
COSTO 7 tool and a specific verification approach using the B method and tools.
4 Formal Analysis and Experimentations
Components, assemblies and compositions should be analysed according to various
facets. Tables 1 and 2 give an overview of the verification requirements that we
consider to validate a Kmelia specification. Some of them were achieved before, in
particular the behavioural compatibility of services and components, treated in [7]:
it was achieved using model-checking techniques provided by existing tools (Loto-
s/CADP 8 and MEC 9 ); the involved parts of the Kmelia specifications were auto-
matically translated into the input languages of these tools and checked.
In this section, we address aspects related to data type checking and assertion
checking; the main goal is to analyse parts of a Kmelia specification using its new
features such as the assertions. Formal verification tools are necessary to check
assertions consistency. Our approach consists in reusing existing tools such as the
B tools and especially the Rodin 10 framework. We design a systematic verification
method that enables us to reuse the proof obligations generated by the B tools for
our specific purpose.
Event-B and Rodin framework. Rodin is a framework made of several tools
dedicated to the specification and proof of Event-B models. Event-B [1] extends the
classical B method [2] with specific constructions and usage; it is intended to the
modelling of general purpose systems and for reasoning on them. Proof obligations
(POs) are generated to ensure the consistency of the considered model, i.e. the
preservation of the INVARIANT by the EVENTS. Other POs ensure that a refined
model is consistent, i.e. the abstract INVARIANT is preserved and the refined events
7 COmponent Study TOolkit dedicated to the Kmelia language
8 http://www.inrialpes.fr/vasy/cadp/
9 http://altarica.labri.fr/wiki/tools:mec_4
10http://rodin-b-sharp.sourceforge.net
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Analysis Status
Static rules: Scope + name resolution + type-checking done
Observability rules in progress (see 2.3)
Component interface consistency done
Services dependency consistency:
DI well-formed vs. I and D (component) done
DI vs. B (eLTS)
Simple constraint checking (parameters, query, protocol, . . . ) in progress
Local eLTS checking (deadlocks, guard, subprovides, . . . ) in progress
Invariant consistency vs. pre/post conditions:
provided services : InvO ∧ PreO ⇒ PostO ∧ InvO experimental (a)
Inv ∧ Pre⇒ PostNO ∧ Inv experimental (b)
required services : vInv ∧ PreO ⇒ PostO ∧ vInv experimental (c)
Consistency between service assertions and eLTS: not yet
eLTS vs. Post the post condition should be established
required service R calls vs. PreR the context must ensure the precondition
(local+virtual)
eLTS vs. subprovided service SP annotations PreSP the context must
ensure the precondition (local)
Table 1
Formal analysis of a simple Kmelia component
Analysis State
Static rules: Scope + name resolution + type-checking done
Observability rules: promoted variables done
Link/sublink consistency: assembly and composition done [7]
signature matching
service dependency matching (subprovides, callrequires)
context mapping (cm function) and observability rules
message mapping
Assembly Link Contract correctness:
cm(PreOR)⇒ PreOP experimental (d)
PostOP ⇒ cm(PostOR) experimental (e)
Provided Promotion Link Contract correctness: PP is at the composite
level
cm(PreOP P )⇒ PreOP experimental (f)
PostOP ⇒ cm(PostOPP ) experimental (g)
Required Promotion Link Contract correctness: RR is at the composite
level
cm(PreOR)⇒ PreORR experimental (h)
PostORR ⇒ cm(PostOR) experimental (i)
eLTS (behaviour) compatibility done [7]
Table 2
Formal analysis of a Kmelia assembly and compositions
do not contradict their abstract counterparts.
POs can be discharged automatically or interactively, using the Rodin provers.
Verifying Kmelia specifications using Event-B. The main idea is, first to con-
sider a part of the Kmelia specification involved in the property to be verified (a
service, a component, a link of an assembly, an assembly, etc), then to build from
this part of the specification, a set of (Event-)B models in such a way that the POs
generated for them correspond to the specific obligations we needed to check the
Kmelia specification assertions. Using B to validate components assembly contracts
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has been investigated in [15,18].
We systematically 11 build some Event-B models, with an appropriate structure
as explained below, to check some of the proof obligations presented in Tables 1
and 2. The Event-B models are currently built by hand.
(i) For each component and its provided services, we generate an Event-B model.
The proof of the consistency of this model ensures the proof of the rules (a)
and (b) for the invariant consistency at the Kmelia level.
(ii) For each required service (and its “virtual context”) we have to generate an
Event-B model. Its B consistency establishes the rule (c).
(iii) For each assembly link between a required service req and a provided one prov,
we give an Event-B model of the observable part of prov, which refines the
Event-B model of the required service req previously checked.
• the consistency proof of the Event-B model ensures the rule (a) for the in-
variant consistency at the Kmelia level;
• the refinement proof establishes both the rules (d) and (e) for the Kmelia
assembly correctness.
Fig. 3. Rodin
We are not going to deal in this article with the details of the translation pro-
cedure 12 . Kmelia invariant and pre-condition translations are quite systematic,
whereas the post-condition concept does not exist into the B language. There-
fore we abstract the post-condition by using an ANY substitution that satisfies
the post-condition (once translated) as proposed in the context of UML/OCL to B
11applying defined rules which are not yet fully automatised
12The specifications and results are available in http://www.lina.sciences.univ-nantes.fr/coloss/
projects/kmelia/index_en.php
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translations [19]. Figure 3 depicts the Event-B translation into Rodin of the service
newReference of StockManager.
Experimental results. Applying our method on the case study presented in Sec-
tion 3, we obtain the Event-B models structured as depicted in Fig 4. These models
are studied within Rodin; it tooks a few hours to write and check the models.
We can verify the Kmelia components StockManager and Vendor before checking
the assembly StockSystem. The Event-B model StockManager is used to prove the
preservation of the invariant assertions by the provided services. The refinement
v_addItem_sm_newReference is used to check the assembly link between the ser-
vices newReference and addItem. The Table 3 gives an idea about the number of
POs that are to be discharged to ensure the correctness of the Kmelia specification.
Studying the example within Rodin revealed some errors in our initial Kmelia
specification. For example, the post-condition of newReference was wrong; one of
the associated POs could not be discharged. After the feedback in our Kmelia spec-
ifications, the error was corrected.
MODEL
  StockManager_
  ask_code
EVENTS
  ask_code
REFINEMENT
  sm_ask_code_
  v_code
EVENTS  
  code_obs  
SEES
REFINEMENT
  v_addItem_
  sm_newReference
VARIABLES
  catalog
EVENTS  
  newReference_obs  
CONTEXT
  StockLib
CONSTANTS
  References
  MaxRef
  NullInt
  NoQuantity
  NoReference
...
...
from Kmelia
StockManager
component
from Kmelia
Vendor component
MODEL
  StockManager
VARIABLES
  vendorCodes
  catalog
  plabels
  pstock
EVENTS
  newReference
  deleteReference
  store
  order
  getNewReference
MODEL
  Vendor
VARIABLES
  orders
  vendorid
EVENTS
  vending
  code
MODEL
  Vendor_
  addItem
VARIABLES
  catalogFull
  catalogEmpty
EVENTS
  addItem
SEES
REFINES REFINES
Fig. 4. Event-B Models
Auto. Manual Total
StockManager 16 3 19
Vendor_addItem 2 1 3
v_addItem_sm
_newReference
22 1 23
Table 3
Rodin Proof obligations
In a general manner, the assertions associated to Kmelia services help us to ensure
the correctness of the assembly link by considering the required-provided relationship
as a refinement from the required service to the provided one. When the assertions
are wrong, the proofs fail, which means the assembly link is wrong.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
In this article we have presented enrichments to the Kmelia abstract component
model: a data language for Kmelia expressions and predicates; visibility features for
component state in the context of composite components; contracts in the compo-
sition of services. The formal specification and analysis of the model are revisited
accordingly. The syntactic analysis of Kmelia is effective in the COSTO tool that
supports the Kmelia model. We have proposed a method to perform the necessary
assertions verification using B tools: the contracts are checked through preliminary
experimentations using the Rodin framework. We have illustrated the contribution
with an example which is specified in Kmelia, translated manually and verified using
Rodin.
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Discussion. Our work is more related to abstract and formal component models
like SOFA or Wright, rather than to the concrete models like CORBA, EJB or
.NET. The Java/A [9] or ArchJava [3] models do not allow the use of contracts. We
have already emphasized (see Section 1) the fact that most of the abstract models
deal mainly with the dynamic part of the components. Some of them [16,23] take
datatypes and contracts into account but not the dynamic aspects. Some other
ones [11,13] delay the data part to the implementation level.
In [14] may/must constraints are associated to the interactions defined in the
component interfaces to define behavioural contracts between client and suppliers.
In Kmelia, the distinction between a supplier constraint and the client is done from
a methodological point of view rather than a syntactic rule. The use of B to check
component contracts has been studied in [15,18] in the context of UML components.
Fractal [17] proposes different approaches based on the separation of concerns:
the common structural features are defined in Fractal ADL [21] ; dynamic behaviours
are implemented by Vercors [8] or Fractal/SOFA [12] and the use of assertions are
studied in ConFract [16]. In ConFract contracts are independent entities which are
associated to several participants, not to services and links as in our case; their
contracts support a rely/guarantee mechanism with respect to the (vertical) com-
position of components.
In [10] a component (a component type in Kmelia) is a model in the sense of
the algebraic specifications. Dynamic behaviours are associated to components but
not to services, which are simple operations. The component provided and required
interfaces are type specifications and composing component is based on interface (or
type) refinement. In Kmelia components are assembled on their services; therefore
the main issue is not to refine types as in [10] but rather to check contracts as in [25].
More specifically our case is more related to the plugin matching of [25].
Perspectives. Several aspects remain to be dealt with regarding assertions and
the related properties, composition and correctness of component assemblies. First,
we need to implement the full chain of assertion verification especially the translation
KmlToB which is necessary to automatically derive the necessary Event-B models
to check the assertions and the assemblies. Second, we will integrate high level
concepts and relations for data types. In particular, we plan to integrate some kind
of objects and inheritance in the type system but also component types. Assertions
in this context are more difficult to specify and to verify.
Another challenging point is the support for interoperability with other compo-
nent models. We assume that in real component applications, a component assembly
is built on components written in various specification languages. When connect-
ing services (or operations) we can at least check the matching of signatures. If
the specification language of the corresponding services or components accepts con-
tracts (resp. service composition, service behaviour) we can provide corresponding
verification means.
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Abstract
A major asset of modern systems is to dynamically reconfigure systems to cope with failures or component
updates. Nevertheless, designing such systems with off-the-shelf components is hardly feasible: components
are black-boxes that can only interact with others on compatible interfaces. Part of the problem is solved
through Software Adaptation techniques, which compensates mismatches between interfaces. Our approach
aims at using results of Software Adaptation in order to also provide reconfiguration capabilities to black-box
components.
This paper provides two contributions: (i) a formal framework that unifies behavioural adaptation and
structural reconfiguration of components; this is used for statically reasoning whether it is possible to
reconfigure a system. And (ii), two cases of reconfiguration in a client/server system in which the server
is substituted by another one with a different behavioural interface, and the system keeps on working
transparently from the client’s point of view.
Keywords: Components, reconfiguration, behavioural adaptation, formal methods
1 Introduction
The success of Component-Based Software Development comes from creating com-
plex systems by assembling smaller, simpler components. Nevertheless, building
systems based on off-the-shelf components is difficult because components must
communicate on compatible interfaces. It is even more difficult when the system
must be able to reconfigure because components must provide reconfiguration ca-
pabilities. Here, we understand by reconfiguration the capacity of changing the
component behaviour and/or component implementation at runtime [15]. For ex-
ample, we are interested in upgrading a component, substituting a component by
another, adding new components to a running system, and so on.
In general, components are black-box modules of software that come with be-
havioural specifications of their interfaces. Therefore, there is no access to the source
code of components, but it is possible to use tool-assisted techniques to analyse the
This paper is electronically published in
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science
URL: www.elsevier.nl/locate/entcs
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behaviour of a component assembly [5,8]. Some applications of this analysis are
used in Software Adaptation [24] to work out behavioural mismatches in the com-
ponents’ interfaces. In [19], an adaptation contract defines rules on how mismatches
can be worked out and a tool generates an adaptor that orchestrates the system
execution and compensates incompatibilities existing in interfaces.
On the other hand, there is little support to analyse whether a reconfiguration
is safe. Enabling system reconfiguration requires designers to define (i) when a
component can be reconfigured, (ii) which kind of reconfiguration is supported by
the component, and (iii) which kind of properties the reconfiguration holds. For
example, ensuring that some parts of the system can be reconfigured without sys-
tem disruption. Our approach aims at providing a formal framework that helps
answering these questions.
There are several related approaches in the literature. SOFA 2.0 [8] proposes
reconfiguration patterns in order to avoid uncontrolled reconfigurations which lead
to errors at runtime. This allows adding and removing components at runtime,
passing references to components, etc., under predefined structural patterns. There
are other more general approaches that deal with distributed systems and software
architectures [12,13], graph transformation [1,23] or metamodelling [11].
Our goal is to reconfigure components that have not been designed with recon-
figuration capabilities in mind. Moreover, we target reconfiguration of components
that may be involved in an ongoing transaction without stopping the system. This
fits in a context where reconfiguration may be triggered at any moment and a
component must be substituted at runtime.
Since substituting a component usually requires finding a perfect match, re-
configuration is usually limited to instances (or subtypes) of the same component.
Our approach is to exploit behavioural adaptation to further allow reconfiguration.
That is, we target reconfiguration scenarios in which both the former and the new
component need some adaptation in order to allow substitution. We build on the
basis that components are provided with behavioural interfaces and the composi-
tion with adaptation contracts. Then, we show that in some cases the information
found in the adaptation contract can be used to endow black-box components with
reconfiguration capabilities.
This paper’s contributions are: (i) we present a formal model that includes
behavioural adaptation and structural reconfiguration of components. With this
framework it is possible to verify properties of the complete system, including those
involving reconfiguration of a component by another one with a different behavioural
interface. And (ii), we present two examples of substitutability in which a server
is substituted by another one with a different behavioural interfaces. We also show
how can we build a fault-tolerant system by constraining the system’s behaviour.
This paper is structured as follows: Firstly, Section 2 provides some background
on formalisms that will be used throughout the paper. Then Section 3 introduces a
client/server system that is used as running example. Section 4 provides the formal
model that allows structural reconfiguration and behavioural adaptation. Section 5
provides applications of our approach for designing reconfigurable systems based on
(non-reconfigurable) black-box components. Then, Section 6 presents related works
on reconfiguration and behavioural adaptation and Section 7 concludes this paper.
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2 Background
This work builds on previous work on hierarchical behavioural models [5] and Soft-
ware Adaptation [9]. We recall in this section the main definitions that are used in
this paper.
2.1 Networks of Synchronised Automata
We assume that component interfaces are equipped both with a signature (set of
required and provided operations), and a protocol. We model the behaviour of a
component as a Labelled Transition System (LTS). The LTS transitions encode the
actions that a component can perform in a given state. In the following definitions,
we frequently use indexed vectors: we note x˜I the vector 〈..., xi , ...〉 with i ∈ I ,
where I is a countable set.
Definition 2.1 [LTS]. A Labelled Transition System (LTS) is a tuple 〈S , s0,L,→〉
where S is the set of states, s0 ∈ S is the initial state, L is the set of labels, → is
the set of transitions : →⊆ S × L× S . We write s α−→ s ′ for (s, α, s ′) ∈→.
Communication between components are represented using actions relative to
the emission and reception of messages corresponding to operation calls, or internal
actions performed by a component. Therefore, in our model, a label is either the
internal action τ or a tuple (M ,D) where M is the message name and D stands for
the communication direction (! for emission, and ? for reception).
Definition 2.2 [Network of LTSs]. Let Act be an action set. A Net is a tuple
〈AG , J , O˜J ,T 〉 where AG ⊆ Act is a set of global actions, J is a countable set of
argument indexes, each index j ∈ J is called a hole. Oj is the sort of the hole j
with Oj ⊂ Act. The transducer T is an LTS (ST , s0T ,LT ,→T ), and LT = {−→v =
〈ag .α˜I 〉, ag ∈ AG , I ⊆ J ∧ ∀ i ∈ I , αi ∈ Oi}
Synchronisation between components is specified using Nets [5]. Nets are in-
spired by synchronisation vectors [2], that we use to synchronise a number of pro-
cesses and can describe dynamic configurations of processes, in which the possible
synchronisations change with the state of the Net; they are transducers [18].
A transducer in the Net is encoded as an LTS whose labels are synchronisation
vectors (−→v ), each one describing a particular synchronisation between the actions
(α˜I ) of different argument processes; the result of this synchronisation is seen as
a global action ag . Each state of the transducer T corresponds to a given config-
uration of the network in which a given set of synchronisations is possible. Some
of those synchronisations can trigger a change of state in the transducer leading to
a new configuration of the network; that is, it encodes a dynamic change on the
configuration of the system.
Definition 2.3 [Sort]. The Sort is the set of actions that can be observed from
outside the automaton. It is determined by its top-level node, L for an LTS, and
AG for a Net:
Sort(〈S , s0,L,→〉) = L Sort(〈AG , J , O˜J ,T 〉) = AG
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A Net is a generalised parallel operator. Complex systems are built by combining
LTSs in a hierarchical manner using Nets at each level. There is a natural typing
compatibility constraint for this construction, in term of the sorts of formal and
actual parameters. The standard compatibility relation is Sort inclusion: a system
Sys can be used as an actual argument of a Net at position j only if it agrees with
the sort of the hole Oj , i.e. Sort(Sys) ⊆ Oj .
2.2 Specification of Adaptation Contracts
While building a new system by reusing existing components, behavioural interfaces
do not always fit one another, and these interoperability issues have to be faced and
worked out. Mismatches may be caused by different message names, a message
without counterpart (or with several ones) in the partner, etc. The presence of
mismatch results in a deadlocking execution of several components [3,10].
Adaptors can be automatically generated based on an abstract description of
how mismatch situations can be solved. This is given by an adaptation contract.
In this paper, the adaptation contract AC between components is specified us-
ing vectors [9]. Each action appearing in one vector is executed by one component
and the overall result corresponds to a synchronisation between all the involved
components. A vector may involve any number of components and does not re-
quire interactions to occur on the same names of actions. Moreover, a vector may
synchronise actions performed by sub-processes in a hierarchical fashion.
For example, a vector v = 〈C 1 : on!,C 2 : activate?〉 denotes that the action on!
performed by component C 1 corresponds to action activate? performed by compo-
nent C 2. This does not mean that both actions have to take place simultaneously,
nor one action just after the other; the adaptor will take into account their respec-
tive behaviour as specified in their LTS, accommodating the reception and sending
of actions to the points in which the components are able to perform them.
on!
activate!
on?
C1  Adaptor
activate?
C2
on! on? activate!
activate?
3 Running Example
This section presents the running example used in the following sections. It consists
of a client/server system in which the server may be substituted by an alternative
server component. This can be needed in case of server failure, or simply for a change
in the client’s context or network connection that made unreachable the original
server. We suppose none of the components have been designed with reconfiguration
capabilities.
The client wants to buy books and magazines as shown in its behavioural inter-
face in Fig. 1(a). The two servers A and B have behavioural interfaces depicted in
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Figs. 1(c) and 2(b) respectively. Server A can sell only one book per transaction 1 ;
on the other hand, server B can sell a bounded number of books and magazines.
Initially, the client is connected to server A; we shall call this configuration cA.
The client and the server agree on an adaptation contract ACC ,A (see Fig. 1(b)).
Naturally, under configuration cA the client can only buy at most one book in each
transaction but it is not allowed to buy magazines because this is not supported
by server A. The latter is implicitly defined in the adaptation contract (Fig. 1(b))
because there is no vector allowing the client to perform the action buyMagazine!.
Finally, server A does not send the acknowledgement ack? (see v4 in Fig. 1(b))
expected by the client; this must also be worked out by the adaptor.
0
4
1
LOGIN !
2
PASSWD !
LOGOUT !
3
BUYBOOK ! BUYMAGAZINE ! ACK ?
(a) LTS of Client C
v1 = 〈C : login!,A : user?〉
v2 = 〈C : passwd !,A : passwd?〉
v3 = 〈C : buyBook !,A : buy?〉
v4 = 〈C : ack?,A : 〉
v5 = 〈C : logout !,A : disconnect?〉
(b) Adaptation Contract ACC ,A
0
4
1
USER ?
2
PASSWD ?
DISCONNECT ? 3
BUY ?
DISCONNECT ?
(c) LTS of Server A
Fig. 1. Configuration cA.
In an alternative configuration cB the client is connected to server B whose
protocol is depicted in Fig. 2(b). Similarly, the client and the server agree on
an adaptation contract ACC ,B (see Fig. 2(a)). Under configuration cB , the client
can buy a bounded number of books and magazines. In Fig. 2(a), we see that
vector v5 allows the client to buy magazines. Moreover, server B sends a different
acknowledgement for each product (see v4 and v6 in Fig. 2(a)).
We shall study reconfiguration from cA to cB which substitutes A by B . It is
worth noting that A and B do not have the same behavioural interfaces. Not only
B provides additional functionality w.r.t. A, but also B does not have the same
names for the actions (and potentially the ordering of actions may be different as
well). For instance, v1 of ACC ,A (see Fig. 1(b)) says that the login! action of the
client relates to user? of server A. On the other hand, this login! action must be
related to connect? of server B (see v1 of ACC ,B in Fig. 2(a)).
4 Formal Model
This section provides the formal model that enables reconfiguration and behavioural
adaptation. We define a reconfiguration contract to determine how the system may
1 A transaction starts in the LTS’s initial state and ends in the final one. The definition of LTS in Section 2.1
does not include final states, though one can understand as final state a state with no outgoing transitions.
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v1 = 〈C : login!,B : connect?〉
v2 = 〈C : passwd !,B : pwd?〉
v3 = 〈C : buyBook !,B : buyBook?〉
v4 = 〈C : ack?,B : bookOk !〉
v5 = 〈C : buyMagazine!,B : buyMagazine?〉
v6 = 〈C : ack?,B : magazineOk !〉
v7 = 〈C : logout !,B : disconnect?〉
(a) Adaptation Contract ACC ,B
0
5
1
CONNECT ?
2
PWD ?
DISCONNECT ?
3
BUYBOOK ?
4
BUYMAGAZINE ?BOOKOK ! MAGAZINEOK !
(b) LTS of Server B
Fig. 2. Configuration cB .
evolve in terms of structural changes. Then, we provide a formal model based on
Nets for this kind of systems.
4.1 Reconfiguration Contract
A system architecture consists of a finite number of components. Each configura-
tion is a subset of these components connected together by means of adaptation
contracts.
Definition 4.1 [Configuration]. A configuration c = 〈P ,AC,S ?〉 is a static
structural configuration of a system. P is an indexed set of components. AC is
an adaptation contract of components in P . S ? is a set of reconfiguration states
defined upon P ; these are states in which reconfiguration is allowed.
Changing a configuration by another is what we call a reconfiguration. This
is specified in a reconfiguration contract which separates reconfiguration concerns
from the business logic. Each configuration can be thought of a static system and
the “dynamic” part is specified by a reconfiguration operation. The reconfiguration
states are left out-of-scope in this paper. We assume here they are given by the
designer, though we show how some of them can be obtained in our examples.
Definition 4.2 [Reconfiguration Contract]. A reconfiguration contract R =
〈C , c0,→R〉 is defined as:
C is a set of static configurations, where ci ∈ C , i ∈ {0..n}, is a static configura-
tion. c0 ∈ C is the initial configuration. →R⊆ C×Rop×C is a set of reconfiguration
operation, with reconfiguration operation Rop ⊆ S ?i × S ?j , S ?i ∈ ci ,S ?j ∈ cj .
From the definition above, reconfiguration can take place in the middle of a trans-
action and the new configuration can have a new adaptation contract. Therefore,
this allows reconfiguring a component by another one that implements a different
behavioural interface. Nevertheless, for guaranteeing consistency this can only hap-
pen at predefined states. A state of the source configuration (s?i ) defines when a
configuration can be reconfigured. On the other hand, a state of the target configu-
ration (s?j ) says what is the starting state in the target configuration to resume the
execution.
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Example
In the running example, there are two configurations:
cA = 〈{C ,A},ACC ,A,S ?A〉 and cB = 〈{C ,B},ACC ,B ,S ?B 〉.
The reconfiguration contract R = 〈C , cA,→R〉 is given by:
C = {cA, cB}, and →R= {cA r−→ cB}, with r = (s?A, s?B ).
r must specify the pairs of reconfiguration states on which reconfiguration can
be performed. Since both servers have different behavioural interfaces, it is not
straight-forward to determine how reconfiguration can take place after a transaction
between the client and the server has started. Therefore, in the simplest scenario
reconfiguration from cA to cB is only allowed at the initial states of the client and
the server. This is specified as a unique reconfiguration state s?i ∈ S ?i , i ∈ {A,B} for
each configuration; more precisely, s?A = {C : s0,A : s0} and s?B = {C : s0,B : s0}.
In Section 5 we will study how other pairs of reconfiguration states can be obtained.
4.2 Building Verifyable Systems
This section shows how to build Nets for the reconfiguration contract above. We
have previously defined the system and now we generate a behavioural model of the
complete system that can be fed into model-checking tools. There are two benefits
in this approach.
Firstly, is it easier to verify properties related to reconfiguration if the complete
system is modelled. In our running example, we can prove that the client may only
buy magazines if the system is reconfigured towards a configuration cB .
Secondly, a Net is close enough to the structure of a program that it should be
possible to implement the Net in a component model framework such as Fractal [7].
This would provide us, at runtime, a component system with predictable behaviour
under reconfiguration.
As the adaptor represents the interactions between the adapted components,
we will use states of the adaptor to identify states in which reconfiguration will be
applied. Let AP be the adapter LTS generated by AC [10], we add a reconfiguration
action rs?i ? for each s
?
i ∈ S ?. This action leaves the adaptor in same state, defined
as the state in which all components are in the state given by s?i .
Definition 4.3 [Network of Configuration]. A configuration c = 〈P ,AC,S ?〉,
defines a Net cNet = 〈AG , J , O˜J ,T 〉, as:
Let AP be the adapter LTS generated by AC, with a reconfiguration action rs?i ?
for each s?i ∈ S ?. Each a! ∈ Sort(pi) defines an action v = {pi : a!,AP : a?} ∈
AG . Each a? ∈ Sort(pi) defines an action v = {pi : a?,AP : a!} ∈ AG . Each
reconfiguration action rs?i ? defines an action v = {AP : rs?i ?} ∈ AG . Each process
pi and AP is an argument of J , with Sort(pi) ⊆ Opi and Sort(AP ) ⊆ OAP .
The Net transducer T is defined as: a unique state sT = s0T ∈ ST ; and a
transition sT
v−→ sT for each v ∈ AG .
In the definition above, a Net closely represents a configuration; the root of the
Net ’s tree is the synchronisation operator given by the Net’s transducer, and the
Net ’s leaves are the components pi and AP . The transducer actions are synchroni-
sation vectors that relate actions between pi and the adaptor; note that due to the
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adaptation process, these actions are exact dual operations. The transducer has
additional transitions taking care of reconfiguration capabilities, though they are
not used within a configuration.
We construct a system that allows reconfiguration between configurations based
on the reconfiguration contract and the construction of a network for a configuration.
Definition 4.4 [Network of Reconfiguration Contract]. A R = 〈C , cA,→R〉
defines a Net RNet = 〈AG , J , O˜J ,T 〉, with:
Each configuration ci ∈ C defines a Net ciNet ∈ J . Each reconfiguration op-
eration r defines a process Pr used as argument of J . This process will be in
charge of initialising the target configuration. The global actions AG are defined
upon the union of the global actions of each configuration, and the reconfiguration
transactions. Formally, AG = [
⋃
∀ci∈C
Sort(ciNet )] ∪ {r : ci r−→ cj ∈→R, i 6= j}.
The sorts of each configuration ciNet define O˜J , i.e. Sort(ciNet ) = Oi . The Net
transducer T=(ST , s0T ,LT ,→T ) orchestrates the system execution. Each configu-
ration Net ciNet is represented by a state si ∈ ST .
Actions within a configuration are transitions over the same configuration state,
i.e., there is a transition si
ag−→ si for each ag ∈ Sort(ciNet )\
⋃
r .
For each reconfiguration operation ci
r−→ cj we add a reconfiguration state sr in
the transducer (see Fig. 3). In this state, only actions within Pr can be performed,
i.e., sr
rα−→ sr where rα are actions in Pr . The reconfiguration starts with an action
rstart = rs?i ? that changes the transducer state from si to sr . Reconfiguration actions
are performed (rα), and finally the system changes to a configuration cj in a state
defined by r by performing the action rend = rs?j ?.
sj
rendrstart
ag ∈ ciNet ag ∈ cjNet
sr
rα
si
Fig. 3. Transducer representing a reconfiguration from configuration ci to configuration cj .
The reconfiguration contract is mapped into a NetRNet . The transducer ofRNet
is an LTS that has each of the configurations as states, and transitions representing
either a reconfiguration r or the allowance of a (non-reconfiguring) action ag within
a configuration.
Each of the configurations ci is mapped into a Net ciNet that is used as an
argument of the RNet ’s holes. Hence, we build a tree of processes in which the
root is RNet , the internal nodes are configurations, and leaves are LTSs of the
components’ behaviour.
Reconfigurations operations eventually move the system from a configuration
to another (see Fig. 3). The role of the state sr is to halt system execution and
initialise the new configuration so that it starts at the target reconfiguration state.
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Example
Back to the running example, the first step in creating the Net is to generate
the adaptors AC ,A (Fig. 4(a)) and AC ,B (Fig. 4(b)) in the form of LTSs. This is
done by the Compositor tool [14]. Based on the adaptation contracts, Compositor
automatically generates an adaptor for each configuration that is guaranteed to
orchestrate deadlock-free interactions between the client and a server.
0
f
1
C:LOGIN ?
2
A:USER !
3
C:PASSWD ?
4
A:PASSWD !
5
C:BUYBOOK ?
8
C:LOGOUT ?6
A:BUY !
7
C:ACK !
C:LOGOUT ?
A:DISCONNECT !
(a) Adaptor AC ,A
0
12
1
C:LOGIN ?
2
B:CONNECT !
3
C:PASSWD ?
4
B:PWD !
5
C:BUYBOOK ?
6
C:BUYMAGAZINE ?
7
C:LOGOUT ?
8
B:BUYBOOK !
9
B:BUYMAGAZINE !
11
B:BOOKOK ?
C:ACK !
10
B:MAGAZINEOK ?
C:ACK !
B:DISCONNECT !
(b) Adaptor AC ,B
Fig. 4. Adaptors
The Net for cA is created as follows 2 :
(i) We add a reconfiguration action s?A
rs?
A
?
−−−→ s?A in the adaptor.
(ii) AG has two actions for each vector in ACC ,A, i.e., v1 = 〈C : login!,A : user?〉
generates the actions v1! = 〈C : login!,AC ,A : login?〉 and v1? = 〈AC ,A :
user !,A : user?〉. AG has the action rs?A? = 〈AC ,A : rs?A?〉.
(iii) LTSs of the components and the adaptor are the Net’s holes: J = {C ,A,AC ,A};
O˜J = {Sort(C ),Sort(A),Sort(AC ,A)}.
(iv) T has a unique state sT , with sT
ag−→ sT , ag ∈ AG .
No initialisation of server B is needed after the reconfiguration because the
system can only be reconfigured in its initial state. Therefore, Pr is a dummy
automaton with a unique state and no transition.
2 For the sake of size, the Net of cB is created in a similar way.
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Finally, we create RNet : the transducer has states sA, sB , srA,B . Non-
reconfiguration transitions are: sA
ag−→ sA, ag ∈ cANet and sB
ag−→ sB , ag ∈ cBNet .
Reconfiguration transitions are: sA
rs?
A
?
−−−→ srA,B and srA,B
rs?
B
?
−−−→ sB .
In this example, reconfiguration is only allowed in the initial state. Nevertheless,
our goal is to allow reconfiguration in arbitrary states in which the client and the
server have already started a transaction. This is the goal of Section 5.
5 Contract-Aware Reconfiguration
We have shown in the previous section that the running example can be reconfigured
at the initial stage of the transaction. Nevertheless, more interesting are scenarios
in which reconfiguration can take place at arbitrary stages of the transaction. With
that purpose, Section 5.1 defines a test that determines whether it is possible to
reconfigure the component system at a certain stage of the transaction. Afterwards,
Section 5.2 studies how to design a fault-tolerant system in which reconfiguration
can take place between two different configurations back and forth.
5.1 History-Aware Substitutability
Now, suppose the previous example needs to be reconfigured during an ongoing
transaction between C and A. This would be the case where a client connects to the
server A, logs in, and before disconnecting, A is substituted by B . Unfortunately,
A and B do not provide such reconfiguration capabilities and it is not possible
to substitute A by B without behavioural adaptation because they have different
behavioural interfaces.
The client must not abort the ongoing transaction t . Therefore, if the execution
trace of C (σC from now on) is valid in the new configuration cB , then C could
have been interacting with B from the very beginning. We proceed by initialising
B under this assumption, i.e., finding an execution trace σB such that the actions
performed by C in t are feasible in cB when B has performed σB .
As the adaptor orchestrates the execution between the two parties, we
can use the state of the adaptor as the global system state. We say that
t = 〈σp1 , σp2〉;s Ap1,p2 when actions performed by P1 in σp1 and P2 in σp2 lead
the adaptor Ap1,p2 to state s.
Definition 5.1 [Trace Compliant]. Let t ;s AC ,S , with t = 〈σC , σS 〉 where σC
and σS are traces of C and S respectively.
S ′ is trace compliant to S given t if there exists t ′=〈σC , σS ′〉;s′ AC ,S ′ .
Not all components are trace compliant given t . However, if t ′ exists, the new
configuration cB can reach a (deadlock-free) state s?1 that simulates the execution
of cA when the latter reaches the state s?0 . Therefore, it is possible to build a recon-
figurable system that starts in a configuration cA and may reconfigure towards a
configuration cB when the client has performed the actions in t . This reconfigura-
tion does not affect the client in the sense it does not need to abort t nor to rollback.
In fact, a new transaction t ′ is created such that the client continues working on
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transparently, though it is warned that the adaptation contract has changed; even
so, its previous actions are valid and considered in the running transaction (t ′).
Trace compliance assures that the client’s history is unchanged, though it says
nothing about future actions. Therefore, it is possible to provide new functionality
in the new configuration while maintaining consistency.
Example
In the running example, the login phase is similar in both configurations from
the client’s point of view. Therefore, it is easy to notice that both configurations
are trace compliant given σC = {login!; passwd !}. This allows us to define a recon-
figuration from the state s?0 = {C : s2,A : s2} to the state s?1 = {C : s2,B : s2}. The
initialisation required by B is the result of finding t ′, i.e., σB = {connect?; pwd?}
(this specifies Pr ). Therefore, meanwhile the client is logged in, the server can be
substituted at runtime by another component with a different behavioural interface.
Then, the client may log in server A, and after a reconfiguration to configuration
cB the client can buy several books and magazines.
On the other hand, cB is not trace compliant to cA given an arbitrary trace σC .
For example, if the client has bought a magazine (or several books) in σC , then this
trace cannot be simulated in cA because A only supports transactions in which at
one book is sold. Still, cB is trace compliant to cA for traces that do not include
buying several books or at least one magazine; we shall explore this scenario in
Section 5.2.
5.2 Fault-Tolerant System
The previous example allowed reconfiguring the system from cA to cB , though
reconfiguring the system from cB to cA is only possible on some of the traces per-
formed by the client. We investigate here how to design a fault-tolerant system by
constraining the behaviour of the previous system. We will guarantee that server
A can always be substituted by B (and B by A likewise) transparently from the
client’s point of view.
One way of ensuring two components are mutually substitutable is by means of
a bisimulation equivalence [22]. A more relaxed equivalence takes into account only
the behaviour of the servers given the constraints imposed by the environment. In
our case, these constraints are summarised within the adaptors because they express
the allowed behaviour performed by both parties.
An even more relaxed condition checks whether the adaptors AC ,A and AC ,B
are bisimilar 3 from the client’s point of view. There are two options: either to
ignore the actions performed by the servers, or to map the actions of one server into
another (through yet another adaptation contract). Both solutions allow servers to
implement different behavioural interfaces; we have chosen to explore the former.
Even under this relaxed condition it is difficult to find two servers that provide
clients with the same functionalities. More likely is that some of the actions allowed
to the client are common in both configurations. Hence, if the system were to work
on this reduced behaviour it would be possible to provide reconfiguration capabilities
3 We leave open which kind of bisimulation is used; for example, strong, weak, or branching bisimulation.
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as shown in Section 5.1. Our solution is to create new adaptors that are equivalent
from the client’s point of view. That is:
ARC ,A ≡C ARC ,B iff
 ∀ t = 〈σC , σA〉;s?0 ARC ,A, ∃ t ′ = 〈σC , σB 〉;s?1 ARC ,B∀ t ′ = 〈σC , σB 〉;s?1 ARC ,B , ∃ t = 〈σC , σA〉;s?0 ARC ,A
These are adaptors that constrain the behaviours of the client and the servers
such that we can perform reconfiguration at any moment (from the client’s point of
view). They are found as follows:
(i) Compute C R = Product((Hide(LA) in AC ,A), (Hide(LB ) in AC ,A)). If C R is
deadlock-free, proceed.
(ii) Compute ARC ,A = Product(C
R,AC ,A) and ARC ,B = Product(C
R,AC ,B ).
Product synchronises matching labels of both parties into a new synchronised
action. Hide makes a set of labels L be internal actions (τ).
0
f
1
C:LOGIN ?
2
B:CONNECT !
7
8
C:ACK !
9
C:LOGOUT ?
6
B:BOOKOK ?
B:DISCONNECT !
3
C:PASSWD ?
4
B:PWD !
C:LOGOUT ?
5
C:BUYBOOK ?
B:BUYBOOK !
C R finds the behaviour that can be performed by the client
in both adaptors. This is done by hiding the actions performed
by the servers (LA and LB ) and building the synchronised
product. If there are no traces that can be performed by the
client in both adaptors, there is a deadlock in C R and it is
not possible to build a fault-tolerant system. Otherwise, using
C R , we constrain each adaptor to this client behaviour which
yields, by construction, trace compliant ARC ,A and A
R
C ,B given
any transaction.
Example
In the running example, the constrained system allows the
client to buy at most one book in each transaction. In fact,
we find that ARC ,A ≡ AC ,A but ARC ,B allows only the traces in
which the client buys a book or nothing at all (see Fig. on the
right). In this scenario, either server A or B suits the client’s
actions, and thus reconfiguration is possible.
Any σC feasible in one of these new adaptors is feasible
in the other. Therefore, we can apply the procedure from
Section 5.1 for finding pairs of states on which reconfigura-
tion can be applied. We build this way a system that can
be reconfigured from one configuration to the other back and
forth.
6 Related Work
Dynamic reconfiguration [15] is not a new topic and many
solutions have already been proposed in the context of dis-
tributed systems and software architectures [12,13], graph
transformation [1,23], software adaptation [20,19], metamodelling [11], or recon-
figuration patterns [8]. On the other hand, Software Adaptation is a recent solution
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to build component-based systems accessed and reused through their public inter-
faces. Adaptation is known as the only way to compose black-box components with
mismatching interfaces. However, only few works have focused so far on the recon-
figuration of systems whose correct execution is ensured using adaptor components.
In the rest of this section, we focus on approaches that tackled reconfiguration
aspects for systems developed using adaptation techniques.
First of all, in [20], the authors present some issues raised while dynamically
reconfiguring behavioural adaptors. In particular, they present an example in which
a pair of reconfigurations is successively applied to an adaptor due to the upgrade
of a component in which some actions have been first removed and next added. No
solution is proposed in this work to automate or support the adaptor reconfiguration
when some changes occur in the system.
Most of the current adaptation proposals may be considered as global, since they
proceed by computing global adaptors for closed systems made up of a predefined
and fixed set of components. However, this is not satisfactory when the system
may evolve, with components entering or leaving it at any time, e.g., for pervasive
computing. To enable adaptation on such systems, an incremental approach should
be considered, by which the adaptation is dynamically reconfigured depending on
the components present in the system. One of the first attempts in this direction
is [4], whose proposal for incremental software construction by means of refinement
allows for simple signature adaptation. However, to our knowledge the only pro-
posal addressing incremental adaptation at the behavioural level is [21,19]. In these
papers, the authors present a solution to build step by step a system consisting of
several components which need some adaptations. To do so, they propose some
techniques to (i) generate an adaptor for each new component added to the system,
and (ii) reconfigure the system (components and adaptors) when a component is
removed.
Compared to [20,21,19], our goal is slightly different since we do not want to
directly reconfigure adaptor behaviours, but we want to substitute both a compo-
nent and its adaptor by another couple component-adaptor while preserving some
properties of the system such as trace compliance.
Some recent approaches found in the literature [6,17,16] focus on existing pro-
gramming languages and platforms, such as BPEL or SCA components, and suggest
manual or at most semi-automated techniques for solving behavioural mismatch. In
particular, the work presented in [16] deal with the monitoring and adaptation of
BPEL services at run-time according to Quality of Services attributes. Their ap-
proach also proposes replacement of partner services based on various strategies
either syntactic or semantic. Although replaceability ideas presented in this paper
are close to our reconfiguration problem, they mainly deal with QoS characteristics
whereas our focus is on behavioural issues.
7 Conclusions
This paper has presented a novel framework that supports the design of reconfig-
urable systems. The formal model defines reconfiguration as a transition from a
(static) configuration to another. Each configuration specifies a component assem-
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bly with its own set of components and connections, and a reconfiguration contract
defines when the configuration can be reconfigured and which is the starting state
in the new configuration in order to resume the execution.
We have integrated Software Adaptation in the framework in order to further
enable reconfiguration. We have shown that, based on adaptation contracts, it
is possible to substitute a component by another one that implements a different
behavioural interface; this potentially includes mismatches in actions, ordering of
actions, and functionality. Briefly, we build on the basis that for some cases it is
possible to find execution traces in which configurations are similar in some sense,
and thus it is possible to simulate the execution of a system in another one with a
different behavioural interface.
Perspectives. We have presented an initial step on reconfiguration of components
with mismatching behavioural interfaces. The framework is expressive and suitable
for our needs and we have presented a case-study of runtime configuration. There
are many open questions, though, that we wish to continue working on:
We have shown that in a simple setting it is possible to find system states in
which it is safe to perform reconfiguration. Nevertheless, for more general scenarios
finding correspondences between states based on trace compliance is not enough.
We believe that it is necessary to refine what are the necessary properties the new
configuration must hold. For example, by endowing a reconfiguration contract with
invariants under the form of temporal properties.
An alternative is to augment component LTSs with sub-transactions. In our
client/server example, the server would specify that a sub-transaction starts when
buying a product and ends when the acknowledgement has been sent to the client.
Then, it would be possible to buy magazines from server B (which is not supported
by server A), and then substitute B by A.
We also plan to address other scenarios in which a component is substituted by a
component assembly. For example, where the server is substituted by a component
implemented by a front-end component and a back-end component. Our formal
model can formalise the behaviour of such systems, though there are new challenges
on how to simulate actions of the former configuration in the new one.
Finally, we plan to integrate this framework within a component model such
as Fractal. We believe that the model built on Nets can be implemented in the
runtime platform of Fractal in order to provide components with safe reconfiguration
capabilities.
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In this paper, we present a formal model, named PobSAM (Policy-based Self-Adaptive Model), for modeling
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1 Introduction
Motivation Increasingly, software systems are subjected to adaptation at run-time
due to changes in the operational environments and user requirements. Adapta-
tion is classified into two broad categories [1]: structural adaptation and behavioral
adaptation. While structural adaptation aims to adapt system behavior by changing
system’s architecture, the behavioral adaptation focuses on modifying the function-
alities of the computational entities.
There are several challenges in developing self-adaptive systems. Due to the fact
that self-adaptive systems are often complex systems with greater degree of auton-
omy, it is more difficult to ensure that a self-adaptive system behaves as intended
and avoids undesirable behavior. Hence, one of the main concerns in developing self-
adaptive systems is providing mechanisms to trust whether the system is operating
correctly, where formal methods can play a key role.
Zhang et al. [2] proposed a model-driven approach using Petri Nets for de-
veloping adaptive systems. They also presented a model-checking approach for
verification of adaptive system [3,4] in which an extension of LTL with ”adapt”
operator was used to specify the adaptation requirements. In this work, system
was modeled using a labeled transition system. Furthermore, authors in [5,6] used
labeled transition systems at a low level of abstraction to model and verify embed-
ded adaptive systems. Kulkarni et al. [7] proposed a theorem proving approach to
verify the structural adaptation of adaptive systems.
Flexibility is another main concern to achieve adaptation. Since, hard-coded
mechanisms make tuning and adapting of long-run systems complicated, so we
need methods for developing adaptive systems that provide a high degree of flexi-
bility. All the proposed formal models hard-code the adaptation logic which leads
to system’s inflexibility. Recently, the use of policies has been given attention as a
rich mechanism to achieve flexibility in adaptive system. A policy is a rule describ-
ing under which condition a specified subject must (can or cannot) do an action
on a specific object. In [8,9,10,11,24], policies are used as a structural adaptation
mechanism. Additionally, [12,13] proposed architectures for engineering autonomic
computing systems that use policies for behavioral adaptations.
This paper In this paper we propose a formal model called PobSAM (Policy-
based Self-Adaptive Model) for developing and specifying self-adaptive systems that
employs policies as the principal paradigm to govern and adapt system behavior. We
model a self-adaptive system as a collection of interacting actors directed to achieve
particular goals according to the predefined policies. A PobSAM model consists
of a set of Self-Managed Modules(SMMs). An SMM is composed of a collection of
autonomous managers and managed actors. Autonomous managers are meta-actors
responsible for monitoring and handling events by enforcing suitable policies. Each
manager adapts its policies dynamically in response to the changing circumstances
according to adaptation policies. The behavior of managed actors is governed by
managers, and cannot be directly controlled from outside.
PobSAM has a formal foundation that employs an integration of algebraic for-
malisms and Actor-based models. The computational (functional) model of Pob-
SAM is based on actor-based models while an algebraic approach is proposed to
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specify policies of managers. Operational semantics of PobSAM is described with
labeled transition systems. The proposed model is suitable for cases where the set
of governing policies of each context is known in advance.
In our previous work [14], we proposed a formal model for policy-based self-
adaptive systems using an actor-based language Rebeca [15]. In [14], we added
policies as rules to the Rebeca code and we focused on policy conflict detection.
Combining adaptation concerns with system functionality in [14] increases the com-
plexity of the model as well as the formal verification process. In order to address
these drawbacks, we need an approach in which adaptation concerns are separated
from system functionality. Here, we extracted the policy rules, specified by an al-
gebraic formalism, from Rebeca code. Moreover, the policies are presented in two
classes, separating the policies governing the actor behavior from the policies which
determine the adaptation strategy (when and how the system passes the adaptation
phase safely). Additionally, here we added modules as an encapsulation mechanism
in which each module can manage itself autonomously.
Contribution Formal methods are proposed for the analysis of adaptive systems,
mainly at the low levels of abstraction, and flexible policy-based approaches are
proposed for designing adaptive systems without formal foundation. Here, we pro-
pose a flexible policy-based approach with formal foundation to support modeling
and verification of self-adaptive systems. Policies allow us to separate the rules that
govern the behavioral choices of a system from the system functionality giving us a
higher level of abstraction; so, we can change system behavior without changing the
code or functionality of the system. We are also concerned about the adaptation
strategy, to pass the adaptation phase safely and at the right moment. As an ex-
ample, we are able to change and reason about the scheduling of jobs using policies
independent of the system code. Although our approach can support both structural
and behavioral adaptation, in this paper, we focus on the behavioral adaptation.
The formal foundation, the modular model, and separation of adaptation rules will
help us in developing rigorous analysis techniques.
Structure of the paper This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we
introduce an example to illustrate our approach. Section 3 introduces the PobSAM
model in brief. Sections 4 and 5 introduce the syntax and semantics of PobSAM
respectively. Section 6 presents related work and compares our approach with the
existing approaches. In Section 7, we present our conclusions and plans for the
future work.
2 Smart Home
In a home automation system, sensors are devices that provide smart home with
the physical properties of the environment by sensing the environment. In addition,
actuators are physical devices that can change the state of the world in response
to the sensed data by sensors. The system processes the data gathered by the
sensors, then it activates the actuators to alter the user environment according to
the predefined set of policies. Smart homes can have different features. Here, we take
into account three features including: (1) The lighting control which allows lights to
switch on/off automatically depending on several factors. In addition, the intensity
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of the lights placed in a room can be adjusted according to the predefined policies.
(2) Doors/Windows management that enable inhabitants to manage windows and
doors automatically. In addition, if windows have blinds, these should be rolled up
and down automatically too. (3) Heating control which allows inhabitants to adjust
the heating of the house to their preferred value. The heating control will adjust
itself automatically in order to save energy.
The smart home system is required to adapt its behavior according to the
changes of the environment. To this aim, we suppose that the system runs in
normal, vacation and fire modes and in each context it enforces various sets of
policies to adapt to the current conditions. For the reason of space, here we only
identify policies defined for lighting control module while the system runs in normal
and fire modes as follows:
Defined policies in the normal mode
P1 Turn on the lights automatically when night begins.
P2 Whenever someone enters an empty room, the light setting must be set to
default.
P3 When the room is reoccupied within T1 minutes after the last person has left
the room, the last chosen light setting has to be reestablished.
P4 The system must turn the lights off, when the room is unoccupied.
Defined policies in the fire mode
P1 Turn on the emergency light.
P2 Disconnect power outlets.
P3 When the fire is distinguished, turn off the emergency light.
3 Modeling Concepts of PobSAM
Self-Managed Module (SMM) is the policy-based building block of PobSAM. A
PobSAM is composed of a set of SMMs. An SMM, in turn, may contain a number
of SMMs structured hierarchically. An SMM is a set of actors which can manage
their behavior autonomously according to predefined policies. PobSAM supports
interactions of an SMM with the other SMMs in the model. To this aim, each SMM
provides well-defined interfaces for interaction with other SMMs. In the smart home
case study, we consider three SMMs including LightClModule, TempClModule and
DWClModule to manage lighting, temperature and doors/windows respectively.
An SMM structure can be conceptualized as the composition of three layers
illustrated in Figure 1.
• Managed Actors Layer This layer is dedicated to the functional behavior of
SMM and contains computational actors. Actors are governed by autonomous
managers using policies to achieve predefined goals. Henceforth, we use the terms
managed actors and actors interchangeably.
• Autonomous Managers Layer Autonomous managers are meta-actors that
can operate in different configurations. Each configuration consists of two classes
of policies: governing policies, and adaptation policies. Using governing policies,
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Fig. 1. The PobSAM Model
the manager directs the behavior of actors by sending messages to them. Adap-
tation policies are used to switch between different configurations to adapt the
module behavior properly. Moreover, a manager may has its local variables too.
• View Layer In PobSAM, each actor provides its required state information to
the relevant managers. Not all aspects of the operational environment have di-
rect influence on the behavior of managers, the views provide only the required
information for managers. The view layer is composed of views that provides
a view or an abstraction of an actor’s state that is adequate for the managers’
needs. The distinction between the underlying computational environment and
the required state information of actors makes analyzing managers much simpler.
Example 3.1 In our example, LightClModule module comprises an autonomous
manager named LightMngr, two light actors (light1 and light2 ), an outlet actor and
a number of views indicating the overall light intensity of room and the status of
the lights.
4 PobSAM Syntax
Figure 2 shows a typical SMM containing manager meta-actors, views and actors,
which we elaborate in the sequel.
4.1 Actors
The encapsulation of state and computation, and the asynchronous communication
make actors a natural way to model distributed systems. Therefore, we use an actor-
based model to specify the computational environment of a self-adaptive system.
To this aim, an extension of Rebeca is used. Rebeca [15] is an actor-based language
for modeling concurrent asynchronous systems which allows us to model the system
as a set of reactive objects called rebecs interacting by message passing. Each
rebec provides methods called message servers (msgsrv) which can be invoked by
others. Each rebec has an unbounded buffer for coming messages, called queue.
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SMM SMM1
Managers
Manager ManagerName1(InitialConfiguration11)
// definition of local variables
Datatype var1;
// manager’s view
<ViewName11,..., ViewName1n>;
// definition of manager’s configurations in terms of
// their governing and adaptaion policies
Configurations
ConfigurationName1={gp11,...,gp1m}<ap11|...|ap1n>;
.
.
.
EndC
Policies
//Definition of governing policies(gps)
GoverningPolicyName1: on eventi if condi do actionsi;
.
.
.
//Definition of adaptation policies(aps)
AdaptationPolicyName1:
on eventj if condj switchto Configuration1 when condk priority Oj;
.
.
.
EndP
EndM
// definition of other managers
EndMS
Views
//definition of views
Datatype1 ViewName1 as expr1;
Datatype2 ViewName2 as expr2;
.
.
.
EndV
Actors
//definition of actors
reactiveclass Classname1() {
Knownrebecs{}
Statevars{ Public datatype v1;
Private datatype v2;}
msgsrv initial() {}
msgsrv msgsrv1(){}
}
main {
...
Classname1 rebec1(...):(...);
...
}
EndA
EndSMM
Fig. 2. The Typical Syntax of a PobSAM Model
Furthermore, the rebecs’ state variables (statevars) are responsible of capturing the
rebec state. The known rebecs of a rebec (Knownrebecs) denotes the rebecs to
which it can send messages. In our extension, an actor can expose a number of its
state variables to the managers (Figure 2). The exposed state variables are used in
the definition of views.
Example 4.1 In the LightClModule SMM, the managed layer comprises a set of
light rebecs controlled by LightMngr. We consider a reactive class named Light
to model the lights which contains setIntensity, switchOn and switchOff message
servers as well as intensity and status state variables.
4.2 Views
In PobSAM, the views are defined in terms of the public state variables of actors. A
view variable could be an actual state variable, or a function or a predicate applied to
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state variables. Views enable managers not to be concerned about internal behavior
of actors and they provide an abstraction of actor’s state to managers.
Example 4.2 In the LightClModule SMM, the LightMngr does not require the
exact values of the lights intensities and providing overall intensity as low, medium
or high values is sufficient to decide. The overall intensity is defined based on the
intensity statevar of the light rebecs as a view.
4.3 Managers
In our model, policies direct the system behavior, and adaptation is achieved by
changing policies. A manager can be in various configurations enforcing different
policy sets. As shown in Figure 2, a manager is defined in terms of its possible
configurations, its view of the actor layer and its local variables.
Governing Policies
Whenever a manager receives an event, it identifies all the policies that are trig-
gered by that event. For each of these policies, the policy condition is evaluated
if one exists. If the condition evaluates to true, the action part of the triggered
policy is requested to execute by instructing the relevant rebecs to perform actions
through sending asynchronous messages. We express governing policies using a
simple algebra as follows, in which P and Q indicate the policy sets:
P,Q
def= P ∪Q|P −Q|P ∩Q|{p}|∅
P ∩ Q means that intersection of policy sets P and Q is used to direct actors.
P-Q reduces policy set P by eliminating all the policies in the second set Q. P ∪Q
represents the union of P and Q governing the actors simultaneously. {p} denotes a
policy set with the simple policy p as its member. P ∩Q and P ∪Q are commutative
and associative.
A simple action policy p=[o,ε,ψ, α] consists of priority o, event ε , optional
condition ψ and action α. In PobSAM, events are defined as the execution of a
message server, sending a message to a rebec, creating new actor or holding a specific
condition in the system. Actions can be composite or simple. A simple action is of
the form r.`(υ) which denotes message `(υ) is sent to actor r. Composite actions
are created by composing simple actions as follows:
α, β
def= α;β|α ‖ β|α+ β|[ω?α : β]|r.`(υ)
Thus a composite action can be the sequential (α;β) or parallel execution (α ‖ β) of
actions α and β. Also, an action can be chosen to execute non-deterministically(+).
Term ([ω?α : β]) represents that action α is chosen to be executed if ω holds, else
β will be chosen. + and ‖ are commutative and associative.
Example 4.3 The governing policies of the lightMngr in the normal configuration
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are as follows, where night, occpd, rccpd and unoccpd denote events and c1, c2, d1
and d2 are arguments indicating the light intensity.
pn1
def= [1 ,night , true, light1 .switchon() ‖ light2 .switchon()]
pn2
def= [2 , occpd , true, light1 .setIntensity(d1 ) ‖ light2 .setIntensity(d2 )]
pn3
def= [3 , rccpd , true, light1 .setIntensity(c1 ) ‖ light2 .setIntensity(c2 )]
pn4
def= [4 , unoccpd , true, light1 .switchoff () ‖ light2 .switchoff ()]
Adaptation Policies
One of the main characteristics of a formal model to specify a self-adaptive system
is considering adaptation semantics. To this end, we should deal with a number
of issues such as ”the time at which an adaptation is performed in the system”
, ”the time at which the manager’s policies are modified” , ”the time at which
the enforcement of new policies begin after modifying policies” or ”the ability to
restricting the system behavior during adaptation”.
Whenever an event requiring adaptation occurs, relevant managers in different
SMMs are informed. However, the adaptation cannot be done immediately and
when the system reaches a safe state, the managers switch to the new configura-
tion. Therefore, we introduce a new mode of operation named adaptation mode
in which a manager runs before switching to the next configuration. While the
manager is in the adaptation mode, it is likely that events occur which need to be
handled by managers. To handle these cases, we introduce two kinds of adaptations
named loose adaptation and strict adaptation. Under loose adaptation a manager
enforces old policies, while under strict adaptation all events will be ignored until
the manager exits the adaptation mode and the system reaches a safe state. For
example in our smart home example, when LightMngr is in the fire configuration
and there is a request for the vacation mode, while fire has not been put out, it
keeps enforcing policies of the fire configuration by switching to the loose adaptation
mode. Also, when LightMngr is in the normal configuration, once fire is detected,
it stops enforcing its current policies by switching to the strict adaptation mode.
A simple configuration C is defined as C def= 〈P,A〉 where P and A indicate
the governing policy set and the adaptation policy of C respectively. Adaptation
policies are defined using an algebraic language as follows:
A
def= bDcδ,γ,λ,ϑ|A⊕A
in which D, δ , γ , λ and ϑ, respectively denote an arbitrary configuration, the con-
ditions of triggering adaptation, the conditions of applying adaptation, adaptation
type (loose or strict) and the priority of adaptation policy. The simple adaptation
policy, bDcδ,γ,λ,ϑ, specifies when the triggering condition δ holds and there is no
other adaptation policy with the higher priority, the manager evolves to the strict
or loose adaptation modes based on the value of λ. When the condition of applying
adaptation γ becomes true, it will perform adaptation. Adaptation policies of a
manager is defined as the composition, ⊕, of the simple adaptation policies. Here,
composition of two policies means that those policies are potentially to be triggered.
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⊕ is associative and commutative. D is defined as follows where ω is an arbitrary
condition:
D,D′ def= [ω?D : D′]|D2D′|C
Terms [ω?D : D′] and D2D′ represent conditional and non-deterministic choices
respectively. In conditional choice, configuration D is chosen if ω holds, else D′ will
be chosen. Non-deterministic choice means that the choice between configuration D
or D′ is made non-deterministically. This operator is associative and commutative.
Example 4.4 In our smart home example, there are three configurations including
Cn, Cv and Cf . Formal specification of lightMngr ’s configurations are as follows
in which pmj denotes policy j defined in mode Cm. vacReq, fire, firePutout and
comebackHome are events while isPutout , isCnfrmd and onVac are lightMngr ’s
local variables. As an example, when the lightMngr is in the fire mode and there is
a request for going on vacation, while fire has net been put out, it can not switch
to the Cv configuration.
Cn
def= 〈{pn1 , pn2 , pn3 , pn4}, bCf cfire,true,S ,1 ⊕ bCvcvacReq,isCnfrmd ,L,2 〉
Cf
def= 〈{pf1 , pf2 , pf3}, bonVac?Cv : CncfirePutout ,true,L,1 ⊕ bCvcvacRequest ,isPutout ,L,2 〉
Cv
def= 〈{pv1 , pv2 , pv3 , pv4 , p5}, bCf cfire,true,S ,1 ⊕ bCnccomebackHome,true,L,2 〉
5 Operational Semantics of PobSAM
5.1 Operational Semantics of Actors and Views
The operational semantics of our extension of Rebeca does not differ from that of
Rebeca[15]. However, any changes in state of the rebecs used in the definition of
views must be reflected to the views. Let I1, I2, . . . , In denote the defined views
of SMM S and η denote the set of defined events that S is concerned with. The
state of a view is determined by its current value that is modified by the related
events occurring at the actor level. After execution of a message server, the changes
of public state variables must be reflected in the views state, too. We specify the
operational semantics of the view layer as a labeled transition system.
Let SB, AB and TB ⊆ SB×AB×SB be the set of states, the set of actions and the
state transition relation of the transition system of the actor layer respectively. The
state transition relation of the view layer TI ⊆ SI ×AI ×SI is defined based on TB,
where SI and AI are the set of states and the set of actions of the view layer transi-
tion system respectively and SI = 〈I1, I2, ..., In〉. Suppose Ij(x1, x2, .., xm) denotes
an arbitrary view defined on public state variables x1, x2, .., xm and Ij |σs denotes the
state of Ij , where its state variables are substituted with their corresponding values
in state σsinSB. For each triple 〈σs, a, σt〉 ∈ TB, we consider an associated transition
〈σ′s, a, σ
′
t〉 ∈ TI where σ′s = 〈I1|σs , I2|σs, ..., In|σs〉 and σ′t = 〈I1|σt , I2|σt , ..., In|σt〉 if
and only if a∈ η or ∃Ik|1 ≤ k ≤ n ∧ Ik|σs 6= Ik|σt , i.e.
σs
a−→σt ∈ TB, (a ∈ η) ∨ (∃Ik|1 ≤ k ≤ n ∧ Ik|σs 6= Ik|σt)
σ′s
a−→ σ′t
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(NPE1)R = {p|(p.ε ∧ p.ψ) = true} ∧ R 6= ∅M∅,∅C[0] ε,τ−→ [M]R,∅C[0]
(NPE2) p ∈ R ∧ (@q ∈ R|q.o > p.o)
[M]R,∅C[0] p.ε∧p.ψ,enf(p)−−−−−−−−−→ [M]R,pC[p.α]
(NPE3) α −→ α′
[M]R,pC[α+ β] true,τ−→ [M]R,pC[α′]
(NPE4)
[M]R,pC[[ω?α : β]] ω,τ−→ [M]R,pC[α]
(NPE5)
[M]R,pC[[ω?α : β]] ¬ω,τ−→ [M]R,pC[β]
(NPE6) α→ α′
[M]R,pC[α ‖ β] true,τ−→ [M]R,pC[α′ ‖ β]
(NPE7)
[M]R,pC[r.`(υ); r′.`′(υ′)] `,`
′ /∈{sendAck,waitAck},τ−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
[M]R,pC[r.`(υ); r.sendAck(r′);r′.waitAck(sendAck(r′)); r′.`′(υ′)]
(NPE8)
[M]R,pC[r.`(υ);β]
true,send(r,`(υ))−−−−−−−−−−→ [M]R,pC[β]
(NPE9)
[M]R,pC[0] true,τ−→ [M]R−p,∅C[0]
(NPE10)
[M]∅,∅C[0] true,τ−→ M∅,∅C[0]
Fig. 3. Rules of policy enforcement
5.2 Operational Semantics of Managers
We use a labeled transition system to define the operational semantics of managers
in which labels have two components. The first component indicates the activation
condition of the transition while the second component denotes the action of the
transition. Assume that M is a logical expression defined on state variables, the
transitions are of the form P
M,a−→Q meaning “if M holds then P has an action a
leading to Q”. Henceforth, we denote a transition by P
µ−→Q where µ = (M,a).
The behavior of a manager depends on the mode in which it is running. A
manager can run in different modes such as normal execution, adaptation and policy
enforcement. To distinguish managers in different modes, we use different notations.
Let [M]sR,pC[α] indicate manager M in the enforcement mode in which,
• C is the configuration in which M is running and C def= 〈P,A〉.
• R is the set of triggered policies to be enforced.
• p is the current policy being enforced by M.
• α is the action of a recent policy being executed by M.
• s denotes M’s view of current context in addition to its local variables.
Ms∅,∅C[0], |M|sR,pC[α] and ‖M‖s∅,∅C[0] indicate M in normal execution, loose
adaptation and strict adaptation modes respectively. We ignore s in the definition
of operational semantics of managers.
Policy enforcement semantics
Whenever an event is received by a manager, it identifies all the triggered policies
with the policy condition evaluated to true. Then it enforces the identified policies
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based on their priorities. Once a manager enforces all the triggered policies, it
evolves to normal mode. Figure 3 gives rules of policy enforcement.
Using NPE1 manager switches to the enforcement mode by identifying the trig-
gered policies to be enforced. NPE2 places the action of a policy with the highest
priority in the action part of the manager to be run. NPE3, NPE4 and NPE5 de-
fine the semantics of non-deterministic and conditional choices of actions. NPE7 is
considered to apply two sequential actions in which r′ is an arbitrary actor. To this
aim, we use synchronous message passing provided by Extended Rebeca [16]. The
corresponding actors of two sequential actions are synchronized after execution of
the first action. We considered two message servers for each reactive class named
sendAck(r) and waitAck(r) which sends and receives a synchronization message
to and from rebec r respectively. NPE8 expresses sending a message to an actor
and removing it from the list of actions to be executed. After applying policy p,
NPE9 will remove p from the list of activated policies. When there is no policy to
be enforced, manager will switch to normal execution mode using NPE10.
As mentioned above, managers in loose adaptation mode are able to enforce
policies. Therefore, all the rules introduced for the enforcement mode, except for
NPE10, are applicable in loose adaptation mode too.
Policy adaptation semantics
For the sake of readability, we omit p, [α] and R symbols of managers in nor-
mal execution and strict adaptation modes. Figure 4 shows rules for adaptation in
strict mode in which B, A′ and B′ denote arbitrary adaptation policies. Further-
more, F and D′′ denote a simple adaptation policy and an arbitrary configuration,
respectively.
(SA1) @F ∈ A|(ϑ < F.ϑ ∧ F.δ = true)
M〈P, bDcδ,γ,λ,ϑ ⊕A〉 δ∧λ,τ−−−→ ‖M‖〈P, bDcδ,γ,λ,ϑ〉
(SA2)
‖M‖〈P, bDcδ,γ,λ,ϑ〉 γ,adapt−−−−→M∅,∅D
(SA3) M〈P,B〉
µ−→M〈P,B′〉
M〈P,A⊕B〉 µ−→M〈P,A⊕B′〉 (SA4)
M〈P,A〉 µ−→M〈P,A′〉
M〈P,A⊕B〉 µ−→M〈P,A′ ⊕B〉
(SA5)
‖M‖〈P, bDcδ,γ,λ,ϑ〉 µ−→‖M‖〈P, bD′cδ,γ,λ,ϑ〉
‖M‖〈P, bD¤D′′cδ,γ,λ,ϑ〉 µ−→‖M‖〈P, bD′cδ,γ,λ,ϑ〉
(SA6)
‖M‖〈P, bDcδ,γ,λ,ϑ〉 µ−→‖M‖〈P, bD′cδ,γ,λ,ϑ〉
‖M‖〈P, bD′′¤Dcδ,γ,λ,ϑ〉 µ−→‖M‖〈P, bD′cδ,γ,λ,ϑ〉
(SA7)‖M‖〈P, bω?D:D′cδ,γ,λ,ϑ〉 ω,τ−→‖M‖〈P, bDcδ,γ,λ,ϑ〉
(SA8)‖M‖〈P, bω?D:D′cδ,γ,λ,ϑ〉¬ω,τ−→‖M‖〈P, bD′cδ,γ,λ,ϑ〉
Fig. 4. Rules of strict adaptation
SA1 states that in the case of strict adaptation, when adaptation policy condi-
tions hold, manager M switches to the strict adaptation mode. SA2 asserts that
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when the condition for applying the adaptation holds, M will evolve to normal
mode and run configuration D. SA5, SA6, SA7 and SA8 define the semantics of
non-deterministic and conditional choices of configurations. SA5, SA6, SA7 and
SA8 rules have a higher priority than SA2. To this aim, we use the ordered SOS
(Structural Operational Semantics) framework [17] and place SA5, SA6, SA7 and
SA8 above SA2. Rules of loose adaptation are identical to strict adaptations rules
except for SA1 which is as @F ∈ A|(ϑ < F.ϑ ∧ F.δ = true)
M〈P, bDcδ,γ,λ,ϑ ⊕A〉
δ∧¬λ,τ−→ |M|〈P, bDcδ,γ,λ,ϑ〉
(LA1).
5.3 Interaction of Managers and Views
The other kind of transitions is related to the interaction of managers and view
layer. Figure 5 demonstrates rules for interaction of managers and the view layer
of S where σs
a→σt ∈ TI and t indicates the new state of M . sv and tv are defined
as the projection of σs and σt on M ’s view respectively, i.e. sv = σs ↑ M.v and
tv = σt ↑ M.v. Construct σs ↑ M.v denotes only the state variables of σs that are
in M.v too. IR1, IR2, IR3 and IR4 express changing M’s view of the view layer
by state changing at the view layer in the normal, enforcement, loose adaptation
and strict adaptation modes respectively, where s(t) is union of sv(tv) and lv. lv
indicates the current state of M in terms of its local variables.
(IR1) σs
a−→ σt,∃Ij ∈ s|Ij |σs 6= Ij |σt
Ms∅,∅〈P,A〉[0]
true,τ−→ Mt∅,∅〈P,A〉[0]
(IR2) σs
a−→ σt, ∃Ij ∈ s|Ij |σs 6= Ij |σt
[M]s∅,∅〈P,A〉[0]
true,τ−→ [M]t∅,∅〈P,A〉[0]
(IR3) σs
a−→ σt, ∃Ij ∈ s|Ij |σs 6= Ij |σt
|M|sR,p〈P,A〉[0] true,τ−→ |M|tR,p〈P,A〉[0]
(IR4) σs
a−→ σt, ∃Ij ∈ s|Ij |σs 6= Ij |σt
‖M‖s∅,∅〈P,A〉[0]
true,τ−→ ‖M‖t∅,∅〈P,A〉[0]
Fig. 5. Rules for interaction of managers and the view layer
6 Discussion and Related Work
Flexibility of self-adaptive systems is realized by three different features including
separation of concerns, computational reflection and component-based design [18].
We explain how PobSAM can address these requirements in the sequel.
PobSAM decouples the adaptation logic of an SMM from its business logic de-
scribed at an abstract level using policies. Among the proposed formal approaches
to model adaptive systems, [2,20,21] combine the adaptation logic into the busi-
ness logics. In [3,6,19] the adaptation concerns have been separated; however, all
the proposed formal models hard-code the adaptation logic which leads to system’s
inflexibility. The proposed model permits us to direct/adapt system behavior by
enforcing/modifying policies at an abstract level without re-coding actors and man-
agers; thereby it leads to increasing system flexibility and scalability.
Computational reflection is the ability of a system to monitor and change its
behavior subsequently. In PobSAM, managers monitor actor’s behavior through
views and direct/adapt SMMs behavior. Policies provide us a high-level description
of what we want without dealing with how to achieve it. Thus, using policies can be
a suitable mechanism to determine if the goals were achieved using existing policy
refinement techniques.
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Furthermore, PobSAM uses SMM as a policy-based building block for a modu-
lar model where each component is able to adapt its behavior autonomously. This
notion makes PobSAM a suitable model to specify self-organizing and cooperating
systems too. Although, in this paper we focused on behavioral adaptation, how-
ever, PobSAM can support structural adaptation by joining/leaving an actor or an
SMM to/from an SMM dynamically, which is an advantage over the most existing
approaches that concentrate on one adaptation type. SMM notion is similar to
Self-Managed Cell (SMC) notion proposed in [13] as a paradigm for engineering
ubiquitous systems. In this work, an SMC consists of a set of components that
constructs an autonomous management domain.
One of the main aspects of modeling a self-adaptive system is specifying adapta-
tion requirements. To this aim, we introduced a two phases adaptation strategy to
pass the adaptation phase safely. Upon receiving an adaptation event by a manager,
it switches to the adaptation mode. Adaptation mode models transient states dur-
ing adaptation. When the system reaches a safe state, the adaptation is completed
by evolving the manager to the new configuration. We believe that the modular
nature of adaptation policies enables us to express adaptation requirements easily
and at the high-level of abstraction.
As stated above, PobSAM has decoupled the adaptation layer from the func-
tional layer. Thus, we can verify the adaptation layer independently from the actor
layer provided that we have a labeled transition system modeling view behavior.
This feature can decrease the complexity of verification procedure.
Dynamic adaptation is a very diverse area of research. While structural adapta-
tion has been given strong attention in the research community(see [22]), fewer
approaches tackle behavioral adaptation as we considered. Due to the lack of
space, we restrict ourselves to present related work done on formal modeling of
self-adaptive systems in addition to applying policy-based approaches in engineer-
ing of self-adaptive systems.
Formal verification of adaptive systems is a young research area [23] and only
a few research groups already focused on this topic. A model-driven approach was
proposed for developing adaptive systems in [2]. In this approach, there are dif-
ferent behavioral variants of a process modeled as Petri Nets. At each time, one
Petri Net runs and reconfiguration is carried out by switching between various Petri
Nets. In another work [3], they modeled a system as a set of steady-state programs
among which the system switches. An extension of LTL with “adapt“ operator
was used to specify adaptation requirements before, during and after adaptation
[4]. Then, they use a model checking approach to verify the system. Kulkarni et
al. [7] proposed an approach based on the concept of proof lattice to verify if a
system is in a correct state during and after adaptation in terms of satisfying the
transitional-invariants. Furthermore, Schneider et al. [5] presented a method to
describe adaptation behavior at an abstract level. After deriving transition systems
from a system description, they verify the system using model checking. In their
later work [6], they proposed a framework for model-based development of adaptive
embedded systems using labeled transition systems. In this work, they verify differ-
ent properties using theorem proving, model checking and specialized verification
methods. [19] proposed a coordination protocol for distributed adaptation of the
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component-based systems and used Colored Petri Nets for formal verification. In
our model, adaptation is performed by applying suitable policies in different con-
texts, which in nature differs from the proposed approaches. We have proposed a
formal model of policy-based self-adaptive systems using Rebeca concentrated on
policy conflict detection [14]. Combining adaptation concerns with system func-
tionality in this approach causes an increase in the complexity of model as well as
formal verification process.
Employing policies as a paradigm to adapt self-adaptive systems has been given
considerable attention during recent years. Work in [8,9,10,11,24,26] used policies
as the adaptation logic for structural adaptation, while we use policies as a mech-
anism for governing as well as adapting system behavior. Furthermore, [24] used
policies for a simple type of behavioral adaptation named parameterization, too.
[25] proposed an adaptive architecture for management of differentiated networks
which performs adaptation by enabling/disabling a policy from a set of predefined
QoS policies, but this architecture does not have formal foundation. Anthony [26]
presents a policy definition language for autonomic computing systems in which
the policies themselves can be modified dynamically to match environmental con-
ditions. However, this work does not deal with modeling system and it is limited
to proposing an informal policy language.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
We proposed PobSAM as a formal model to develop self-adaptive systems which
uses policies as the main mechanism to govern and adapt the system behavior. To
this aim, we model a system as the composition of a set of autonomous components
named SMMs. Each SMM contains two types of actors: managed actors that are
dedicated to the functional layer of system and autonomous managers that coordi-
nate actors to achieve the predefined goals using policies. This model integrates two
formal methods including algebra and actor-based model to specify a system. Then,
we presented the operational semantics of PobSAM by means of labeled transition
systems.
There is much more research to pursue in the area of verification of self-adaptive
systems. In this paper, we focused on formal modeling of self-adaptive systems.
Verification of different properties of adaptation and functional layers of PobSAM
models is an ongoing work. We are going to implement a tool to support our ap-
proach too. As our model can support both behavioral and structural adaptations,
our future researches will be concentrated on specifying structural adaptations. Ex-
tending this model for modeling self-organizing systems in which managers need to
coordinate together is considered as a future work, too.
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Abstract
This paper considers the problem of model-based testing of a class of safety-critical systems. These systems
are built up from components that are connected a network-like structure. The number of possible structures
is usually large. In particular, we consider the following issue: For many of these systems, each instance
needs its own set of models for testing. On the other hand, the instances that should be tested will have to
be chosen so that the reliability statements are generally applicable. Thus, they must be chosen by a domain
expert. The approach in this paper addresses both of these points. The structure of the instance of system
under test is described using a domain-specific language, so that a domain expert can easily describe a system
instance for testing. At the same time, the components and composition operators are formalized. Using a
structure description written in the DSL, corresponding test models can be automatically generated, allowing
for automated testing by the domain expert. We show some evidence about the feasibility of our approach
and about the effort required for modelling an example, supporting our belief that our approach improves
both on the efficiency and the expressivity of current compositional test model construction techniques.
1 Introduction
Safety-critical embedded systems such as control applications in industrial automa-
tion or train automation are very complex due to their broad range of possible
applications. Among these systems, industrial plant controllers, railroad coordina-
tion systems, logistic planning systems etc. form a class that is especially adaptable
to many different application scenarios. One thing that is common to many of these
systems is that they control an underlying network of physical entities that are con-
nected in some way, often with several hierarchy levels. The network formed by these
entities induces data flows between neighbouring components and vertically through
the different levels of hierarchy. These data flows are observed and manipulated by
the control system. As an example, a railway control system for a given segment
of the railroad network will use the underlying structure of the tracks, switches and
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Fig. 1. An example of a hierarchical network structure: The European high-speed railroad network and a
detail, Kaiserslautern station
signals on the lowest level of its internal model, aggregating them into larger control
units that finally form the network (cf. figure 1). We will call this kind of systems
network-structured systems.
To handle the complexity inherent in these structures, one way to construct
such embedded control systems is a modular, component-based approach. For each
installation of such a system, e.g., for a given industrial plant or a given railway
network, an instance of the embedded system is created by instantiating some basic
component types and plugging them together in an appropriate way. For many of
these systems, one finds that the number of possible instances, is huge and effectively
unbounded.
From the perspective of quality assurance it is not clear how to test such a
huge space of instances w.r.t. different quality properties like correctness, safety or
reliability. Reliability is one of the most important non-functional quality properties
of embedded software systems required by contract or different standards like the
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IEC 61508 [10], IEC 61511 [9], CENELEC 50126 [3], ISO CD 26262 [11] or DO178B
[17]. Measures like mean time between failures (MTBF) or failure rates are typical
reliability indicators.
The problems that a tester faces for these systems are twofold: For one thing,
which instances should be tested? If one is interested in generally applicable state-
ments about system reliability, a set of instances that exercises the handling of
critical situations is required. In most cases, only a domain expert will be able to
decide exactly which instances are relevant here.
On the other hand, even if the instances to test are known, one still has to
generate test cases for each of these instances. When one tries to demonstrate
the reliability of a system, a large number of test cases per instance is necessary.
Multiplied with the number of instances, the amount of required test cases becomes
huge.
A common approach to solve the problem of test case construction is the au-
tomatic generation of test cases. Among the possible method for generating test
cases, model-based test approaches form an important and well-researched subclass.
These techniques generate test cases (i.e., test inputs and expected results) from
one or more models that describe the behaviour of the system and/or the system's
environment. These models are known as test models.
When testing for reliability, one usually chooses techniques that generate test
cases based on the operational profile of the system, allowing unbiased estimations
of reliability measures. One of these techniques is Model-Based Statistical Testing
[20], also known as Statistical Testing. This approach uses a description of the
possible system inputs from a user's point of view to generate test cases. This
description is formalized as a Markov chain of possible input event sequences. The
expected outputs can either be annotated to the Markov chain, or calculated using
a second model, the system model, for more complicated systems.
When trying to apply model-based testing techniques to network-structured sys-
tems, one finds that each instance requires test models tailored to the underlying
network structure. To avoid the overhead of generating test models for each instance,
it appears worthwhile to construct test models for each instance from some general
information and the description of the concrete instance. As the structure of the
instances lends itself to a natural composition-based description, a component-based
approach seems promising. Naturally, this approach must be designed in such a way
that the instance description given by the domain expert can easily be translated
into an instance of the test models.
Given some method that can be used to construct test models for a network-
structured system from pre-defined components and a description of the system
instance by a domain expert, it becomes possible to carry out testing of this system
with little work for each instance, as the most labour-intensive step, namely the
construction of the test model components, has to be done only once, and the
translation from the domain expert's representation of an instance to test cases can
be fully automated (cf. figure 2). Moreover, this approach allows the domain experts
to carry out (parts of) testing without the burden of having to learn the details of
testing the system under consideration.
In this paper, we present an approach called COMPOSE that allows for the
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Fig. 2. Elements of the approach
systematic compositional construction of test models using domain-specific infor-
mation. This approach comprises an integrated technique to describe state-based
component behaviour and compose these components according to a specification
given in a domain-specific language.
We believe that our approach improves both the efficiency and the expressivity
compared to state-of-the-art work in the compositional construction of test models.
In particular, we state the following claims:
(i) Constructing one composite model using the modelling techniques of COM-
POSE does not require more effort than using other techniques.
(ii) The construction of several composite models for different system instances is
more efficient using COMPOSE when compared to other techniques.
(iii) The resulting models produce identical test results.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In section 2, prior work is described.
The COMPOSE approach is described in section 3. It is illustrated by a running
example. Section 4 describes how we plan to evaluate our approach with the claims
stated above, and gives some preliminary results. Finally, we summarize our work
and point out further improvements and directions.
2 Related Work
Many ideas in this paper are based on common ideas found in component-based
software and model-based engineering. The focus of this paper is not on extending
these results, but rather on the application of these techniques to software testing,
in particular, to model-based testing. It continues the work of a prior case study
from the railway domain, which has been described in [12]. As noted there, the use
of domain-specific languages for describing compositional models is, in itself, not a
new idea; see, e.g., [7].
Often, composition operators are given by describing the action of the operator
in natural language, usually together with a mathematical specification (cf. [5,21,13]
and various others). We are not aware of any formalizations of composition operators
in some machine-readable language, except for some simple examples of operators
for process calculi [14].
Most model-based testing methods are based on automata or Markov chains.
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Apart from the most commonly described composition operators, namely different
forms of parallel composition [18], some more general operators have been defined
in the literature.
For Markov chains, only few compositional approaches exist. Parallel composi-
tions are obvious candidates, but are subsumed in other approaches. One general
approach that we found is known as Stochastic Automata Networks [4]. It describes
a Markov chain as a set of stochastic automata. These automata can interact us-
ing synchronized events (i.e., some transitions of the Markov chains are labelled
using an event name and may only fire simultaneously) and functional rates (i.e.,
a transition rate may depend on the current state of some other Markov chain).
Another approach is the Test Generation Language [15], which describes how stimu-
lation sequences generated by several different Markov chains can be woven into one
stimulation sequence for testing. This is done by giving several operators working
on event sequences. In our experience, using a high-level approach like the Test
Generation Language is preferable, as it allows clearer descriptions of intent.
For Mealy automata and more general state-event systems, a number of com-
positional techniques exist. First of all, Statecharts [6] can be seen as a method
to describe the composition of state-event systems in a compact notation. An-
other approach is the use of communicating automata, for example in UPPAAL [2].
Further compositional approaches have cropped up in the area of Model-Driven De-
velopment. Some of these approaches (e.g. [19]) describes connectors using process
calculi, which is quite close to the approach taken here. As our goal was to have
a single technique for the construction of composite Markov chain models and sys-
tem models, these approaches were not directly applicable to our problem, as these
approaches do not provide appropriate handling for Markov chains.
Choosing a different point of view, model-based testing needs to generate se-
quences of stimulus events. When abstracting away the details of which underlying
model is used, we are left with event-generating processes. These processes can be
naturally described using process calculi, such as the pi calculus. Indeed, the pi calcu-
lus [14] already has a notion and graphical notation for the composition of different
communicating processes. By modelling both component models and composition
operators as communicating processes, one can use this kind of process composition
to easily describe complex models.
3 The approach
In the following, the approach sketched above will be described in detail. As a
running example, the construction of a behavioural model for a Train Control System
[12,22] will be shown.
The approach has five steps:
(i) Identify the atomic components.
(ii) Determine appropriate composition operators.
(iii) Describe the behaviour of the atomic components using finite-state automata.
(iv) Define the behaviour of the composition operators, using the stimulus stream
model described below.
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S1 S3 S5S2 S4
B2
B3
B5
B6
B1 B4 B7
Fig. 3. An example track layout. Notation: The black triangles labeled S1 etc. are switches. B1 up to B7
are blocks, whose borders are the dashes lines.
(v) Define a DSL that uses the composition operators and atomic components to
build a system model from the domain description.
Usually, one wishes to have a direct mapping from syntactic components of the
DSL to composition operators and atomic components. On the other hand, a true
one-to-one mapping will usually not be possible  some information may be implicit
in the domain description, or there may be extraneous information.
For the example, an assistance system for a railway operating procedure known
as Zugleitbetrieb is modelled. This system is called ZLB-PS. Briefly, the operation
of this system can be summarized as follows:
(i) ZLB-PS is an assistance system that acts as substitute for the train sheet, a
paper form that records the position and movement of trains as well as track
reservations.
(ii) ZLB-PS uses track-side equipment (e.g. vacancy detectors) to counter-check
and enforce the train director's decisions. All track-side equipment is controlled
by ZLB-PS.
(iii) The railroad network is partitioned into blocks, which contain switches and
other track-side equipment. Moving a train means moving it from one block to
another.
(iv) ZLB-PS can be configured for arbitrary track layouts.
(v) For a train to move from A to B, it must first reserve a track and ensure that
this track is set up. During movement, it must notify the train director of
arrival and may also indicate departure.
The track layouts used for ZLB-PS are network-like structures, which motivates
our use of this example. A simple but typical layout is depicted in figure 3.
3.1 Identification of atomic components
In the first step, the basic components from which the test model is to be built must
be identified. As a starting point, one starts from the domain expert's view of the
system, choosing elements of this description as candidates for components. These
components are then compared against the (informal) description of the system.
One may find that some components are not explicitly described in the system
representation chosen above, e.g., with coordination components that have only one
instance. These components are then added to the candidate set.
The candidate set can then be considered element by element. One may find
that an element does not actually contribute to the behaviour being modelled or
does not have a clear-cut behaviour. In this case, the element should be removed or
replaced be suitable other components.
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Composition
operator
Component
Component
Component
input
output
resultant component
Fig. 4. The mechanics of composition operators; the arrows denote data streams
This step may be iterated when new information from further steps is available,
adding, removing or changing components as required. In any case, one should try
to keep a simple mapping from the DSL to the components.
As a first approximation, one finds that the structure of a railroad network is
made up from lengths of track, switches and block borders. Looking at the system's
requirements, it can be seen that the block borders themselves as well as the lengths
of track are not directly considered, but make up parts of a block. Hence, one
exchanges the track and block border components for a block component.
Also, signals are mentioned. As they can occur only on block borders, it is clear
how they can be modelled in the domain expert's description: they correspond to
block borders.
Finally, it becomes clear that reservations et cetera are described on a level above
blocks, therefore a small mediating component will be needed as well, the central
interlocking unit (short CIU). The component types are summarized in Figure 4 as
rectangles with thick borders.
3.2 Determination of composition operators
Based on the identified components and the set of possible configurations, one next
identifies how these components should be composed. The composition of a set of
components yields a new, larger component, allowing a hierarchical description of
the resulting system.
For this approach, one takes a black-box view of the components, describing their
behaviour solely using streams of events entering and leaving the component. The
job of the composition operator is to tie together the components by connecting to
their input and output streams and coordinating which data is sent to and received
from each component (cf. Figure 4). The possible composition operators can range
from very simple operations, such as a simple scatter/gather operator that simply
broadcasts inputs to all attached components and passes through their outputs, to
complex and application-specific operators.
The railroad example will use two composition operators: At one level, a block
contains its signals and switches, who can only operate correctly in cooperation
with their environment inside the block. Thus, a low-level composition operator is
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defined, which describes how a block instance is built up from switch models, signal
models and the (abstract) model of a general block. This composition operator
needs additional information, namely the concrete layout of switches, signals and
connections inside the block.
The concrete block instances, together with the central interlocking unit, can
then form the description of the complete system. Here, the high-level composition
operator is used, which describes how the signals from the CIU are distributed to
the concrete block instances. Again, this operator needs extra information, namely
which blocks are neighbours of a given block.
Again, a summary of the composition operators and their application is shown
in Figure 4: The composition operators are shown as ellipses, their configuration
information is given by the italic text and the components that are composed using
a composition operator are connected to it via arrows. The result of a composition
is given by a rectangle (with thin borders) surrounding all necessary information; it
forms a new component, which can again be composed with other components.
3.3 Describing the atomic components
The next step is the description of component behaviour. As single components are
modelled as Mealy machines, one can use various methods in this step, e.g. by direct
construction of the state/transition graph [8], by transformation from Statecharts
(cf. [6]) or a wealth of other techniques (e.g., [16]).
For the running example, sequence-based specification was chosen because back-
wards traceability to the requirements was considered as an important requirement
[12]. The application of this method yielded four Mealy machines, which are de-
scribed in the paper just referenced.
3.4 Describing the composition operators
Now that the interfaces of the components are known, the composition operators
can be constructed. To do this, one assumes that each Mealy machine is a (com-
municating) process with an event input stream and an event output stream. The
role of a composition operator is thus to describe how several such Mealy machine
processes can be connected to form a larger component with one or more input and
output event streams (cf. the section on the determination of composition operators,
especially Figure 4.
A good way to describe the behaviour of a composition operator is to use a pro-
cess calculus, such as CSP or the pi-calculus. The approach described in this paper
is based on a (slightly extended) version of pi-calculus [14]. A companion version
of the stochastic pi-calculus exists as well, which is used to describe composition of
Markov chain-based usage models for software testing. For reference, the following
syntax is used for the pi calculus:
Def ::= name '(' Patterns ')' ':=' Proc
Process definition
Proc ::= '0' Null process
| '(' Proc ')'
| GuardedProcs
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| Proc '|' Proc Parallel composition
| 'replicate' Proc Proc is replicated, i.e.,
infinitely many parallel copies are created
| 'new' Bindings '.' Proc Introduction of new name bindings
| name '(' Terms ')' Process instantiation
GuardedProcs ::= GuardedProc
| GuardedProc '+' GuardedProcs
Nondeterministic guarded choice
GuardedProc ::= Guard When the guard holds, do nothing
| Guard Proc When the guard holds, perform
new bindings and execute Proc
Guard ::= var '(' Patterns ')' '?' Receive on channel, with data
| var '?' Receive on channel, no data
| var '(' Terms ')' ' !' Send on channel, with data
| var ' !' Send on channel, no data
Patterns ::= Pattern | Pattern ',' Patterns
Pattern ::= var Accept any name/term, bind to var
| '_' Dummy pattern, accept anything
| name '(' Patterns ')' Constructor expression
| name '(' ')' Empty constructor expression
Terms ::= Term | Term ',' Terms
Term ::= var The binding of var
| name '(' Terms ')' Constructor expression
| name '(' ')' Empty constructor expression
Bindings ::= Binding | Binding ',' Bindings
Binding ::= var Normal binding
| var ':' 'imm' immediate binding
Semantics for the pi calculus are given in Milner's book [14], while our extensions
are described in a technical report [1].
As there is a natural transformation from Mealy machines to pi processes, the
composition of several Mealy machines using a given composition operator can be
described by assuming that the Mealy machines are given by processes M1 to Mk,
and the composition operator by C. Then the resulting model is the pi process
defined similar to the following:
Composite(in, out) ::=
new in1, out1, ..., ink, outk.
M1(in1, out1) | ... | Mk(ink, outk)
| O(in, out, in1, out1, ..., ink, outk)
In the following example, it will be shown that the pi calculus can be used as a
kind of programming language to describe the operational semantics of the com-
position operators. This has several advantages:
(i) It is easy to define application-specific operators.
(ii) Tool support for model compositions is possible.
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(iii) Operators can be built from other operators using simple language constructs,
viz., process instantiation.
For ZLB-PS, two composition operators have to be modelled. These composition
operators built as far as possible using standard operators. At first, consider the
general structure of the operators.
The high-level composition operator works as follows: An instance of the Central
Interlocking Unit is composed with a set of instances of concrete blocks. Whenever
a stimulus describing some operation on a path in the network enters the Central
Interlocking Unit, all blocks on this path are sent the corresponding stimulus in the
reservation protocol. If the stimulus has a synchronous response, a transactional
pattern is employed to guarantee that all blocks are in a consistent state.
Therefore, the composition operator works as follows: If the central interlocking
unit outputs request(f, t), the path from f to t is computed. Next, each path
element is sent requestin turn. If the request succeeds, the next element in the
path is considered (the end of the path is handled in an appropriate way), and if
this element is successfully reserved, OK is returned. If the next element fails (be it
because the element itself failed or some problem happened later in the path), or if
the request does not succeed, NOK is returned. The handling of tearDown(f, t) is
and setupis analogous. On the other hand, the cancelstimulus is simply sent to all
relevant blocks.
As a pi-calculus process, this operator can be expressed as follows:
// Entrance to the high-level composition
HighLevel(ciu, listBlocks, adjacencies) :=
// Initial state: normal operation state
HighLevelNormal(ciu, adjacencies)
// Run each block component instance,
// all of them in parallel.
| Parallel(listBlocks);
// The behaviour of the central interlocking unit
// when not processing a request.
HighLevelNormal(ciu, adjacencies) :=
// A request is received
ciu(REQUEST(f, t))? new path, result.
// Start three processes:
// A path calculation...
( CalculatePath(adjacencies, f, t, path)
// ... the transaction process that tries
// to reserve all the blocks on the path (except
// the first, which is a special case) ...
| path(first)? Transaction(RESERVE(), path, result)
// ... and the process that acts on the result,
// providing an answer and entering the appropriate mode.
| result(OK())? ciu(OK())!
HighLevelRequested(ciu, adjacencies, f, t))
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+result(NOK())? ciu(NOK())! HighLevelNormal(ciu, adjacencies))
// A teardown is received; basically, the same handling as for
// a request.
+ciu(TEARDOWN(f, t))? new path, result.
( CalculatePath(adjacencies, f, t, path)
| path(first)? Transaction(TEARDOWN(), path, result)
| result(what)? ciu(what)! HighLevelNormal(ciu, adjacencies));
// The behaviour of the central interlocking unit
// when processing a request.
HighLevelRequested(ciu, adjacencies, f, t) :=
new path, result. (
CalculatePath(adjacencies, f, t, path)
| ciu(SETUP())? (Tranasction(SETUP(), path, result)
|result(what)? ciu(what)!
HighLevelNormal(ciu, adjacencies))
+ciu(CANCEL())? (Distribute(CANCEL(), path)
|HighLevelNormal(ciu, adjacencies));
The HighLevel operator uses three helper processes, namely CalculatePath, Trans-
action (which implements the transactional pattern) and Distribute (which dis-
tributes a stimulus along a path). These processes can be implemented as follows:
Transaction(reqType, path, result) :=
// end of path: no obstacle to the reservation
path(END())? result(OK())!
// still on path: try the request on the current
// path element\dots
+ path(STEP(s))? s(reqType)! (
// if it fails, stop transaction
(s(NOK())? result(NOK())!)
// if it suceeds, try next element\dots
+ s(OK())? new resNext. (Transaction(reqType, path, resNext)
// hand down result, and call rollback if necessary
| resNext(OK())? result(OK())!
+resNext(NOK())? s(ROLLBACK())! result(NOK())!)
// Simple recursive implementation of a
// "for all elements" operation
Distribute(reqType, path) :=
path(END())?
+ path(STEP(s))? s(reqType)! Distribute(reqType, path);
CalculatePath(adjacencies, from, to, path) :=
[Code omitted for brevity: A function
that calculates an arbitrary path through
the graph given in adjacencies starting at
from and ending at to. The path is output by sending
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a sequence of STEP(s) terms, one for each vertex on the
path, and finally a END() term.]
The implementation of the low-level composition operator can be given in a simi-
lar way. It re-uses the definitions of Transaction, Distribute and CalculatePath.
Again, we omit the implementation itself for brevity.
3.5 Definition of a DSL
The final step of this method is to define a DSL describing instances of the sys-
tem and mapping it to applications of the composition operators to appropriate
component instances.
To describe an instance of a complicated system, domain experts have usually
developed their very own notation, e.g., block diagrams of the system or railroad
network diagrams. The language is derived from such a notation, and should be
designed in a way familiar to domain experts. Additionally, the translation from
syntactic elements of the language to instances of the components and composition
operators should be easy to implement. Optimally, each syntactic element maps to
a fixed set of component instances and composition operator applications.
For the running example, a DSL based on the track layout was chosen (cf. figure
Figure 3). It contains, among other information, data on which blocks, switch
and signal components exist, and how blocs and switches are interconnected. For
convenience, an already-existing XML encoding of the track layout was leveraged,
which contained large amounts of extraneous information.
The elements that were relevant for the model construction were the following:
• The definition of a single component. This was used to instance the appropriate
component models.
• The introduction of a neighbourhood relationship between two blocks. This data
was filled into the block connectivity graph, used by the high-level composition
operator.
• The introduction of the follower sets of a switch, where a follower set describes
which blocks can be reached when a switch is set in a given position. This infor-
mation was preprocessed and then used to fill the low-level connective graph for
the low-level composition operator.
• The definition of a single block additionally implies the application of the low-
level composition operator to this block and all track devices (i.e., switches and
signals) belonging to this block.
Finally, the (implied) CIU instance is created once and the high-level composition
operator applied to the results of the low-level compositions.
For the track layout given in 3, we get the following component instances and
composition operator applications (see also 5:
(i) Five instances of the switch model, one each for S1 to S5.
(ii) Seven instances of the block model.
(iii) Eight instances of the signal model, two each for the blocks B2, B3, B5 and B6.
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Fig. 5. The result of the composition. Each model (rectangle) is named by some letters symbolizing its
type (B means block component, S switch, Sig signal and C concrete block) and, optionally, a number.
Composition operators are signified by circles, where HL means high-level composition, and LL low-level
composition.
(iv) One instance of the CIU.
(v) Seven applications of the low-level composition operator, namely on for B1 and
S1, one for B4 with S2 and S3, one for B7, S4 and S5 and one each for B2,
B3, B5 and B6 together with their respective signals. Each of these operators
yields a concrete block, called C1 to C7.
(vi) One application of the high-level composition operator, composing the CIU
with C1 to C7 and yielding the complete system model.
4 Experiences from the example
As this paper was based on prior work by the authors [12], some limited experience
about efficiency is available. In particular, the approach described in [12] works along
the same lines as COMPOSE, with all steps but step 4 of the technique virtually
identical. Not surprisingly, we find that the implementation of the composition
operators as an executable Java program required significantly more effort (a few
man-weeks) compared to their specification as pi-calculus processes (two or three
days).
All in all, we find that the COMPOSE approach seems to perform well: It permits
the production of test models for network-structured systems with acceptable effort.
This leads us to formulate several hypotheses:
(i) COMPOSE satisfies the requirements described in the introduction: It allows
the construction of test models for network-structured systems in a way that is
comprehensible for domain experts.
(ii) COMPOSE does not require significantly more effort to construct the artifacts
for one composite model than other techniques.
(iii) COMPOSE requires significantly less effort to construct several different com-
posite models, compared to other techniques.
(iv) The models generated using this technique generate the same test cases and/or
test verdicts compared to models built by other techniques.
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These hypotheses will form the basis of a serious evaluation of the COMPOSE
approach. We plan to derive the necessary results by using a controlled experiment
and/or an industrial case study. For the comparison to other, existing techniques,
Stochastic Automata Networks [4] and Prowell's TGL [15] seem to be the most
appropriate candidates.
5 Conclusion and Outlook
In this paper, we have demonstrated an approach called COMPOSE that allows
for the systematic compositional construction of behavioral models. This approach
comprises an integrated technique to describe state-based component behaviour and
compose these components according to a specification given in a domain-specific
language. In our approach, component behaviour is described using Mealy machines,
while composition operators can be specified using process calculus expressions. This
allows a tester or system expert to build models suitable for analysis and model-
based testing. On the other hand, the instantiation of a model is described using
a domain-specific language, allowing a domain expert to construct instances of the
system and environment models for testing without any deeper knowledge about
these models. The advantage of this approach is that the domain expert can easily
test the system in as many configurations as he deems relevant and important,
without having to worry about constructing test cases or computing test results
manually.
Our approach is an extension of older work, described in a previous paper [12],
where a special case of this approach was demonstrated. The improvement in this
paper is that we can now specify the behaviour of the composition operators more
easily, so that the approach can be applied with less effort.
Starting from here, we plan to do three things. The first task, which is already
close to completion, is the implementation of a tool to support this approach. Next,
we plan to apply this approach on different examples, e.g., an example from indus-
trial control. Finally, we will investigate how the concepts behind this approach can
be used for quantitative reliability estimation of complex systems.
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Abstract
We propose a formal framework for extending a class-based language, equipped with a given class composition mechanism,
to allow programmers to define their own derived composition operators. These definitions can exploit the full expressive
power of the underlying computational language.
The extension is obtained by adding meta-expressions, that is, (expressions denoting) class expressions, to conventional
expressions. Such meta-expressions can appear as class definitions in the class table.
Extended class tables are reduced to conventional ones by a process that we call compile-time execution, which evaluates
these meta-expressions.
This mechanism poses the non-trivial problem of guaranteeing soundness, that is, ensuring that the conventional class table,
obtained by compile-time execution, is well-typed in the conventional sense.
This problem can be tackled in many ways. In this paper, we illustrate a lightweight solution which enriches compile-
time execution by partial typechecking steps. Conventional typechecking of class expressions only takes place when they
appear as class definitions in the class table. With this approach, it suffices to introduce a unique common type code for
meta-expressions, at the price of a later error detection.
Keywords: Modular composition, Java-like languages, Meta-programming, Type systems
Introduction
Support for code reuse is a key feature which should be offered by programming languages,
in order to automate and standardize a process that programmers should, otherwise, do by
hand: duplicating code for adapting it to best solve a particular instance of some generic
problem. Two different strategies which can be adopted to achieve code reuse are compo-
sition languages and meta-programming.
In the former approach programmers can write fragments of code (classes in the case
of Java-like languages) which are not self-contained, but depend on other fragments. Such
dependencies can be later resolved by combining fragments via composition operators, to
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obtain different behaviours. These operators form a composition language. Inheritance
(single and multiple), mixins and traits are all approaches allowing one to combine classes,
hence they define a composition language in the sense above.
The limitation of this approach is that the users, provided with a fixed set of composition
mechanisms, cannot define their own operators, as it happens, e.g., with function/method
definitions.
In meta-programming, programmers write (meta-)code that can be used to generate
code for solving particular instances of a generic problem. In the context of Java-like
languages, template meta-programming is the most widely used meta-programming facil-
ity 4 , as, e.g., in C++, where templates, which are parametric functions or classes 5 , can be
defined and later instantiated to obtain highly-optimized specialized versions. The instanti-
ation mechanism requires the compiler to generate a temporary (specialized) source code,
which is compiled along with the rest of the program. Moreover, template specialization al-
lows to encode recursive computations, that can be thought of as compile-time executions.
This technique is very powerful, yet can be very difficult to understand, since its syntax and
idioms are esoteric compared to conventional programming. For the same reasons, main-
taining and evolving code which exploits template meta-programming is rather complex,
see, e.g., [3]. Moreover, well-formedness of generated source code can only be checked “a
posteriori”, making the whole process hard to debug.
Here, our aim is to distill the best of these two approaches, that is, to couple disci-
plined meta-programming features with a composition language, in the context of Java-like
classes. More precisely, we propose a formal framework for extending a class-based lan-
guage, equipped with a given class composition mechanism 6 to allow programmers to
define their own derived composition operators. These definitions can exploit the full ex-
pressive power of the underlying computational language.
The extension is obtained as follows: meta-expressions, that is, (expressions denoting)
class expressions, are added to conventional expressions. Then, such meta-expressions can
appear as class definitions in the class table. Extended class tables are reduced to con-
ventional ones by evaluating these meta-expressions. This meta-circular approach implies
compile-time execution as in template meta-programming, with the advantage of a familiar
meta-language, since it just coincides with the conventional language the programmers are
used to.
This mechanism, which is trivial in itself, poses the non-trivial problem of guaranteeing
soundness, that is, ensuring that the conventional class tables, obtained by compile-time
execution, are well-typed (in the conventional sense).
Ideally, typing errors in generated source code should be detected statically, that is,
without requiring reduction at the meta-level at all, as it happens, e.g., in MetaML [16].
However, this would require to introduce sophisticated types for meta-expressions. In this
paper, we illustrate instead a lightweight solution which enriches compile-time execution
by typechecking steps. Conventional typechecking of class expressions only takes place
when they appear as the right-hand side of class definitions in the class table. With this
approach, it suffices to introduce a unique common type code for meta-expressions, at the
4 A very limited form of meta-programming is offered by Java/C# generics, which are classes parametric in some type
parameters, that can be compiled once. Java generics are a source level feature, which is compiled away, while generics are
fully supported by C#.
5 Note that C++ supports, along type-parameters, other kinds of template parameters.
6 In this paper for sake of simplicity we illustrate the approach on only one composition operator, that is, extends.
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price of a later error detection.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 1 we informally introduce our approach
by means of some examples, in Section 2 we provide a formalization on a very simple
class composition language, and in Section 3 we summarize the contribution of the paper
and draw related and further work. The Appendix contains the proof of soundness. This
paper is the full version of [8].
1 Examples
In order to show how to use meta-programming as a tool for better composing software, we
introduce a language allowing one to compose classes by means of some operators. In such
a language, a class declaration associates a class expression with the name of the declared
class. The simplest form of class expression is the base class, that is, a set of field and
method declarations. For instance, the literal { int answer() { return 42; } } denotes a
base class declaring a single method named answer. In our example language, we can give
the name C to that class body by writing:
class C = { int answer() { return 42; } }
This is the exact Java syntax, with the exception of the extraneous symbol =. Of course,
here the symbol = can be followed by any arbitrarily involved class composition expression,
in place of a simple base class literal.
Since our aim here is to explain how our approach works, rather than proposing a
specific composition language, for simplicity we consider a very simple language offering
just a single binary operator, extends, allowing one to combine two classes in a way that
should feel natural to Java programmers: the left operand extends, that is, overrides, the
right operand.
For instance, writing
{ int a() { return 1; } } extends
{ int a() { return 0; } int b() { return 0; } }
is equivalent to write:
{ int a() { return 1; } int b() { return 0; } }
To add a meta-programming facility to this simple language, we allow class (composi-
tion) expressions to be used as expressions of a newly introduced type: code.
For instance, the following program
class C = {
code m() {
return { int one() { return 1; } };
}
}
class D = new C().m()
declares two classes, C and D. The former, C, declares a single method named m, which
returns a value of type code. This value, in turn, is a base class declaring the (non-meta)
method 7 one. The latter class, D, is declared using an expression that has to be evaluated
in order to obtain the corresponding class body. In this example, the body of D is the value
returned by the method m of C, so this program could be equivalently written as:
7 We call meta-methods the methods involving code manipulation.
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class C = /* ...as before... */
class D = { int one() { return 1; } }
One very basic use of this mechanism allows to obtain conditional compilation. For
instance, in the previous example we could have written:
class C = {
code m() {
if (DEBUG) return /* ...debug version... */;
return /* ...as before... */;
}
}
The following (meta-)method:
code mixin(code parent) {
return { /* ... */ } extends parent;
}
behaves like a mixin, extending in some way a parent class passed as argument.
Note that the code in the extension can select arbitrary fields or methods of the parent
class. This is allowed because we do not typecheck a class expression until it is associated
to a class name in the class table. This choice allows for an incredible leeway in writing
reusable code, at the price of a late error detection. The situation is very similar to what
happens with C++ templates [15,13].
The class to be used as parent could be constructed, having a generic list type, List<>,
by chaining an arbitrary number of classes:
code chain(List<code> parents){
if (parents.isEmpty()) return Object;
return parents.head() extends this.chain(parents.tail());
}
This is indeed similar to mixin composition, with the advantage that the operands of this
arbitrarily long composition do not have to be statically known.
Finally, the following example is a graphic library that adapts itself with respect to its
execution environment, without requiring any extra-linguistic mechanisms: 8
class GraphicalLibrary {
code produceLibrary() {
code result = BaseGraphicalLibrary;
String producer = System.getProperty("sys.vcard.brand");
if (producer.equals("NVIDIA"))
result = NVIDIASupport extends result;
else if (producer.equals("ATI"))
result = ATISupport extends result;
else
throws new CompilationError(
"No compatible hardware found");
if (System.getProperty("os.name").contains("Windows"))
result = CygwinAdapter extends result;
return result;
}
}
The method produceLibrary builds a platform-specific library by combining the generic li-
brary BaseGraphicalLibrary with the brand-specific drivers (represented by the two classes
NVIDIASupport and ATISupport) and wrapping the result, if required on the specific plat-
form, with the class CygwinAdapter, which emulates a Linux-like environment on Windows
operating systems.
8 To keep the example compact, we do not detail all the classes named in the example, and we simply assume that they are
declared elsewhere.
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cp :: = class C = ce (conventional) program
ce :: = C | B | ce extends ce ′ class expression
B :: = {fds mds} base class
fds :: = fd field declarations
fd :: = T f ; field declaration
mds :: = md method declarations
md :: = T m(T x ) {return e; } method declaration
e :: = x | e.f | e.m(e) | new C(e) | (C )e (runtime) expression
v :: = new C(v) value
T :: = C type
CT :: = 〈C , fds,mhs〉 class type
mhs :: = mh method headers
mh :: = T m(T ) method header
∆ :: = C :CT class type environment
Γ :: = x :T parameter type environment
Figure 1. Syntax and types of the conventional language
In this way the compilation of the same source produces customized versions of the
library depending on the execution platform. In other words, this approach can be used
to write active libraries [2], that is, libraries that interact dynamically with the compiler,
providing better services, as meaningful error messages, library-specific optimizations and
so on.
2 Formalization
Figure 1 shows syntax, values and types of our conventional language, using the overbar
notation to denote a (possibly empty) sequence. 9
The top section of the figure defines the syntax, where we assume infinite sets of class
names C , field names f and method names m . As already mentioned, to keep the presen-
tation minimal we consider a class composition language with only one operator, extends.
This conventional language is very similar to Featherweight Java [6], FJ for short, but the
operator extends composes two class expressions, rather than the name of an existing class
with a class body (base class).
Reduction rules are as in FJ and are omitted. The only difference is that look-up, for-
mally expressed by the function mbody , needs to be generalized, as shown in Figure 2,
to take into account that extends composes two class expressions. We omit the analogous
trivial generalization of the function fields . Values v of the conventional language are as in
FJ.
9 This notation for metavariables is the analogous of the Kleene-star in BNF style.
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(<-DIRECT)
∆ ` C<Ci
∆(C ) = 〈C1 . . .Cn, , 〉
i ∈ 1..n (<-TRANS)
∆ ` C<C ′
∆ ` C ′<C ′′
∆ ` C<C ′′
(≤-REFL)
∆ ` C≤C
(≤-STRICT)
∆ ` C<C ′
∆ ` C≤C ′
(METHOD-T)
∆; x1:T1, . . . xn:Tn, this:C ` e:T ′
∆ ` T ′≤T
∆; C ` T m(T1 x1 . . .Tn xn){return e; }:T m(T1 . . .Tn)
(NAME-T)
∆; C ′ ` C :〈C , fds,mhs〉
∆(C ) = 〈 , fds,mhs〉
(BASIC-T)
∆; C ` md1:mh1
. . .
∆; C ` mdn:mhn
∆; C ` {fds md1 . . .mdn}:CT
CT = 〈∅, fds,mh1 . . .mhn〉
(EXTENDS-T)
∆; C ` ce1:〈C 1, fds1,mhs1〉
∆; C ` ce2:〈C 2, fds2,mhs2〉
∆; C ` ce1 extends ce2:〈C 1∪C 2, fds1∪fds2,mhs1∪mhs2〉
dom(fds1)∩dom(fds2) = ∅
(PROGRAM-T)
∆,∆′; C1 ` ce1:CT 1
. . .
∆,∆′; Cn ` cen:CTn
∆ ` C1 = ce1 . . .Cn = cen:∆′
∆′ = C1:CT1 . . .Cn:CTn
∆,∆′ ` < acyclic
mbodycp(C ,m) = mbodycp(ce,m) if cp(C ) = ce
mbodycp({. . .C m(. . .){return e; } . . .},m) = e
mbodycp(ce1 extends ce2,m) = mbodycp(ce1,m) if mbodycp(ce1,m) defined,
mbodycp(ce2,m) otherwise
Figure 2. Typing rules and look-up of the conventional language
Typing rules are shown in Figure 2.
The first four rules define the subtyping relation. Note that, since a class definition
can contain many class names as subterms 10 , in our generalization a class can be a direct
subtype of many others. However, method look-up function mbody gives precedence to the
10For instance, class C = D extends E.
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p :: = class C = e (generalized) program
e :: = . . . | C | B | e extends e ′
v :: = new C(v) | ce
T :: = C | code
(META-RED)
e
cp−→ e ′
cp (C = e) p −→ cp (C = e ′) p
(EXTENDS-1)
e1
cp−→ e ′1
e1 extends e2
cp−→ e ′1 extends e2
(EXTENDS-2)
e
cp−→ e ′
v extends e
cp−→ v extends e ′
(≤-REFL-CODE)
∆ ` code≤code
(T-NAME)
∆; Γ ` C :code
(T-BASIC)
∆; Γ ` B :code
(T-EXTENDS)
∆; Γ ` e1:code ∆; Γ ` e2:code
∆; Γ ` e1 extends e2:code
Figure 3. Meta-expressions and compile-time execution
left operand as in standard FJ.
Rule (METHOD-T) is as in FJ, typing rules for expressions are also as in FJ and are
omitted.
The typing judgment ∆; C ` ce:〈C , fds,mhs〉 assigns a class type to a class expression
ce appearing as (subterm of) the definition of class C , needed to type method bodies in base
classes in ce . This class type models the type information which can be extracted from ce,
and consists of three components: a set C of class names (those appearing as subterms in
ce, which are, hence, the direct supertypes of C ), a set of field declarations and a set of
method headers extracted from method declarations. As usual, we assume that these sets
are well-formed only if a field (method) name appears only once, and write dom to denote
the set of declared names. In rule (EXTENDS-T), this assumption implicitly ensures that
a method can be overriden only with the same type, whereas the additional side condition
prevents hiding of fields, and both are standard FJ requirements.
In rule (PROGRAM-T), standard FJ typing rule for programs is generalized to open
programs, that is, programs which can refer to already compiled classes, modeled by the
left-side class type environment ∆. We denote by ∆,∆′ concatenation of two class type
environments with disjoint domain.
Figure 3 shows how the conventional language is extended to allow customizable com-
position operators.
As already mentioned, this is achieved as follows: meta-expressions, that is, (expres-
sions denoting) class expressions, are added to conventional expressions, as shown in the
second production. These meta-expressions have a special primitive type code which is
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added to types (fourth production, and typing rules in the last section of the figure). An
example of meta-expression is
new C().m({ int m(){ return 2;} })
In particular, a class expression is seen as a value of type code (third production).
Moreover, such meta-expressions can appear as class definitions in the program (first
production).
Then, compile-time execution consists in reducing this (generalized) program to a con-
ventional program, where all right-hand sides of class declarations are values, that is, class
expressions. This is modeled by the relation p −→ p ′, whose steps are meta-reduction
steps, that is, steps of reduction of a meta-expression. More precisely, as formalized by
rule (META-RED), in a (generalized) program it is possible to reduce the right-hand-side of
a class declaration in the context of a conventional fragment cp of the program. We have
assumed, without any loss of generality, that in a generalized program the conventional part
comes first. The relation e
cp−→ e is the standard FJ reduction of an expression in the con-
text of a (conventional) program, enriched by the rules (EXTENDS-1) and (EXTENDS-2).
We consider now the issue of soundness. Compile-time execution can: (1) not ter-
minate; (2) get stuck; (3) reduce to a program where the right-hand-side of some class
declaration is a value different from a class expression; (4) reduce to a program where
some class declaration is ill-typed; (5) reduce to a well-typed program.
Indeed, there is no way to have both terminating metaprograms and a fully metacircular
approach (over a Turing complete base-language) because, to guarantee the termination,
one has to restrict either the resources used by metaprograms or the metalanguage itself.
To prevent (2)-(3)-(4), hence to guarantee that compile-time execution always produces
a well-typed program when terminates, we can take different approaches. In this paper, we
propose a simple technique which integrates meta-reduction with typechecking, as shown
in Figure 4.
In this approach, reduction of a program involves some typechecking steps, which can
either succeed or fail. In the latter case the program reduces to error.
More in detail, during compile-time execution each class declaration class C = e in
the program can be annotated with the following meaning:
• empty annotation: initial state, no check has been performed yet;
• annotation code: e is a well-typed meta-expression;
• annotation CT , for some class type CT : e is (a well-typed meta-expression which de-
notes) a well-typed class expression of type CT .
We will use p˜ as metavariable for annotated programs. More precisely, checked compile-
time execution is defined on annotated programs of the following form:
p˜ :: = cp:∆ cp′:code [class C = e:code] p | error
where square brackets denote optionality, and e is not of the form ce. Moreover, for any cp
conventional program, cp:code is the program obtained by annotating each class declaration
by code, and, for any ∆ s.t. dom(cp) = dom(∆), cp:∆ is the program obtained by
annotating each class declaration with the type associated in ∆ to the corresponding class
name.
We have assumed, without any loss of generality, that in an annotated program the cp:∆
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(META-RED)
e
cp−→ e ′
cp:∆ cp′:code (class C = e:code) p −→ cp:∆ cp′:code (class C = e ′:code) p
(META-CHECK)
cp:∆ cp ′:code (class C = e) p −→
cp:∆ cp ′:code (class C = e:code) p
∆; ∅ ` e:code
(META-CHECK-ERROR)
cp:∆ cp′:code (class C = e) p −→ error
@cp′′ ⊆ cp′, cp′′ 6= ∅ s.t. closed(∆, cp′′)
∆, ∅ 6` e:code
(CHECK)
cp:∆ cp′:code p˜ −→ cp:∆ cp′:∆′ p˜
cp′ 6= ∅
∆ ` cp′:∆′
(CHECK-ERROR)
cp:∆ cp ′:code p˜ −→ error
cp′ 6= ∅
closed(∆, cp′) or p˜ = ∅
@∆′ s.t. ∆ ` cp′:∆′
Figure 4. Checked compile-time execution
part comes first, then the cp:code part, then the others. In particular, in the initial program
conventional class declarations appear first and are annotated code. Moreover, reduction
rules ensure that at each intermediate step there is at most one class declaration which has
been annotated code but is not reduced yet. This is formalized later by the subject reduction
property, that is, Theorem 2.2.
Rule (META-RED) models a (safe) meta-reduction step. Indeed, meta-reduction is only
performed w.r.t. a conventional program cp which has been previously succesfully type-
checked. Note that, here as in the following two rules, there can be another portion of the
program cp ′ which has already been reduced, but for which it is still impossible to per-
form a conventional typechecking step. This happens when cp′ refers to some class names
whose definition is still unavailable, see the first example in the following.
Rule (META-CHECK) and (META-CHECK-ERROR) model a typechecking step at the
meta-level. That is, the first class declaration in the program which is not annotated yet is
examined, to check that its right-hand side e is a well-typed meta-expression. The expres-
sion is typechecked w.r.t. to the portion of the conventional program cp which has been
already successfully typechecked. If the typechecking step succeeds, then the class decla-
ration is annotated code. Otherwise, an error is raised only if it is not possible to perform
a further conventional typechecking step on cp′, since any non-empty subset of cp′ refers
to some class names whose definition is still unavailable. This is expressed by the side-
condition: closed(∆, p) holds when p only refers to class names that are either in dom(∆)
or in dom(p) itself (the trivial formal definition is omitted).
Rule (CHECK) and (CHECK-ERROR) model a conventional typechecking step. A suc-
cessful typechecking step takes place if there is a portion of the conventional program cp′
which can be typechecked w.r.t. the current class type environment ∆. An error is raised,
instead, if no successful typechecking step is possible and, moreover, there is no hope it
will be possible in the future, since either cp′ only refers to class names which are already
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available, or there are no other class definitions to reduce.
We show now some examples illustrating how checked compile-time execution works.
First we give an example of successful compile-time execution. We abbreviate by B
the base class { int one(){ return 1; } }. The program
class C = { code m() { return B; } } : code
class D = { int m() { return new E().one();} } : code
class E = new C().m()
is reduced by (CHECK) to
class C = { code m() { return B; } } : 〈∅, ∅, code m() 〉
class D = { int m() { return new E().one();} } : code
class E = new C().m()
is reduced by (META-CHECK) to
class C = { code m() { return B; } } : 〈∅, ∅, code m() 〉
class D = { int m() { return new E().one();} } : code
class E = new C().m() : code
is reduced by (META-RED) to
class C = { code m() { return B; } } : 〈∅, ∅, code m() 〉
class D = { int m() { return new E().one();} } : code
class E = { int one() { return 1; } } : code
is reduced by (CHECK) to
class C = { code m() { return B; } } : 〈∅, ∅, code m() 〉
class D = { int m() { return new E().one();} } : 〈∅, ∅, int m() 〉
class E = { int one() { return 1; } } : 〈∅, ∅, int one() 〉
Compile-time execution checks that class C is well-typed. Note that it is not possible to
check class D since it refers to class E that has no associated class expression yet. Hence,
expression new C().m() is checked to be of type code. At this point, reduction of this expres-
sion can take place, and finally the resulting class D is checked to be well-typed. Finally,
also the class D is verified to be well-typed.
The second example shows a case when compile-time execution terminates with an
error.
class C = { code m() { return B; } }: code
class D = new C().k()
is reduced by (CHECK) to
class C = { code m() { return B; } } : 〈∅, ∅, code m() 〉
class D = new C().k()
is reduced by (META-CHECK-ERROR) to error.
Compile-time execution checks that class C is well-typed,and then checks whether the
expression new C().k() is of type code. This is not the case, since class C has no methods
named k. Moreover, because no standard typechecking steps are possible, since there are
no other classes, an error is raised.
In the last example we abbreviate by B the base class
{ int one(){ return new C().k(); } }.
class C = { code m() { return B; } } : code
class D = new C().m()
is reduced by (CHECK) to
class C = { code m() { return B; } } : 〈∅, ∅, code m() 〉
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class D = new C().m()
is reduced by (META-CHECK) to
class C = { code m() { return B; } } : 〈∅, ∅, code m() 〉
class D = new C().m() : code
is reduced by (META-RED) to
class C = { code m() { return B; } } : 〈∅, ∅, code m() 〉
class D = { int one() { return new C().k(); } } : code
is reduced by (CHECK-ERROR) to error.
Compile-time execution checks that class C is well-typed, then checks that the expres-
sion new C().m() is of type code, then reduces this expression. Finally, the check that the
resulting class D is well-typed fails since class C has no methods named k.
This example also illustrates that standard typechecking of class expressions only takes
place when they are associated to a class name in the class table. For instance, the fact
that base class B is ill-typed is known from the beginning, but is only detected when B is
associated to D. This choice allows for more expressive power, at the cost of a later error
detection. In further work we will investigate smarter strategies allowing one to discover
some inconsistencies earlier, for instance using type constraints as in [1].
In order to state our soundness result, we define a judgment ` p˜ OK which states that
annotations in p˜ are correct.
(OKERROR)
` error OK
(OK1)
∅ ` cp:∆
` cp:∆ cp ′:code p OK
(OK2)
∅ ` cp:∆
∆; ∅ ` e:code
` cp:∆ cp′:code (class C = e:code) p OK
e 6= ce
Soundness is formally expressed by the usual progress and subject reduction properties.
Proofs are in the Appendix.
Theorem 2.1 (Progress) If ` p˜ OK, then either p˜ −→ p˜ ′ or p˜ = error or p˜ is of the
form cp:∆.
Theorem 2.2 (Subject reduction) If ` p˜ OK and p˜ −→ p˜′ then ` p˜′ OK.
3 Conclusion
We have presented a framework for extending a Java-like language (that is, a class-based
statically typed language with nominal types) with class composition operators blended
into conventional expressions, thus using meta-programming as a flexible tool for com-
posing software. Compile-time execution reduces extended class tables to conventional
ones, by evaluating meta-expressions. Safety is ensured by a lightweight approach, where
conventional typechecking of class expressions only takes place when they appear as class
definitions in the class table.
An important advantage of this lightweight approach is that it is modular, in the sense
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that it can be applied on top of an existing Java-like language. In particular, checked
compile-time execution is defined on top of typechecking and reduction relations of the
underlying Java-like language, as formally shown in Figure 4. Correspondingly, an im-
plementation could basically consist in 11 an algorithmic version of the rules in Figure 4
where (META-RED) steps and (META-CHECK)-(CHECK) steps invoke the JVM and the Java
compiler, respectively.
Metaprogramming approaches can be classified by two properties: whether the meta-
language coincides with the conventional language (the so-called meta-circular approach),
and whether the code generation happens during compilation. MetaML [16], Prolog [14]
and OpenJava [17] are meta-circular languages, while C++ [7], D [4], Meta-trait-Java [12]
and MorphJ [5] use a specialized meta-language. 12 Almost any dynamically typed lan-
guage allows some sort of meta-circular facility, typically by offering an eval function.
Such a function allows to run arbitrary code, represented by an input string. Regarding
code generation, MetaML and Prolog performs the computation at run time, while C++, D,
Meta-trait-Java, MorphJ and OpenJava use compile-time execution. Again, dynamically
typed languages providing an eval function allow runtime meta-programming. 13
The work presented in this paper lies in the area of meta-circular compile-time execu-
tion.
Among the above mentioned approaches, [17] is the one showing more similarities
with ours. In OpenJava, programmers can add new language constructs on top of Java,
and define the semantics of these new constructs by writing meta-classes, that is, particular
Java classes which instruct the OpenJava compiler on how to perform a type-driven trans-
lation into standard Java. These meta-classes use the reflection-based Meta Object Protocol
(MOP) to manipulate the source code. In the same way it is even possible to change the
semantics of standard Java language constructs. A similar capability of specifying within
the code instructions for contextual compilation has been recently provided in Java 6 by
annotations.
However, this approach, besides being lower-level, has a very different goal w.r.t. ours,
that is, to make easy for programmers to extend and possibly change the behaviour of an ex-
isting language, in rather arbitrary ways. In our case, instead, syntax and semantics of both
the underlying language and the language for composing classes are fixed. The program-
mer is only allowed to define its own derived composition operators by using the whole
expressive power of the underlying language. Note also that both approaches produce stan-
dard Java code; however, in our case this code is obtained by an algorithm which interleaves
standard Java compilation and execution steps, rather than by a unique preprocessing step.
In this paper, we have illustrated our approach on a minimal class composition lan-
guage, to be able to analyze in isolation the safety issue. Further work will be carried out
in two complementary directions. On the one hand, we will design a richer composition
language suitable for our aims, likely a subset/variant of Featherweight Jigsaw [11,9,10].
On the other hand, we will study alternative approaches to guarantee safety, ranging from a
fully static analysis based on sophisticated types, as in MetaML [16], to intermediate solu-
tions still including dynamic checks, but allowing earlier error detection. Moreover, to test
11Besides a parser for the extended language.
12The latest version of D seems to include a limited form of metacircular compilation.
13 Some dynamically typed languages like Groovy allows meta-circular compile-time excution while they are translated into
bytecode (or some other abstract representation).
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the applicability of our proposal, we will develop a prototype which exploits our ideas by
extending a real language such as Java.
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A Proofs
Theorem A.1 (Progress) If ` p˜ OK, then either p˜ −→ p˜′ or p˜ = error or p˜ is of the
form cp:∆.
Proof By case analysis on the definition of ` p˜ OK.
(OKERROR) Trivial.
(OK1) We have ` cp:∆ cp ′:code p OK and ∅ ` cp:∆. We distinguish two subcases:
either there exists a non-empty cp′′ such that cp′′ ⊆ cp′ and closed(∆, cp′′) or not.
cp ′′ exists
In this case,
• if ∆ ` cp ′′:∆′ for some ∆′, then we can apply rule (CHECK),
• otherwise we can apply rule (CHECK-ERROR).
cp ′′ not exists
In this case,
• if p is empty and cp′:code is not empty, then we can apply rule (CHECK-ERROR),
• if p is empty and cp′:code is empty, then the program is of the form cp:∆,
• if p is not empty, then it is of the form (C = e) p′. In this case, if ∆; ∅ ` e:code,
then we can apply rule (META-CHECK), otherwise rule (META-CHECK-ERROR).
(OK2) We have ` cp:∆ cp ′:code (class C = e:code) p OK, with e not of the form ce,
and ∅ ` cp:∆, ∆; ∅ ` e:code. From these last two judgments and the fact that e is not
a value, by the progress property of the conventional language we know that e
cp−→ e ′,
hence we can apply rule (META-RED).
2
Lemma A.2 (Weakening) ∆; Γ ` ce:CT implies ∆,∆′; Γ ` ce:CT .
Lemma A.3 If ∅ ` cp:∆ and ∆ ` cp′:∆′ then ∅ ` cp, cp ′:∆,∆′.
Proof Since ∆ ` cp ′:∆′ has been deduced by rule (PROGRAM-T), we have
(i) for each C = ce in cp ′, ∆,∆′ ` ce:∆′(C ),
(ii) ∆,∆′ ` < is acyclic by side condition.
Analogously, since ∅ ` cp:∆ holds, we have that, for eachC = ce in cp, ∆ ` ce:∆(C ).
Hence, by Lemma A.2, ∆,∆′ ` ce:∆(C ), and we can apply (PROGRAM-T) getting the
thesis. 2
Theorem A.4 (Subject reduction) If ` p˜ OK and p˜ −→ p˜ ′ then ` p˜ ′ OK.
Proof By case analysis on the definition of p˜ −→ p˜′.
(META-RED) We have
(i) p˜ ≡ cp:∆ cp′:code (class C = e:code) p −→ p˜ ′ ≡ cp:∆ cp′:code (class C = e ′:code) p,
(ii) e
cp−→ e ′,
(iii) ∅ ` cp:∆ and ∆; ∅ ` e:code, since ` p˜ OK holds.
From (ii) and (iii), by the subject reduction property of the conventional language, we
get that ∆; ∅ ` e ′:code. Hence, we can apply (OK2) with this premise and get ` p˜ ′ OK.
(META-CHECK) We have
(i) p˜ ≡ cp:∆ cp ′:code (class C = e) p −→ p˜ ′ ≡ cp:∆ cp′:code (class C = e:code) p.
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(ii) ∆; ∅ ` e:code by side condition.
(iii) ∅ ` cp:∆ since ` p˜ OK holds.
Hence, we can apply (OK2) with premises (ii) and (iii) and get ` p˜ ′ OK.
(META-CHECK-ERROR) We have cp:∆ cp ′:code (class C = e) p −→ error, hence we
get the thesis by rule (OKERROR).
(CHECK) We have
(i) cp:∆ cp′:code p˜ −→ cp:∆ cp′:∆′ p˜,
(ii) ∆ ` cp′:∆′ by side condition,
(iii) ∅ ` cp:∆, since ` cp:∆ cp′:code p˜ OK holds,
From (ii) and (ii) we get ∅ ` cp, cp′:∆,∆′ by Lemma A.3. Hence, we an apply (OK1)
with this premise and get ` cp:∆ cp′:∆′ p˜ OK.
(CHECK-ERROR) We have cp:∆ cp ′:code p˜ −→ error, hence we get the thesis by rule
(OKERROR).
2
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Abstract
Component-Based Software Engineering (CBSE) is a widely used approach for the software design, par-
ticularly when addressing large scale software. The common practice is to build software by composing
large collections of components. Such software requires a complex management of their dependencies to be
deployed successfully and safely. Therefore, all component dependencies, functional and extra-functional
one must be precisely and formally specified. In a previous work, we have proposed a formal language to
specify functional dependencies and a formal deployment framework to manage them. Based on this work,
we propose an extension with extra-functional dependencies specification and management for component
deployment. With this extension, it is possible to specify that a component provides or requires a service
with specific extra-functional properties (such as security level, version information, resource consumption
level, etc.). We present here how specifying extra-functional component dependencies and how managing
them to be able to ensure success and safety of component installation and deinstallation.
Keywords: Component-based software, Safe deployment, Extra-functional properties
1 Introduction
Component-Based Software Engineering (CBSE) [12] stresses the idea that a soft-
ware system is a composition of pre-existing and newly developed components. One
of the main contributions that CBSE has to this idea is the reuse of software com-
ponents to save out development effort. The component reuse leads to a complex
management of deployment dependencies [13]. Indeed, removing a shared compo-
nent may have an impact on components which depend on it. Therefore, to deploy
components we have to know explicitly all their functional and extra-functional de-
pendencies to be able to manage them safely. Dependencies represent the relations
between provided services and required one. Functional dependencies describe the
intended behaviours of components or system and extra-functional dependencies
include constraints on properties of components or system.
1 Email: m.belguidoum@gmail.com
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Functional issues of component-based software engineering have been well investi-
gated [5], [12], but very little research has been performed concerning non-functional
properties. Moreover, a formal verification of extra-functional dependencies for de-
ployment of component based system has not been really investigated.
In a previous work [2], we have proposed a component deployment framework
which verifies the dependency description using a set of inference rules to guarantee
the success and the safety of installation, deinstallation and upgrading [4] operations.
Our aim in this work is to extend the proposed framework to be able to verify
the success and the safety of software deployment with respect to extra-functional
properties. Therefore, in this paper, we propose an extension of our dependency
language to enable the specification of extra-functional properties in addition to the
usual functional one. With this extension, it is possible to specify that a component
provides or requires a service with specific extra-functional properties (such as secu-
rity level, version information, resource consumption level, . . . ). The properties are
used in the description of components, services and target system. This extension
requires:
(i) To be able to distinguish component instances. A component may be present
several times in the system with different extra-functional properties. For ex-
ample, depending on requirements, deploying an instance of a component with
good QoS or another with less resource consumption.
(ii) To be able to distinguish service instances in a component description. A
component may provide or require several times the same service with different
extra-functional properties. For instance, a component may provide the same
service with different properties : version, security level, language, etc.
(iii) To be able to determine if properties of an available component or an avail-
able service satisfy the corresponding constraints of the required component or
the required service. For example, the available component having version 3
satisfies the required component with the constraint: version greater than 2.
After this introduction, we present in section 2 the related work. In section 3,
we describe more precisely what properties are and how they are described in the
next section. Section 4 presents how the verification of extra-functional properties is
integrated using deployment rules (proposed in [2]) to ensure the safety of installation
and deinstallation operations. Finally, Section 5 concludes and discusses future work.
2 Related work
Several research using UML have been investigated to model extra-functional prop-
erties of software. Most important among these approaches is [7] in which a new
UML profile [9] is proposed in order to model extra-functional properties in models
based on the service component architecture specification. It shows how services
and extra-functional behaviors can be modeled and described in a loosely coupled
implementation environment by extending UML with profiles. Another interesting
approach proposed by Skene et al. [11]. They present SLAng a language for pre-
cisely specifying service-level agreements (SLAs) using the precise UML (pUML)
definition of the semantics of UML [6]. There, meta-models are used to specify
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both the syntax and the semantics of a modelling language. These approaches are
interesting, however, the properties formalisation remains very low.
Another language for modelling non-functional properties of component-based
systems is CQML (Component Quality Modelling Language) proposed in [1] it is
based on UML and OCL (Object Constraint Language) [10]. It is a rich lexical
language for QoS specification but it lacks formality and precise semantics. In [14] an
interesting formal specification of timeliness properties of a component-based system
is presented. It uses extended temporal logic of actions TLA+ [8] to describe the
system. This work is somewhat similar to our work in that it attempts to provide
a formal description of extra-functional properties. However, our aim is to verify
and prove the safety of component deployment using predicate logic which is more
simple and feasible comparing to TLA+ formalism.
Finally, we can quote OCL [10] the Object Constraint Language which is a formal
language used to describe expressions on UML models. It provides the power of first-
order predicate which is similar to our formalism. However, we prefer integrating
extra-functional properties in our dependency language which is already proposed
with its inference engine in our deployment framework [2] to be able to verify and
prove deployment success and safety.
3 Dependencies with properties
In this paper, we present a basic notion of property: it has a name and a type. The
type constrains the possible values that the property may be associated with. It also
constrains the available operations on the corresponding property. For example,
properties of number type offer comparison operations such as >, <, ≥, ≤ that
are not available on a string type, etc. Properties are introduced in our deployment
framework in the generic way by introducing them in our metamodel [3]. A deployed
entity may be a complete system (defined as a set of components), a component or
a service. In our dependency language we add in the provided side a list of property
generally denoted by E with their values [p1 = v1, . . . , pn = vn]. For example, a
service s with a property named version of value 1 is denoted by s[version = 1].
It is clear that when specifying a service (or a component) a property cannot be
bound twice to different values. A property constraint specifies the constraint that
the matching components or services must ensure. In the context of this paper,
constraints on number property type may use any usual comparison operator (>,
≥, <, ≤, =, 6=) and constraints on string property type may use only equality or
inequality.
Finally, a system is composed of components. A component provides (a com-
position of) services. Each provided services have a requirement which represents
a conditional expression involving other entities. The dependency language gram-
mar presented below defines more precisely which kind of composition is possible on
provided right side and on required left side (dependency = required → provided:
if requirements are satisfied then services are provided).
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3.1 Basic satisfiability
Our reasoning framework compares the requirement of component dependencies with
available services and components in the system. For instance, a required service
s constrained by [version ≥ 3] can be satisfied by an available service s which has
the property [version = 4]. For this, we define the notion of basic satisfiability of a
property E in a constraint ϕ and denotes it ϕ ← E (see definition 3.1). Intuitively,
this relation is verified if all the names of the constraints ϕ exist in the set of the
names of properties E . To define it more formally, we need to define the notion of
domain for properties and constraints. The domain is the set of property names
that appear in either a property or a constraint:
dom([]) = ∅, dom([p1O1v1, . . . , pnOnvn] = {p1} ∪ · · · ∪ {pn}
where O denote either a comparison operator (for constraints) or a binding op-
erator (for properties).
Definition 3.1 (Basic satisfiability) A property E is satisfied in a constraint
ϕ = [p1O1v1, . . . , pnOnvn] if and only if
(i) all the names of constraints are included in the set of the property names E :
dom(ϕ) ⊆ dom(E)
(ii) the constraint ϕ is true when substituting all properties by their values in E :
(E(p1)O1v1) ∧ · · · ∧ (E(pn)Onvn)
The satisfiability (ϕ← E) of a property of an entity x in the constraint of another
entity x′ is calculated as follows:
(x′, ϕ)← (x, E) = (x′ = x) ∧ (ϕ← E), where x and x′ are components or services.
3.2 Dependency specification
Dependency specification is represented as the composition of provided services that
require a composition of required services and components. Dependencies are com-
posed using three operators #, • and ?. Intuitively, these operators correspond
respectively to disjunction (one of the sub-requirements must be met), conjunc-
tion (the two sub-requirement must be met) and optional dependency (if the sub-
requirement is met, some services may be provided). Dependencies are described
in more details in [2], the formal description follows a grammar based on predicate
logic. In this paper, we extend this grammar by adding properties at the level of
the provided services and the constraints on the properties at the level of required
and forbidden components and services (see definition 3.2).
Definition 3.2 (Dependencies) The dependencies or intra-dependencies repre-
sent the relations between each provided service (which may have extra-functional
properties) of a component and its requirements (which may have constraints on
extra-functional properties). Dependencies are described using the predicate logic
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and are specified by the following grammar:
D ::= P ⇒ s E | D •D | D #D | ?D P ::= true | P ∧ P | Q
Q ::= Q ∨Q | ϕ | ¬c ϕ | ¬s ϕ | c ϕ .s ϕ | s ϕ E ::= | [v = value E ′]
E ′ ::= | , v = value E ′ ϕ ::= | [v O value ϕ′] ϕ′ ::=|, v O value ϕ′
O ::=> | ≥ | < | ≤ | = | 6=
The basic dependency P ⇒ s E correspond to a provided service s with proper-
ties E which has a requirement P . This requirement is expressed by a term called
a predicate (in conjunctive normal form). Predicates are composed by usual logical
operators (conjunction and disjunction). It represents: (1) constraints on the system
ϕ, (2) a forbidden component with its property constraints ¬c ϕ, (3) a forbidden
service with its property constraints ¬s ϕ, (4) a service provided by a specific com-
ponent with their property constraints c ϕ .s ϕ and (5) a service provided by any
component with its property constraints s ϕ. As it is explained earlier, properties
E represent the set of the corresponding values of properties (variable v, value),
constraints ϕ represent the set of the triplet (variable v, operator O, value). In this
paper, we consider variables as strings and values as string, number and boolean
types.
For example, we assume that the dependency description of the mail server
postfix is as follows:
([FreeDisk ≥ 1380] ∧ ¬csendmail ∧ slib[version > 1.2]⇒ sMTA[SecLevel = 2])
• ?(samavis ⇒ sAV [SecLevel = 2])
It means that the component postfix needs 1380kb of free disk space and a service
slib in a version greater than 1.2 and it conflicts with the component sendmail. When
these conditions are satisfied, it can be installed and it will provide the service sMTA
(for Mail Transfer Agent) with a security level equal to 2. It may also provide an
Anti virus service sAV having security level value equal to 2 if the service samavis is
available.
3.3 Context description
The description of a system is called a context. A context is composed of (1) its
environment denoted by E or ctx.E (contains the value of the system properties), (2)
the set of its components denoted C, (3) the dependency graph between these com-
ponents denoted ctx.G. The structure of (2) and (3) are complex and are described
in more detail below.
As a system may contain several instances of the same component, we need to
identify all these instances. For a component c, the instances are named (c, num)
where num is the instance number which is already installed in the system (see
definition 3.3).
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Definition 3.3 (CalcNum) The function CalcNum calculates the new compo-
nent instance as follows:
CalcNum(c, Ctx) = max({0} ∪ {n|(c, n, . . .) ∈ Ctx.C}) + 1
The set of installed components contain component information. It is represented
by C a set of six-tuples (c, num, Ec,Ps,Fs,Fc) storing for each installed instance of a
component c its number num, its properties Ec, its provided services Ps, its forbid-
den services Fs and its forbidden components Fc. Each provided service is stored
together with its environment (s, Es). Forbidden services and forbidden components
are stored with their associated constraints Fs (resp. Fc), they are denoted by
(s, ϕs) (resp. (c, ϕc)).
Finally, a dependency graph stores all dependencies between components of a
system. It can be viewed as a model of the interconnection between component of
the system.
Indeed, as components can provide several times the same service with different
properties, it is necessary to identify the services to distinguish them. In our model,
the service identifier, denoted by ids.
A node of the graph G represents the identifier of an available service (ids =
(idc, s, Es)), where idc = (c, num) represents the component identifier (the provider
of the service s) and Es represents its properties. An arc is a couple of nodes
ids1
x,ϕc,ϕs7−−−−−→ ids2, where x is the kind of dependency: M for mandatory or O for
optional, ids2 requires ids1 with the constraints ϕc and ϕs, ϕc are constraints on the
component which provides the service ids1 and ϕs are constraints on the required
service ids1.
Constraints must be stored in the graph to be able to ensure the safety of deploy-
ment operations that need to change the graph. For example, if a service s1 has the
security level (ls = 3) and it is used by another service s2 with a constraint on the
security level (ls > 2), let suppose that s1 must be substituted by another service
s3[ls = 2], s3 cannot replace s1 because the constraint of the service s2 (ls > 2) is
not satisfied by the property of s3. As the structure of the context is rather complex,
we define utility functions that calculate the set of available services (resp. compo-
nents) AS (resp. AC ) and forbidden services (resp. components) FS (resp. FC )
for a given context. 
AS(ctx) =
⋃{Ps | (. . . ,Ps, . . .) ∈ ctx.C}
AC (ctx) = {(c, num) | (c, num, . . .) ∈ ctx.C}
FS(ctx) =
⋃{Fs | (. . . ,Fs, . . .) ∈ ctx.C}
FC (ctx) =
⋃{Fc | (. . . ,Fc) ∈ ctx.C}
Ps is the set of service couples with their properties (s, Es) and Ctx.C represents
the elements (c, num, Ec,Ps,Fs,Fc) describing each component c with its identifier
num, all its properties Ec, all its services Ps, all its forbidden services Fs and all its
forbidden components Fc.
Adding properties in components and services and adding constraints on these
properties in requirements makes difficult the calculation of available and forbidden
components and services. The Forbidden function determines whether a provided
component or a service are forbidden in the context (see the definition 3.4). The
function Available determines whether a required component or a service required
are available in the context (see definition 3.5).
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Definition 3.4 (Forbidden) The Forbidden function checks whether the provided
component (c, Ec) respectively a provided service (s, Es) are not forbidden in the
context by verifying their Satisfiability (see definition 3.1) in the sets FC respectively
FS with the properties of the corresponding component respectively a service. It is
defined as follows:Forbidden(ctx, c, Ec) = ∃(c′, ϕc) ∈ FC(ctx) | (c′, ϕc)← (c, Ec)Forbidden(ctx, s, Es) = ∃(s′, ϕc) ∈ FS(ctx) | (s′, ϕs)← (s, Es)
Definition 3.5 (Available) The functionAvailable checks whether a required com-
ponent, a required service or a required service provided by a specific component are
available in the context. It verifies the satisfiability of available component in the
constraint of the required component. It verifies the satisfiability of available service
in the constraint of the required service and it verifies the satisfiability of available
service from a specific component in the constraint of the required service from a
specific component. It is defined as follows:
Available(ctx, c, ϕc) = ∃(c′, Ec) ∈ AC(ctx) | (c, ϕc)← (c′, Ec)
Available(ctx, s, ϕs) = ∃(s′, Es) ∈ AS(ctx) | (s, ϕs)← (s′, Es)
Available(ctx, c.s, ϕc, ϕs) =
∃(c′,−, Ec,Ps, . . .) ∈ ctx.C | (c, ϕc)← (c′, Ec) ∧ ∃(s′, Es) ∈ Ps | (s, ϕs)← (s′, Es)
Finally, when a service is available in a context, we have to know the set of
its identifier. The function CalcIdS is used for this purpose. As it is explained
in context description, the identifiers represent the graph nodes and we use them
to distinguish between the different instances of the same service (provided by the
same or different components).
Definition 3.6 (CalcIdS) The function CalcIdS calculates the identifiers of the
required services (provided by any component or a precise one) which are available in
the context. It is based on the satisfiability check, i.e., the verification of the required
service constraints with properties of available corresponding service properties. It
is defined as follows:
CalcIds(ctx, c.s, ϕc, ϕs) =
{(c, n, s, Es) | (c, n, Ec,Ps,−,−) ∈ ctx.C ∧ (s, Es) ∈ Ps ∧ (ϕc ← Ec) ∧ (ϕs ← Es)}
CalcIds(ctx, s, ϕs) =
{(c, n, s, Es) | (c, n, Ec,Ps,−,−) ∈ ctx.C ∧ (s, Es) ∈ Ps ∧ (ϕs ← Es)}
4 Deployment description
Once the basic notions of property, dependency and context are defined we can
present the rules that ensure that deployment operations are safe. In this section,
the discussion is centered on the installation and deinstallation operations.
4.1 Installation
The installation process is divided in two phases: a first step ensure component
installability (its requirements are satisfied and its provides services do not conflict
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Predicates:
PTrue: ctx `P true
PAnd:
C `P P1 ctx `P P2
ctx `P P1 ∧ P2
POrL:
ctx `P Q1
ctx `P Q1 ∨Q2
POrR:
ctx `P Q2
ctx `P Q1 ∨Q2
PVar:
ϕ← ctx.E
ctx `P ϕ
PNotS:
¬Available(ctx, s, ϕs)
ctx `P ¬ s ϕs
PNotC:
¬Available(ctx, c, ϕc)
ctx `P ¬ c ϕc
PServ:
Available(ctx, s, ϕs)
ctx `P s ϕs
PComp:
Available(ctx, c.s, ϕc, ϕs)
ctx `P c ϕc.s ϕs
Dependencies:
CTriv:
ctx `P P ¬Forbidden(ctx, s, Es)
ctx `C P ⇒ s Es
CAnd:
ctx `C D1 ctx `C D2
ctx `C D1 •D2
COpt: ctx `C ?D
COrL:
ctx `C D1
ctx `C D1 #D2
COrR:
ctx `C D2
ctx `C D1 #D2
Fig. 1. Installability rules
with the context) and a second step calculate the effect resulting from the installa-
tion.
4.1.1 Installability
Installability involves (1) ensuring that any required service is available in the context
(see definition 3.5), (2) ensuring that none of the components that will be installed
is forbidden and also that none of its provided services is forbidden (see definition
3.4). It is defined as follows:
Definition 4.1 (Installability) A component c with a dependency D and a set of
properties Ec is installable within a context ctx (ctx `C c : D, Ec) iff the component
with its corresponding properties is not forbidden and its dependency D is verified
by the checking rules of Fig. 1. The general installability rule is defined below:
CComp:
ctx `C D ¬Forbidden(ctx, c, Ec)
ctx ` c : D, Ec
The installability rules presented in Fig. 1 are similar to those proposed in [2].
The difference is in the verification of the availability of required components and
services using satisfiability relation.
Simple dependencies P ⇒ s Es are verified if the predicate P is true and s Es is
not forbidden (CTriv). The evaluation of a predicate P in the context ctx follows
propositional logic and is presented in the first part of the figure (rules denoted by
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GTrue: ctx, id `G true⇒ ∅
GAnd:
ctx, id `G P1 ⇒ G1 ctx, id `G P2 ⇒ G2
ctx, id `G P1 ∧ P2 ⇒ G1 ∪ G2
GOr:
ctx, id `G Q1 ⇒ G1 ctx, id `G Q2 ⇒ G2
ctx, id `G Q1 ∨Q2 ⇒ G1 ∪ G2 GVar: ctx, id `G ϕ⇒ ∅
GNotS: ctx, id `G ¬ s′ϕ⇒ ∅ GNotC: ctx, id `G ¬ c′ϕ⇒ ∅
GServC:
Available(ctx, c′.s′, ϕc, ϕs)
ctx, id `G c′ϕc.s′ϕs ⇒ {id′ M,ϕc,ϕs7−−−−−→ id | id′ ∈ CalcIds(ctx, c′.s′, ϕc, ϕs)}
GServ:
Available(ctx, s′, ϕs)
ctx, id `G s′ϕs ⇒ {id′ M,[],ϕs7−−−−→ id | id′ ∈ CalcIds(ctx, s′, ϕs)}
Fig. 2. Graph calculation rules
`P ). During installability, optional dependencies are ignored (COpt) because such
dependencies may be unavailable without preventing component installation. The
conjunction of dependencies is verified when the two dependencies are valid (CAnd),
the disjunction (D1 #D2) means if D1 then COrL else if D2 then COrR.
4.1.2 Installation
Once the component installability is checked using installability rules, the effect of
its installation in the target system must be calculated. This effect gathers the new
available services (with their properties), the new forbidden services and components
(with their constraints) and the new dependencies (as a dependency graph). Before
presenting the installation rules, we describe first some functions which calculate the
installation effect.
Definition 4.2 (Graph calculation) The dependency graph G is built as compo-
nents are deployed. For each component we compute the subgraph that corresponds
to it to build the global graph. The subgraph of a component c which provides
services having identifiers ids is calculated from each predicat P of its dependency
(ctx, ids `G P ⇒ G) by the rules presented in Fig. 2.
The difference between these rules and those presented in [2] is the use of service
identifier for as nodes and constraints of components and services as labels. The
rules GTrue, GAnd, GOr, GVar, GNotS, GNotC are exactly identical and consists in
the gathering process of new arcs. The two last rules are the only rules that add
new arcs. The rule GServC bind all potential providers of each required service to
the current provided service. The set of providers is calculated using the previously
defined CalcIds of the definition 3.6. Each new binding is labeled by (M, ϕc, ϕs),
meaning that the dependency is mandatory and the constraints imposed on the
required component and its service are ϕc and ϕs. The rule GServ is similar, but
links the service id with any component providing it.
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The second function necessary to calculate installation effect is CalcF that gath-
ers of all forbidden entities (services or components).
Definition 4.3 (CalcF) The function CalcF calculates the forbidden components
and the forbidden services using the condition of the dependency predicate. It
computes them as follows:
CalcF (true) = CalcF (s ϕ) = CalcF (c ϕ.s ϕ) = CalcF (ϕ) = ∅,∅
CalcF (P1 ∧ P2) = F1s ∪ F2s ,F1c ∪ F2c where CalcF (Pi) = F is,Fic
CalcF (Q1 ∨Q2) = F1s ∪ F2s ,F1c ∪ F2c where CalcF (Qi) = Fis,F ic
CalcF (¬ sϕ) =
{
{(s, ϕ)},∅ if ¬Available(ctx, s, ϕ)
∅,∅ else
CalcF (¬ cϕ) =
{
∅, {(c, ϕ)} if ¬Available(ctx, c, ϕ)
∅,∅ else
Definition 4.4 (Installation) The installation of a component c with a depen-
dency D in a context ctx adds: the new component instance (its number num) with
its provided services Ps, forbidden services Fs and forbidden components Fc and
the subgraph (G) (see rules in Fig. 3) into the context.
IComp:
ctx, c, num `I D ⇒ Ps,Fs,Fc,G num = CalcNum(c, ctx)
ctx `I c : D, Ec ⇒ (c, num, Ec,Ps,Fs,Fc),G
The main rule that calculates the effect of the installation is the rule ITriv.
The provided services represent the couples of services and their properties (s, Es).
The sets of forbidden services and forbidden components are calculated with the
function CalcF . The dependency graph is calculated using the rules of Fig. 2 which
are denoted by (`G) in the rule ITriv. The function Forbidden checks whether the
provided services with all their properties are not in conflict with the constraints of
the context.
4.1.3 An installation example
We assume that the component POSTFIX (denoted by CPX) provides the service
SMTA with the property version equals to (v = 3) if a set of requirements are
fulfilled. These requirements are: Free Disk Space (FDS ≥ 1380), the component
SENDMAIL (CSM ) having a version greater or equal to 2 (v ≥ 2) is forbidden, the
library Slib with a version greater or equal to 3 is required (v ≥ 3). The description
of POSTFIX dependency is as follows: D1 •D2 :{
D1 = [FDS ≥ 1380] ∧ CSM [v ≥ 2] ∧ Slib [v ≥ 3]⇒ SMTA [v = 3]
D2 =?(CA [v ≥ 3, NS ≥ 2].Samavis [NS ≥ 3]⇒ SAV [NS = 4])
Let's have the following initial context with environment properties E and a set
of components C{
E = {FDS = 500000, OS = LINUX,RAM = 128};
C = {(C1, 1, [], (Slib [v = 3]),∅,∅), (CA, 1, [v = 4, NS = 3], (Samavis [NS = 3]),∅,∅)};
The installability proof
The installability proof is demonstrated using the installability rules of the Fig. 1.
It is as follows:
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ITriv:
ctx, ids `G P ⇒ G ¬Forbidden(s, Es) CalcF (P ) = Fs,Fc
ctx, id `I (P ⇒ s, Es)⇒ {s, Es},Fs,Fc,G
INot1:
ctx `P ¬P
ctx, id `I (P ⇒ s, Es)⇒ ⊥
INot2:
Forbidden(s, Es)
ctx, id `I (P ⇒ s, Es)⇒ ⊥
IOpt1:
ctx, id `I D ⇒ ⊥
ctx, id `I ?D ⇒ ∅,∅,∅,∅
IOpt2:
ctx, id `I D ⇒ Ps,Fs,Fc,G
ctx, id `I ?D ⇒ Ps,Fs,Fc, {s O,ϕc,ϕs7−−−−−→ s′ | s −,ϕc,ϕs7−−−−−→ s′ ∈ G}
IAnd1:
ctx, id `I D1 ⇒ ⊥
ctx, id `I D1 •D2 ⇒ ⊥
IAnd2:
ctx, id `I D2 ⇒ ⊥
ctx, id `I D1 •D2 ⇒ ⊥
IAnd3:
ctx, id `I D1 ⇒ P1s ,F1s ,F1c ,G1 ctx, id `I D2 ⇒ P2s ,F2s ,F2c ,G2
ctx, id `I D1 •D2 ⇒ P1s ∪ P2s ,F1s ∪ F2s ,F1c ∪ F2c ,G1 ∪ G2
IOrL:
ctx, id `I D1 ⇒ Ps,Fs,Fc,G
ctx, id `I D1 #D2 ⇒ Ps,Fc,Fs,G
IOrR:
ctx, id `I D1 ⇒ ⊥ ctx, id `I D2 ⇒ Ps,Fs,Fc,G
ctx, id `I D1 #D2 ⇒ Ps,Fs,Fc,G
Fig. 3. Installation rules
CComp
CAnd
A
Ctx `C D1
?(CA [v ≥ 3, NS ≥ 2].Samavis [NS ≥ 3]⇒ SAV [NS = 4])
Ctx `C D1 • D2 ¬Forbidden(Ctx,CPX , [])
Ctx ` CPX : D1 • D2
A = CTriv
B
Ctx `P [FDS ≥ 1380] ∧ ¬CSM [v ≥ 2] ∧ Slib [v ≥ 3]
¬Forbidden(Ctx, SMTA, [v = 3])
Ctx `C [FDS ≥ 1380] ∧ ¬CSM [v ≥ 2] ∧ Slib [v ≥ 3]⇒ SMTA [v = 3]
B = PTriv
PVar
500000 ≥ 1380
Ctx `P FDS ≥ 1380
PNotC
¬Available(Ctx,CSM , [v ≥ 2])
Ctx `P ¬CSM [v ≥ 2]
PServ
Available(Ctx, Slib, [v ≥ 3])
Ctx `P Slib [v ≥ 3]
Ctx `P [FDS ≥ 1380] ∧ ¬CSM [v ≥ 2] ∧ Slib [v ≥ 3]
The installation proof
Once POSTFIX is installable, we compute the installation effect using installation
rules of Fig. 3. The context will be updated with new provided services, new for-
bidden components, new forbidden services and the new dependency subgraph. D1
respectively D2 are demonstrated by the set of inference rules denoted respectively
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by A' and B.
IComp
IAnd3
A'
Ctx,CPX , 1 `I D1 ⇒ P1s ,F1s ,F1c ,G1
B
Ctx,CPX , 1 `I D2 ⇒ P2s ,F2s ,F2c ,G2
Ctx,CPX , 1 `I D1 •D2 ⇒ P1s ∪ P2s ,F1s ∪ F2s ,F1c ∪ F2c ,G1 ∪ G2 1 = CalcNum(CPX , Ctx)
Ctx `C CPX : D1 •D2 ⇒ (CPX , 1,P1s ∪ P2s ,F1s ∪ F2s ,F1c ∪ F2c ),G1 ∪ G2
A'=ITriv
GAnd
GServ
Available(Ctx, Slib, [v ≥ 3])
Ctx,CPX , 1, SMTA, [v = 3] `G Slib [v ≥ 3]⇒ G1 Ctx,CPX , 1, SMTA, [v = 3] `G CSM [v ≥ 2]⇒ ∅
Ctx,CPX , 1, SMTA, [v = 3] `G [FDS ≥ 1380]⇒ ∅
Ctx,CPX , 1, SMTA, [v = 3] `G P ⇒ G1
Forbidden(Ctx, SMTA, [v = 3]) CalcF (P ) = ∅, {(CSM , [v ≥ 2])}
Ctx,CPX , 1 `I (P ⇒ SMTA, [v = 3])⇒ {(SMTA, [v = 3])},∅, {(CSM , [v ≥ 2])},G1
B=IOpt2
ITriv
GServ
Available(Ctx, Samavis, [NS ≥ 3])
Ctx,CPX , 1, SAV , [NS = 4] `G Samavis [NS ≥ 3]⇒ G2¬Forbidden(Ctx, SAV , [NS = 4]) CalcF (CA [v ≥ 3, NS ≥ 2].Samavis [NS ≥ 3]) = ∅,∅
Ctx,CPX `I (CA [v ≥ 3, NS ≥ 2].Samavis [NS ≥ 3]⇒ SAV .[NS = 4])⇒ {(SAV , [NS = 4])},∅,∅,G2
Ctx,CPX `I ?(CA [v ≥ 3, NS ≥ 2].Samavis [NS ≥ 3]⇒ SAV .[NS = 4])⇒ {(SAV , [NS = 4])},∅,∅,G2

P1s ,F1s ,F1c = {(SMTA, [v = 3])}, {}, {(CSM , [v ≥ 2])}
G1 = {(C1, 1, lib [v = 3]) M,[],[v≥3]7−−−−−−−→ (PX, 1, SMTA [v = 3]}
P2s ,F2s ,F2c = {SAV [NS = 4]}, {}, {}
G2 = {CA [v = 4, NS = 3], 1, Samavis [NS = 3] O,[v≥3,NS≥2],[NS≥3]7−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ PX, 1, SAV [NS = 4]}
After the installation of POSTFIX, the context is updated. The resulting depen-
dency graph represents the union of G1 and G2 presented above. The component
POSTFIX (CPX ,1,[],Ps,Fc,Fs) is added to the set of components:
C = {(C1, 1, [], (Slib [v = 3]),∅,∅), (CA, 1, [v = 4, NS = 3], (Samavis [NS = 3]),∅,∅),
(CPX , 1, [], {(SMTA [v = 3]), (SAV , [NS = 4])}, (SSM [v ≥ 2]),∅)}
Notice that any component SENDMAIL (SSM ) having a version greater or equal to 2
(v ≥ 2) is forbidden otherwise (if v < 2) the component SSM is not forbidden.
4.2 Deinstallation
The deinstallation follows the same approach as installation. The first phase checks
the feasibility of deinstallation, and the second phase calculates the effect of dein-
stallation on the context.
4.2.1 Deinstallability
The principle of verification is exactly the same as presented in [2]. The difference lies
in the dependency syntax and management of components and services identifiers
(instances). Indeed, we can remove an instance of a component (c, num) if none of
its instances of provided services ids is used necessarily by other components directly
on indirectly (see definition 4.5).
Definition 4.5 (Mandatory dependencies (MD)) The set of mandatory depen-
dencies (MD) of a service ids in a dependency graph G is the set of nodes that have
a mandatory dependencies and belong to all graph paths from ids to the leaves:
MD(G, ids) =
⋃
{{ids′} ∪MD(G, ids′) | ids (M,−,−)7−−−−−→ ids′ ∈ G}
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Definition 4.6 (Optional dependencies (OD)) The set of optional dependencies
(OD) of a service ids in a dependency graph G is the set of nodes that have optional
dependencies and belong to all graph paths from ids to the leaves:
OD(G, ids) =
⋃
{{ids′} ∪OD(G, ids′) | ids (O,−,−)7−−−−−→ ids′ ∈ G}
Definition 4.7 (Deinstallability) A component (c, num) can be deinstalled from
the context ctx iff all the instances of its provided services are not used by other
components in a mandatory way, i.e. there is no mandatory dependency in all paths
from all these provided serviced to the graph leaves. It is checked using the following
rule:
Check-DI:
(c, num, Ec,Ps,−,−) ∈ ctx.C
⋃
{MD(G, (c, num, s, Es)) | (s, Es) ∈ Ps} = ∅
ctx `D (c, num)
4.2.2 Deinstallation
The structure of the context containing all instances separately makes it possible
to deinstall an instance only by removing the corresponding tuple from C. There-
fore, the deinstallation effect is a set of nodes that have to be removed from the
dependency graph and is calculated in the same way as in [2]. The difference lies in
the management of component and service identifiers. The nodes that have to be
removed are those corresponding to the nodes of provided services of corresponding
component and those that are used directly or indirectly in an optional way (see
definition 4.6) and do not use any other service.
Definition 4.8 (Deinstallation) The deinstallation rule calculates the set of nodes
that have to be removed from the graph with their corresponding arcs. The removed
nodes are those provided by the component (c, num) and those which have only op-
tional arcs in each path from them to graph leaves and are not tails of any arc. The
calculation of removing nodes follows this rule:
Effet-DI:
(c, num, Ec,Ps,−,−) ∈ ctx.C
ctx `E (c, num)⇒
⋃
(s,Es)∈Ps
({(s, Es)} ∪ {ids′ ∈ OD(ctx.G, (c, num, s, Es)) | @n, n −7−−→ ids′ ∈ ctx.G})
After deinstallation, the component tuple is removed from ctx.C and the set N
is removed from the dependency graph:
G \N = {n1 x7−→ n2 | n1 x7−→ n2 ∈ G ∧ n1 /∈ N ∧ n2 /∈ N} where N is the set of nodes
calculated by the rule Effet-DI (ctx `E c⇒ N).
4.2.3 A deinstallation example
An example of dependencies of a component assembly is illustrated in Fig. 4. This
assembly is composed of the components INTERNET, SECURITY and UPDATE which
are represented in boxes. The intra-dependencies are inside the boxes, the required
services are represented in the left side of each box and the provided one are in
the right side. Dependencies can be necessary or optional (represented by dotted
line). To update applications the component UPDATE needs (1) a transfer function
(transfer), (2) a service web with the version and language constraints: [v ≥ 3, lg =
Fr] which is provided by the component INTERNET and must satisfy the constraints
[type = ADSL2+, download ≥ 8Mb/s] and (3) may uses a hash function (sha256)
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provided by SECURITY. When all these requirements are fulfilled the component
UPDATE provides the service update with the security level and language properties
[sl = 4, lg = Fr]. Its provides also the optional service ihm with a graphical user
interface [gui = graph] which depend on the service pluginihm. Fig. 5 shows the
dependency graph of this component assembly including the gray part.
INTERNET.[type = ADSL2+, download ≥ 8].web[v ≥ 3, lg = Fr]
transfer
sha256
pluginihm
update[sl = 4, lg = Fr]
ihm[gui = graph]
UPDATE
dns
tcp-ip
web[v = 3, lg = fr]
INTERNET
INTERNET[download ≥ 3].web[v ≥ 2]
hash
sha256[sl = 3]
SECURITY
Fig. 4. Example of a component for the UPDATE
Let's verify the deinstallation of the component SECURITY with its services (see
Fig. 4 and Fig. 5). The service SECURITY.sha256 provided by the component
SECURITY is optional for the component UPDATE. The set of mandatory dependen-
cies (MD) of the service provided by the component SECURITY is empty. There-
fore, this component is deinstallable. The nodes which are removed from the
graph are calculated by the rule Effect-DI. Indeed, the service UPDATE.update which
is part of the optional dependency of the service SECURITY.sha256 has two re-
quirements INTERNET[ϕ].web[ϕ] and C4.transfet, it represents the tail of two arcs.
Therefore, the component UPDATE can not be deinstalled. The removed service is
SECURITY.sha256. The resultant graph is represented in Fig. 5.
C1.tcp-ip
C2.dns
INTERNET.web
(M, ϕC1 = φ, ϕtcp−ip = φ)
(M, ϕC2 = φ, ϕdns = φ)
C3.hash SECURITY.sha256
(M, ϕINTERNET = [download ≥ 3], ϕweb = [v ≥ 2])
C4.transfer
UPDATE.update
C5.pluginihm UPDATE.ihm
(M, ϕC4 = φ, ϕtransfer = φ)
(M, ϕINTERNET = [Type = ADSL2+, download ≥ 8], ϕweb = [v ≥ 3, lg = Fr])
(O, ϕC5 = φ, ϕpluginihm = φ)
Fig. 5. The dependency graph after the deinstallation of the component SECURITY
5 Conclusion and Future work
In this paper, we have presented an extension of the deployment formalisation which
is described in [2]. This extension concerns the integration of extra-functional prop-
erties in the deployment reasoning engine. Therefore, the description of depen-
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dencies, the description of the context and the description of deployment rules are
extended by properties and constraints on them. Thus, in the requirement side of
dependencies we express the components and the services constraints and in the pro-
vided side of the dependencies we add properties of both services and components.
This extension is not limited to the component and service names, its advantage
is to be able to manage different instances of the same component and the same
service according to their properties and depending on requirements and needs.
Therefore, we will identify services and components by their instances and not by
their names. Consequently, the verification of installation deinstallation is based
on instance satisfiability and not only name comparison. For that, deployment
rules presented in [2] are extended to take into account the verification of extra-
functional properties. The integration of extra-functional properties in substitution
phase presented in [4] will be treated in another paper.
Finally, we plan to deal with deployment policies which are often associated
with extra-functional properties. These policies are used to control and personalise
deployment. For this reason, we have to formalise policies with their associated rules
for each deployment phase to improve deployment quality while maintaining safety.
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